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This thesis is a collection of four empirical essays. The essays are linked by their concern 
with a particular topic in the financing of smaller businesses – viz. small firms and their 
banks. The first essay discusses the pricing of the bank loan for growing SMEs. The second 
essay examines the role of financial advice to small firms in alleviating credit constraints. 
The third essay explores patterns of SMEs’ discouragement towards borrowing in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The final empirical essay introduces a novel concept 
(“informal turndown”) designed to further illuminate contemporary discussions of 
discouraged borrowing amongst SMEs and empirically compares the profile of firms who 
discouragement stems from informal talks with their banks with those that feared rejection. 
These empirical essays draw on two UK datasets: UK survey of SME Finance (2007) and 
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Essays on Entrepreneurial Finance: Small firms and their banks 
 
Introduction 
In an efficient capital market, when both demand and supply sides are well informed and 
with the help of price adjustment mechanisms, good projects are funded and adverse 
selection doesn’t exist (Parker, 2002; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Storey, 2003). Rarely, 
though, do these conditions prevail, especially for smaller firms. For financial institutions, 
financing SMEs entails more risk and greater costs compared to financing large firms. 
SMEs higher rate of failure (Bates and Nucci, 1989), lack of credit history, lack of audited 
financial statement (Binks and Ennew, 1997), and proportionately high costs of due 
diligence (Riding et al., 2012b) all serve to undermine ‘informedness’ and introduce the 
prospect of adverse selection. Higher information asymmetry may lead to credit rationing 
or to the over-supply of credit (de Meza, 2002; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). If some good 
projects are not funded because lenders fail to establish a price that justifies the estimated 
(perceived and actual) risk, credit-rationing occurs and there is a “funding gap” (Cressy, 
2002; Parker, 2002).  
Growing small firms require financial capital to invest in working and human capital and 
explore new opportunities (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). 
When access to external sources of capital is restricted, entrepreneurs  are constrained to 
rely on internal sources that, in turn, may retard the rate of the growth (Casson, 2003; 
Rahaman, 2011). The importance of access to bank facilities in the development of small 
firms lies at the significance of debt as the most used external source of financing (Robb 
and Robinson, 2014). Entrepreneurs, after exhausting internal sources, would prefer debt 
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over equity financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984) to retain control and ownership over their 
firms and enjoy lower costs of due diligence (Berger and Udell, 2003).  
Financial institutions employ different verification techniques and design detailed contract 
to ease SMEs’ access to debt financing (Berger and Udell, 2006, 2003). Banks gather hard 
and soft information on their customers based on their financial statements, years of 
personal relationships, and credit risk ratings acquired from third parties. If they decide to 
lend to a customer, contracts are tailored according to the level of perceived riskiness by 
asking for collateral and personal guarantees, designing covenants, varying maturity terms, 
or offering menu pricing - or a combination of these(Berger and Udell, 2006, 2003; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Given the use of these varied techniques and contracts, 
empirical studies (largely in the UK and the US) typically find limited evidence of credit 
rationing in general and over the long term (Vos et al., 2007). However, some (sometimes 
perceived) financial constraints have been identified among specific groups of SMEs, such 
as innovative firms (Colombo and Grilli, 2007; Freel, 2007; Lee, 2014; Riding et al., 
2012a), and ethnic minorities (Mitchell and Pearce, 2011; Park and Coleman, 2009). These 
studies investigate, inter alia, the effects of banking structure, firm demographics, and the 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics on the SME’s access to the banks. 
Beyond simple “access” issues, there are other facets of the SME-bank relationship that 
bear upon the nature and quality of access per se. These include such items as the terms 
and conditions of loans (Drakos, 2013; Grunert and Norden, 2012), the benefits of soft and 
hard supports in mitigating credit constraint for SMEs (Riding and Haines Jr., 2001; Wren 
and Storey, 2002), and the cost of capital (Dietrich, 2012; Howorth and Moro, 2012; Nitani 
and Riding, 2013; Vander Bauwhede et al., 2015). Moreover, illuminating “how” small 
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firms obtain bank loans is important in understanding the credit constraints faced or 
reported by entrepreneurs. Two essays in this thesis fall into this stream of research by 
investigating 1) the relationship between firms’ growth and the price of bank loans, and 2) 
the effect of financial advice on entrepreneurs’ access to bank facilities. 
 However, an important element of the SME-bank credit landscape is not captured by most 
studies of access to external financing – viz. discouraged borrowers. Kon and Storey’s 
(2003) theoretical model of discouraged borrowers opened a relatively new stream of 
research (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Chandler, 2010; Cowling et al., 2016; Ferrando 
and Mulier, 2015; Freel et al., 2012; Xiang et al., 2015) by including those who need credit 
but ‘fear of rejection’ stops them from acting upon their need (Kon and Storey, 2003). 
Although discouragement does not connote credit rationing when a potential “good” 
applicant refrains from submitting a formal application, the implications are the same: a 
good project is not funded. Two essays in this thesis fall into this stream of research by 
investigating: 1) trends in SME discouragement in the UK in the aftermath of a credit shock 
of 2008, and 2) the means of discouragement by examining the role of banks in 
discouraging potential borrowers. These essays aim to add to our knowledge of credit 
constraints from the demand perspective. 
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief description of each of the essays that 
comprise the thesis, a short description of the data used and methodologies employed (with 
reflection upon the methodological choices made and the compromises that these entailed, 




Summary of essays 
The cost of growth: small firms and the pricing of bank loans 
Rostamkalaei, A. and Freel, M., 2016. The cost of growth: small firms and the pricing of 
bank loans. Small Business Economics, 46(2), pp.255-272. 
Presented at the International Council for Small Business Conference(ICSB), Dublin, June 
2014 
This essay employs the 2007 UK survey of SME Finance (Cosh et al., 2008) to examine 
the relationship between growth and the price of the loan. Growing firms are more likely 
to have constrained access to bank finance (Freel, 2007; Riding et al., 2012a), but the 
majority, despite their riskiness, have their loan applications approved when they ask for 
credit (Vos et al., 2007). One of the barriers to the growth, it is argued, might be the price 
they pay to have their requests approved. The essay hypothesizes that growing firms 
(measured by both past growth and growth intention) are more likely to pay more for 
external finance. Moreover, the essay anticipates that the riskiness of the growth mode is 
also reflected in the price. After controlling for sample selection bias with Heckman’s 
(1979) two-stage, the results show that firms that experienced growth in the past three years 
and those who experienced growth and still plan to grow substantially in the future are more 
likely to contract at a higher interest rate on their bank loans. Although firms that intend to 
grow are not more likely to pay a higher price, firms that intend to grow by introducing a 
new product to the market face higher probability of more expensive debt. While the banks 
are not risk-funders, growing firms mainly finance their activities through the banks. Their 
riskiness is translated into higher risk premium paid to banks.  
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The manuscript was submitted to Small Business Economics and received two rounds of 
revisions prior to its acceptance.  
 Business advice and lending in small firms 
Rostamkalaei, A. and Freel, M., 2017. Business advice and lending in small firms. 
Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 35(3), pp. 537-555. 
Presented at the Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship Conference(ISBE), 
Glasgow, November2015 
Drawing upon data from the UK SME Finance Monitor(2011-2014), this essay focuses on 
the role of business advisors in preparing entrepreneurs for making financial decisions. This 
work argues that an important step towards a successful request of external finance is the 
entrepreneur’s knowledge in realizing the appropriate time and the process of making a 
formal application. It speculates that entrepreneur’s characteristics and credit need affect 
the likelihood of seeking for advice and using advice. The essay reasons that some 
entrepreneurs are more diligent in realizing the incrementality of business advice and ask 
for finance specific support when they decide to apply for finance. Also entrepreneurs with 
high risk businesses are more likely to search for additional information and financial 
advice. The second part of the essay argues that advice-seeker entrepreneurs are more likely 
to analyze and consider (or discard) the advice appropriately. Accordingly, they face a 
higher probability of successful bank application. Financial specific advice reduces the risk 
of adverse outcomes for credit applications.  
The analyses show that more diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to seek advice prior 
formal application; however, their chance of successful application does not change by 
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advice-seeking. Moreover, innovative firms are more likely to seek finance related advice 
for a loan application. Advice offered in their case increases the likelihood of an approved 
application. The findings show that there is a merit in attending to demand-side intervention 
by promoting business support services to help SMEs with ameliorating subjective 
riskiness and reducing information asymmetry.  
The manuscript was submitted to Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space and 
was accepted for publication after one round of revision.  
 Discouraged borrowers aftermath of financial crisis: a UK study 
Rostamkalaei, A., 2017. Discouraged borrowers aftermath of financial crisis: a UK study. 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 24(2), pp.394-410. 
This essay looks at the pattern of discouraged borrowers among UK small businesses 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Previous studies show that the rate of discouragement 
in the UK market increased after 2008 with a lag from the onset of the crisis (Cowling et 
al., 2016). This essay argues that the effect of the credit squeeze and the boost in loan 
application turndown had a prolonged effect among entrepreneurs. To test this effect, data 
from UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2016) was used. Two datasets were combined and 
the sample weights were adjusted. The analyses show that while the rate of loan application 
turndown is not significantly different in the years following the crisis, a significant 
decrease in the rate of discouragement starts in 2013 (comparing to 2010). It seems it takes 
time for entrepreneurs to adjust their subjective fear of rejection. Given that discouraged 
borrowers in this sample have a mixed set of high and low-risk profiles, some entrepreneurs 
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self-ration themselves adversely. This essay tries to shed light on the hidden demand for 
credit and review one of the aspects of the prolonged effect of a financial crisis on SMEs.  
The manuscript was initially submitted to Internal Small Business Journal and had been 
rejected after one round of review. After some modifications, the manuscript was submitted 
to Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development and was accepted after one round 
of review.  
  Borrower Discouragement: The role of Informal Turndowns 
Rostamkalaei, A. Riding, A.  and Nitani, M. 2017. Borrower Discouragement: The role of 
Informal Turndowns. Working paper. 
Presented at the 2nd Entrepreneurial Finance Conference, Ghent, July 2017 
The essay taps into the notion of “Informal Turndown” by Wynant and Hatch (1991): 
Banks’ mechanism of deterring a potential borrower from credit market by a verbal 
rejection during an informal inquiry about credit availability. Informal turndowns could 
lead to discouragement. However, the fear of rejection, in this case, is accurate. There are 
a variety of reasons that may deter an entrepreneur from approaching credit market 
(Chandler, 2010), yet, our knowledge of the mechanism through which an entrepreneur is 
informed about the likelihood of a rejection is low. This essay tries to fill this gap.  
For many firms, the lending process starts with an informal inquiry about the availability 
of the credit and then follows through a formal application. With entrepreneurs seeking to 
finance growth and survival of their firms and avoid potential rejection, and with lenders 
under pressure to maximize profits, it therefore makes sense that informal discussions 
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would be employed to reduce information asymmetry on both sides of the transaction.  The 
paper seeks to understand the means of discouragement and to do so, the main focus is on 
the informal turndown and discouragement due to subjective fear of rejection. It is expected 
that comparing to non-applicants who fear rejection, business owners who experienced 
informal turndown would be larger and older firms and have better relationship with their 
banks. The owners of smaller and younger firms, or those who do not have a good 
relationship with their banks, are more likely to ponder over their application based on their 
own judgement and fear of rejection. In addition, entrepreneurs who seek for finance 
rigorously are more likely to initiate an informal inquiry and then deter their applications.  
Drawing upon data from UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2015), the analyses find that 
more established firms are more likely to refer to their banks and defer formal applications 
following an informal turndown rather than to be discouraged by their own judgement. We 
explain this effect through the length of banking relationship. Unexpectedly, firms who 
have a satisfying relationship with their banks are more likely to be discouraged by their 
own fear rather than being told by their banks. It is possible that entrepreneurs with 
satisfactory relationship with their banks, see themselves in a better position to judge their 
credit worthiness and the credit availability at their banks and do not initiate an informal 
process. Also, entrepreneurs who need credit to a greater extent are more likely to seek 
their banks’ opinions and then defer their applications.  
The main limitation of this research is that the data do not reveal which applicants applied 
for a bank loan as a result of an informal talk with bank. Nor do we know the outcomes of 




This essay is currently not published.  
Surveys 
This thesis employs two similar surveys on UK small business financing practices. These 
two surveys (UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2016) and UK Survey of SME finance 
(2007)) are parts of similar questionnaires surveyed over the years from 2004 by different 
survey conductors (BDRC Continental, 2017; Cosh et al., 2008; Fraser, 2013, 2009, 2006). 
Datasets are deposited in and accessible via https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/. The UK 
SME Finance Monitor is still an ongoing project and I have tried to use the most recent 
version when working on each project. Ideally, I would like to use UK SME Finance 
Monitor (2011-2016) for all the analyses, however, the omission of some questions (such 
as interest rate) necessitated using the earlier survey.  
 UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2016): 
This survey is being conducted quarterly by BDRC Continental. The survey combined the 
first and second quarter of 2011 with 5000 observations and after that, around 5000 
observations are added quarterly.  
The initial sample is provided by Experian and Dun & Bradstreet. All waves are conducted 
with the same quota profile. Sampling quotas were first assigned by the size of the business 
(measured by the number of employees except for the owner) and then sector and regions 
within each size group. This structure is used to calculate sample weights. Then a 20% 
share for start-ups is considered to adjust the sample weights.  
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The highlights of each quarter and the annual reports, as well as special reports, are publicly 
published by survey conductor at http://bdrc-continental.com/products/sme-finance-
monitor/ 
The survey, initiated in 2010 by Business Finance Taskforce and British Bankers’ 
Association, set up phone interviews with small business owners or managers to understand 
their perceptions of finance and business environment. Most of the questions are about the 
SMEs’ experiences with using bank facilities especially bank loan and overdraft.  
The first section of the survey checks the eligibility of the business to make sure it meets 
the selection criteria: having less than 250 employees, annual turnover less than £25 m., 
non- governmental, not a social enterprise, a for-profit organization, not owned by another 
company (more than 50% of share). The respondents of the survey are people responsible 
for the financial decision making (mainly owners or managers). Demographic information 
of the firm such as sector and legal status are double-checked in this section.  
The second section of the questionnaire identifies which firm, in the past 12 months of the 
survey, was using, applied for, or have changed the status of the bank facilities. Depending 
on the answers, the respondents were asked questions about: the status of their facilities, 
the outcome of their applications, the issues with their banks throughout the process, advice 
sought before making applications, and decisions made after being notified about the results 
of applications. Initial questionnaires had data on the price of bank facilities which were 
dropped in the later waves. The survey asks from non-applicants whether they needed credit 
during the past 12 months and if they confirmed that they needed credit, it furthers the 
question by inquiring about the reasons why the firm did not apply for credit.   
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The next section asked how the respondents evaluate their relationships with their banks, 
choosing from a 5-item Likert scale from very satisfied to not at all satisfied. The data does 
not capture the length of the relationship with the main bank; a variable that is usually used 
to control for the effect of relational lending. To alleviate this problem, some other variables 
are added to the models hoping that it partially captures the effect of relational lending such 
as the level of satisfaction, use of other sources of finance with the bank, working with the 
main bank, and experience with bank application in the past. The survey also asks whether 
the respondents are considering a new source of external financing in near future, what 
source and for what purpose. There are short questions that measure the owner’s knowledge 
of other sources of financing such as venture capitalists and business support services.  
The last section has questions about the firm's’ growth history and growth intention, 
profitability and the sale in the past 12 months. It also collects information about the owner 
or principal owner in case of partnerships: gender, age, the level of education. Ethnicity is 
captured in the data but due to a high rate of missing values are not considered in the 
analyses.  
Sample providers inserted data on credit risk rating. The classification of the risk rating is 
different between Experian and Dun & Bradstreet. The classification of the risk rating is 
more elaborated in Experian than that of Dun & Bradstreet. Therefore, the Experian scale 
has been matched with Dun & Bradstreet (BDRC Continental, 2015a). Overall, 15% of the 
observations, mainly smaller firms, do not have risk ratings, therefore, the analyses are 
presented with and without the risk rating for comparison.  
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 UK Survey of SME Finance (2007) 
This survey stands with two similar surveys conducted in 2004 and 2008. The 2007 survey, 
with 2514 observations, consists of information on UK private SMEs with less than 250 
employees (Cosh et al 2008). All selection criteria are similar to those of UK SME Finance 
Monitor (2011-2016). The data was collected by Continental Research with telephone 
interviews. The sample was provided by Dun & Bradstreet. Additional data on start-ups 
was acquired from Experian. The response rate is 10%. Unweighted results are biased 
towards larger firms. Unlike the UK SME Finance Monitor, this survey captures the interest 
rate paid on the most current loan. Also, the length of the relationship with the main bank 
is measured with a categorical variable.  
 Methods  
The details of the methodology, techniques, and definitions are explained in the essays. 
However, some extra explanations which are not reflected elsewhere are discussed below. 
Definitions: 
The definitions of some variables are slightly different from the survey conductors. For 
example, BDRC Continental (2015) defines the discouragement as a situation when a SME 
does not “apply to borrow because it had been put off directly […] or indirectly…”(pp. 22). 
However, in the essays presented in this thesis, discouragement is considered when an 
entrepreneur does not apply for a loan, despite the need, mainly because of a subjective fear 
of rejection. This is a narrower definition. In addition, discouragement because of the costs 
of borrowing is considered in alternative definitions for robustness checks. These 
definitions are still different from Kon and Storey’s (2003) definition of discouraged 
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borrowers because I am unable to use quality of the non-applicants. However, it is 
consistent with previous studies of discouraged borrowers. 
Some definitions in the available dataset were not flexible. For example, both datasets did 
not report the precise values of interest rate, sales, the length of banking relationship, or the 
size of the loans. Instead, only categorical values are available to the public. This affected 
the definition of the variables. All the variables are either binary or categorical. To have 
balanced number of observations in each item of categorical variables, some items are 
combined. For example, the survey differentiates between firms with between 50 to 100 
and 100 to 249 employees. However, to have a balanced set of observations across each 
category, the last two categories are combined to have firms with more than 50 employees.  
The location of the firms is captured with 12 regions of Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics (NUTS1). A firm’s location is controlled in all the models to capture the 
potential effect of business and banking environments. However, since the focus of the 
analyses were not on difference across different locations, NUTS1 had not been fully used 
in the models. Instead, a categorical variable is used to measure whether a firm is in 
London, South East, or the rest of the UK. The justification for such a change is that London 
and South East of the UK have the highest figures in Gross Value added and Gross 
Domestic Product in the UK (Harari, 2016). 
 Techniques: 
 Weighted analysis: 
Both surveys used in this thesis are stratified into size (number of employees), sector, and 
location. After conducting the interviews and considering the non-respondents, it became 
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apparent that larger firms are overrepresented in the sample. Survey conductors calculated 
the sample weights. The analyses use weighted methods in three out of four empirical 
essays. In the first essay, the over-representation had been addressed as a limitation of the 
study. (After the paper had been published, I attempted to replicate the analysis employing 
sample weights. The results are substantially the same.) 
For the two essays that used more than 10 waves of the surveys in the analyses, it was 
necessary to adjust the sample weights after combining unique waves. The first way to do 
this was to assume the quota of SMEs within sector, size, and regions stay the same over 
the years. This assumption seems reasonable because similar figures are reported by the 
survey conductor over the years. Then, it is assumed that the risk of cross-sampling is low. 
Even if a firm is presented in two waves (the possibility of having such an issue is not 
reported by survey conductors), it is treated like a new firm. Therefore, a weight is an 
attribute of each firm to show how many firms it represents and it does not change over 
time. Weights were changed by multiplying in the ratio of 4.5 million businesses divided 
by Estimated population in appended data. Descriptive statistics show that firms’ 
demographic information is close enough to population estimates after this adjustment. 
However, for robustness check, I have used the ipfweight (add-on) procedure in Stata to 
replicate the weight calculations on the appended dataset and compared the results with the 
descriptive statistics. 
The released data only contains information on firms that completed the survey, it was not 
possible to test for non-respondent bias. It is hoped that by implementing weight this 
potential problem is alleviated.  
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  Missing values  
The share of missing values for some of the variables is high. For example, in both surveys 
the ethnicity is measured; however, there are a lot of missing values (Ethnicity is added in 
later waves in UK SME Finance Monitor). Although including ethnicity might have given 
interesting information about the situation of SMEs in the borrowing market, the results 
could have been biased towards specific groups. In a situation like this, such variables are 
not included.  
About 15% of the credit risk rating is missing from the datasets. The analyses are presented 
with and without risk ratings. It had been speculated that credit risk rating, obtained from 
third parties, could reveal important information about the creditworthiness of clients - Both 
to banks and entrepreneurs themselves. Therefore, I decided to present the results with and 
without the inclusion of risk rating. Another way to address the problem of missing values 
is imputing. However, missing values were not missing-at-random (Schafer and Graham, 
2002). Most firms without credit risk rating are smaller and new firms (BDRC Continental, 
2015a). In addition, the details of the calculation of credit risk rating were not known to us; 
therefore, imputation method could not be implemented.  
 Non- experimental data 
Data employed in this thesis is non-experimental; therefore, it is necessary to deal with the 
complications of not randomized data (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). For example, in 
evaluating the effect of advice in easing credit constraints, ideally and in a pure random 
experiment, advice should be offered randomly to SMEs. Moreover, we deal with 
occasional missing data. For example, we don’t know which non-applicants would obtain 
credit should they applied for it. There are different methods for addressing the problems 
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raised by the non-random assignment of the intervention or missing variable. Some of them 
had been tried in the essays of this thesis, however, not being used or reported. 
 One of the methods that have been tried was Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model for 
correcting selection bias on the dependent variable. In investigating the effect of advice, 
one cannot know whether a non-applicant would seek for advice should they needed credit. 
Or, in the studies of discouragement, one cannot know whether a non-applicant would be 
an applicant or a discouraged borrower if they needed credit. The samples in both cases are 
selected among those who needed credit and did not consider those who did not need credit. 
This may cause sample selection bias. To alleviate the problem, it has been tried to model 
credit neediness as a function of firms’ characteristics and growth intention. Then, Inverse 
Mill’s Ratio (IMR) was calculated and implemented in the second stage model. Growth 
intention was used as exclusion criteria. However, in three studies, IMR was not significant. 
There were no other variables that seemed appropriate to explain the credit neediness, but 
not the equations of interest. In the absence of such variable and of a reason for believing 
that there is not sample selection bias, the problem has been acknowledged as a research 
limitation. 
 Another technique for reducing bias in the sample that had been tried is matching methods 
(Stuart 2010). The aim of using matching methods (Propensity Score Matching in this 
thesis) was to reduce the bias and create a balanced sample with similar distributions over 
observable covariates. For example, if one considers advice as a treatment, the initial idea 
was to have observations which are observationally similar over a set of covariates with 
only difference is the receiving advice. The aim was to run the regression models on the 
balanced sample to find out whether advice is associated with successful application. For 
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several reasons, this method was not finally used. First of all, the covariates used for 
matching did not seem to help with selection bias problem. Yet, the balanced sample used 
in the analyses was concerned with the firms who applied for credit. Second, it does not 
seem to add anything to the model. With all categorical and dummy variables as matching 
covariates, most observation were matched and a limited number of observations left out. 
Therefore, the regression results were not substantially different. Notwithstanding low 
efficiency in using matching technique, the assumption of ignorable treatment assignment 
seems violated: treatment is independent of the potential outcome (Rosenbaum and Robin) 
(for example, advice and successful application). For these reasons, matching technique 
have only been tried but not finally used. 
 Software: 
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Essay 1-  The cost of growth: Small firms and the pricing of bank loans 
 
Abstract 
Drawing upon data from the 2007 UK Survey of SME Finance, the current analysis is 
concerned with the extent to which growth firms are discriminated on price in loan markets. 
Or, more simply, the extent to which growth firms pay more for credit. Given relatively 
small turndown rates historically, higher credit prices may be a more substantial growth 
constraint than the access to finance issues that have dominated the academic literature to 
date. To this end, we observe, inter alia, that firms who have recorded recent high growth 
are more likely to pay higher interest rates for the loan they obtained. Moreover, small sized 
firms who intend to grow through the introduction of new products exhibit a higher 
probability of paying more for credit than their peers. Finally, acknowledging that banks 






1.1.  Introduction 
It has long been recognised that a small group of high growth firms create the bulk of the 
net new jobs in an economy. These are Storey’s (1998) “ten percenters” or Birch’s (1990) 
“gazelles”. Unsurprisingly, these firms have been the focus of considerable academic 
research (Henrekson and Johansson 2010) and policy attention (Hoffman 2007). Indeed, 
informed recent debate has focused on the merits of further shifting the emphasis of 
entrepreneurship policy away from the creation of new ventures to the support of high 
growth firms (cf. Shane 2009; Mason and Brown 2011). This view is consistent with recent 
evidence that suggests that the presence of “ambitious entrepreneurship” is a stronger 
predictor of macro-economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general (Stam et al. 
2007). In this light, identifying and supporting growth firms are key priorities. 
Much of the extant academic research has been concerned with the characteristics of 
growing firms (Barringer, Jones, and Neubaum 2005; Baum, Locke, and Smith 2001) or 
with the (often institutional) determinants of growth (Davidsson and Henrekson 2002; 
Barkham, Gudgin, and Hart 2012). Less attention has been paid to the issue of barriers to 
growth; that is, to the obstacles faced by firms as they expand rapidly (Lee 2013). However, 
an important subset of barriers that has received attention relates to finance (Becchetti and 
Trovato 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 
2006). In general, this line of research has explored the extent to which limits to access to 
various forms of external finance constrains the growth of smaller firms. A prominent 
finding in this literature is that growth firms are likely to be less successful loan applicants 
(e.g. Freel 2007). Failure, from this perspective, is typically defined in terms of simple loan 
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turndowns or loan scaling; such that growth firms are more likely to either receive no loan 
or a smaller amount than applied for. These firms are credit rationed: that is, assuming that 
these growth firms are otherwise observationally indistinct from successful applicants, 
banks are rationing credit on some basis other than price. 
However, whilst growth firms may disproportionately face turndowns or loan scaling, it 
still remains that the majority receive the loans they apply for (Vos et al. 2007). In these 
cases, it is the terms of the loans which are of interest. In particular, if growing firms are 
shown to pay systematically higher prices for debt, then this may be of greater concern than 
the smaller numbers who are credit rationed. Whilst higher price may reflect higher risk, 
higher loan prices may also hinder firm development, as the resources required to invest in 
growth are diverted to the loan provider. This question is the focus of the current study. 
Drawing on data from the 2007 UK Survey of SME Finance (Cosh et al. 2008), we model 
the price firms paid for variable rate loans. Our models contain information both on past 
growth and future growth intentions; including the proposed growth strategies. We find 
evidence that both past growth and future growth intention, conditional on strategy, 
associate with higher loan prices. 
The manuscript is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on bank 
financing of small firms, with particular emphasis on growth firms, and develops three 
hypotheses that link loan pricing and firm growth. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 
elaborates on our models and modelling choices. Section 5, presents our empirical results. 





1.2.  Literature review 
In accessing bank finance, compared to large and established companies, small firms are 
disadvantaged by their information opacity, the relative scarcity of collateralizable assets, 
and disproportionately high monitoring costs (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Berger and 
Udell 1998). For start-ups, lack of credit history and high rates of failure also contribute to 
their unfavourable situations. In consequence, the small firm sector has long been thought 
to be subject to credit rationing (Parker 2002; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Vos et al. 2007, 
among many): a situation in which some borrowers are denied credit or receive a lower 
amount of credit than they applied for. An important condition holds that these firms are, 
in all other respects, indistinguishable from those who have received (full) credit (Parker 
2002).  In such a situation, a firm is known as credit rationed. It does not receive the money 
it requested despite being willing to pay a higher interest rate (de Meza 2002). In short, 
banks are seen to ration credit on some basis other than price. 
In practice, credit institutions use a variety of techniques to distinguish between good and 
bad borrowers; employing different contract terms such as higher pricing, collateralisation 
and sub-optimal loan sizes (Parker 2002). If banks were to use similar contract terms, 
employing a pooled interest rate for all types of borrowers, good borrowers will likely either 
exit the loan market (Parker 2002; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) or subsidize lower quality 
borrowers (de Meza 2002). Using different contract terms is a means to reveal the types of 
borrowers (Parker 2002) and to recognise varying risks of default. For example, collateral 
is perceived as a sign of entrepreneurs’ commitment and confidence in their success. The 
willingness to secure a loan with collateral, frequently through personal asset, acts as a 
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positive signal to banks about the qualities of the entrepreneur as a good borrower (Berger 
and Udell 1998; Binks and Ennew 1996). In the presence of such instruments, and 
accounting for borrower heterogeneity, there is limited evidence of broad-based credit 
rationing in the small firms’ literature (Freel 2007). However, the absence of credit 
rationing does not necessarily entail the absence of discrimination. Indeed, given differing 
risk profiles attendant upon varying firm characteristics and strategies, banks must 
inevitably discriminate one firm from another in the terms of contracts they offer for credit. 
In this case, banks seek to ration credit on the basis of price and price-related characteristics. 
Firm strategy and performance are principal sources of borrower heterogeneity that may 
bear upon risk. As noted above, only a small proportion of small firms make much of a 
contribution to net job creation, innovation, or increased productivity (Shane 2009; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013, 60). Due to their 
importance, small growing firms have been the subject of numerous studies aiming to 
describe the growth cycle and to identify the factors supporting or impeding growth (Dobbs 
and Hamilton 2007). Financial structure and access to finance at the time of growth are 
common themes in these studies. Of course, access to finance does not directly cause 
growth; but credit constraints may affect growth by suppressing it (Binks and Ennew 1996; 
Vickery 2008), or forcing managers to rely on internal funds as a source of growth 
investment (Rahaman 2011). Internal sources of financing, often personal wealth or 
retained earnings, are typically the first option of an entrepreneur (Vos et al. 2007; Berger 
and Udell 1998). However, internal sources are likely to be limited and this limitation may 
act to constrain the growth of the firm (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006). Indeed, Rahaman 
(2011) shows that as external financial constraints lessen, firms switch from internal to 
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external funds as a means to finance growth. Moreover, this patterns of transition from 
internal to external funding is most pronounced in small unquoted companies (Rahaman 
2011). These firms are more likely to be financially constrained and to face information 
problems. However, there is likely to be an important complementarity between internal 
and external finance: “Access to internal sources of finance may play the twin roles of 
proxying for internal financial capacity as well as providing a signal about the quality of 
future growth opportunities. Such signals, in turn, reduce the external financial constraint” 
(Rahaman, 2011, p. 723). In short, small growing firms are eventually likely to view 
external sources of finance as a complement to internal sources and to increasingly use 
external sources to fund growth. Crucially, of these external sources, banks are consistently 
identified as the primary provider of external funds for small firms (Robb and Robinson 
2014).   
In this vein, for instance, Beck et al (2005), based on data from a firm level survey 
conducted by the World Bank, find that financial obstacles are perceived as the most 
important barriers to growth. The identified barriers largely revolve around bank finance 
and include: the provision of collateral; the bureaucratic procedures of banks; the social 
networks of borrowing; and, the price of finance. In other studies, perceived financing 
constraints are also shown to have a positive association with growth intention (Binks and 
Ennew 1996; Nitani and Riding 2013). Firms intending to grow expect to encounter more 
problems than firms which actually experienced growth. That is, growing firms (who are 
often smaller and younger firms) anticipate that lack of credit history and an established 
relationship with banks will result in tighter credit availability (Binks and Ennew 1996). 
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Consistent with the perception of finance as a barrier to growth, recent empirical research 
has provided evidence that growth firms are more likely to have their loan applications 
refused (Riding et al. 2012), face loan scaling (Freel 2007) and identify themselves as 
discouraged borrowers (Freel et al. 2010). Typical rationalisation of these findings focuses 
on the higher risk associated with growth firms. However, despite this risk, most loan 
applicants go on to successfully borrow all or some of the money they sought. For instance, 
using data from the US National Survey of Small Business Finance, Levenson and Willard 
(2000) estimated that only 6% of firms “had an unfulfilled desire for credit”; of which 2% 
were actually denied funding and 4% were discouraged from applying. More specifically, 
Vos et al. (2007) observed that fast growing small firms in the UK and US, respectively, 
applied for and obtained more sources of financing than non-growth firms. It follows that, 
if most applicants are successful, the focus of the discussion should shift from credit access 
to terms of credit. Central to credit terms are the prices firms pay for their loans. 
To the extent that higher loan prices reflect higher borrower risk  (Berger and Udell 2003; 
Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005), one would anticipate growth firms facing higher loan 
rates. Firm growth implies change: change in, inter alia, employment, sales, market share, 
or assets. Rapid growth implies rapid change. These changes occur over a specific period 
of time (Dobbs and Hamilton 2007) and research has shown small firm growth to be 
episodic (Brush, Ceru, and Blackburn 2009). In other words, growth is a temporary and 
dynamic phase that many firms experience (Nightingale and Coad 2014), and growing 
firms undertake several alterations in their business processes and products. Not only are 
the outcome of these changes uncertain, but the pace of change makes it more difficult for 
banks and credit institutions to monitor growing firms and evaluate their performance 
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(Binks and Ennew 1996). Past research has shown that the price of obtaining funds rises as 
the valuation of the firm becomes less straightforward for its investors (Strahan 1999). In 
this way, the increased levels of information asymmetry attached to growing firms 
increases their risk and consequently the financial constraints they face (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005; Binks and Ennew 
1996; Nitani and Riding 2013). Higher loan price, reflecting higher risk (Strahan 1999), 
may be a key manifestation of financial barriers for growth-oriented entrepreneurs. 
The foregoing leads us to two linked hypotheses: 
H1. Firm which experienced growth in the near past pay higher interest rates on loans. 
H2. Firms which intend to grow in near future pay higher interest rates on loans.  
Small firms may take a variety of paths to growth (Garnsey, Stam, and Heffernan 2006). 
The variety in paths is likely to be underpinned by variety in strategy. Importantly, the 
various growth strategies that entrepreneurs take impose different levels of additional risk 
to their firms. For example, Wiklund and Shepherd (2005) report research that suggests 
that ‘tried-and-true’ strategies lead to higher mean performance, whilst risky strategies – 
with higher performance variety – may lead to both greater individual successes and more 
frequent failures. This is consistent with the view that innovation only spurs growth in a 
“handful of ‘superstar’ fast growth firms” (Coad and Rao 2008); whilst for the bulk of firms 
innovative investments lead to zero or negative returns. 
To the extent that banks primarily provide non-syndicated commercial loans to small 
businesses (Berger and Udell 2003), banks are not providers of risk capital. That is, banks 
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do not share in the upside gain of spectacular growth. Accordingly, the greater risk of 
failure is likely to bear on the lending decision and on the price of the loan; more than the 
prospect of dramatic success. In this vein, Freel (2007) provides evidence that innovators 
were less likely to get access to all of the funds they seek from their banks (i.e. to face loan 
scaling). Similarly, Nitani and Riding (2013) find that costs of borrowing are higher for 
R&D intensive firms. In short, the foregoing leads us to anticipate that firms seeking to 
grow through innovation will face higher borrowing costs than firms seeking to expand by 
simply doing ‘more of the same’. 
H3. Loan pricing is related to growth modes, such that more aggressive growth strategies 
will associate with higher interest rates and safer strategies will be associated with lower 
interest rates. 
1.3. Data and methodology 
The data used in this study are a sub sample drawn from the 2007 UK Survey of SME 
Finance (Cosh et al. 2008). Since the data was collected in autumn 2007, we anticipate that 
our results are not greatly influenced by the major changes in banking environment starting 
from December 2008 in the United States. However, we reflect upon the implications of 
the timing of the study in our concluding remarks. Respondents to the survey were owners 
or managers of firms, excluding public and not for profit organizations, with less than 250 
employees or/and £35 Million turnover. The initial sample was provided by Dun and 
Bradstreet with more than 82,000 firms. However, after considering the survey criteria, 
survey quota and accessibility, around 25,000 firms were contacted. The response rate was 
10%. This response rate might increase the risk of sampling bias; however, the proportion 
of responses is the same across all sizes of companies (Cosh et al. 2008). Testing for non-
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response bias was not possible. In addition, weighting the respondents based on size, sector 
and region and comparing them with break-down of 4.3 million businesses in the UK show 
that firms with zero employees represent relatively less than population statistics. We bear 
these limitations in mind for interpretation of our results. The survey collected information 
on a variety of financial tools firms had been using (within the three years prior to the 
survey date) for business purposes including largest single outstanding loan. For these 
loans, data on interest rate and other terms of contract were collected.  
The survey includes 2,500 firms; however, for the purpose of this study, 247 firms are the 
focus. These are the firms which use banks’ commercial loans and mortgages, with variable 
interest rate, at the time of data collection. Interest rates incorporate elements of both the 
prevailing riskiness of the economic environment and the perceived (or measured) riskiness 
of the individual borrower. By focusing only on variable rates loans, we hope to control for 
the former and address only the latter. Variable interest rates comprise of a base rate plus 
some premium above base1. The former may be thought to capture the economic conditions 
at any given time; whilst the latter addresses the riskiness of the entrepreneur or firms. By 
focusing on the premium paid over the base rate, variations in absolute rates that may reflect 
different underlying economic conditions at the time of loan granting are largely controlled 
for. Crucially, whilst our loans were all outstanding on the survey date, they were not all 
awarded contemporaneously. The survey collected data on the premium paid over the base 
rate, rather than the final interest rate. We hold that changes in rate premiums largely reflect 
the dynamics of the lending environment and firm level characteristics, and much less the 
underlying economic conditions. Unlike several studies (Binks and Ennew 1996; Beck and 
                                                          
1 In the UK, this is typically the Bank of England base rate plus some premium determined by individual banks. 
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Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005; Vos et al. 2007) 
regarding financial constraints or loan pricing, our research deals with an objective measure 
of higher or lower price. 
In contrast to variable rates, and to the extent that they do not vary over time, fixed rates 
are likely to reflect borrower riskiness and economic conditions only at the time at which 
they were awarded. Accordingly, fixed loan rates for loans awarded at different times are 
not directly comparable. We set them aside in the current analyses2. 
1.3.1.  Dependent variable 
In constructing our dependent variable, we use a survey question that asks respondents the 
rate they paid for their largest outstanding bank loan. The questions were only directed at 
those firms who reported using bank loan and mortgage facilities at the time of data 
collection (around 25% of sample firms). Of these, 41% provided information on the 
variable interest rate. The remainder held fixed rate loans. Firms holding variable rate loans 
were offered a categorical response variable, which expressed the rate in percentage points 
above base. Specifically, firms could indicate the rate they paid in one of seven rate ranges. 
The lowest range was 0-2%; thereafter the next four categories increased by 2 percentage 
points at a time. The two final categories indicated variable interest rate in the ranges of 
10-15% and more than 15% over the prevailing base rate. However, no firms reported 
paying more than 10% over base rate. 
Figure 1 represents the distribution of contracted rate premiums in the sample. The majority 
of loans falls in the first category of 0-2% premium rate (57%), followed by the second 
                                                          
2 To confirm our intuition, we performed a similar suite of analyses on fixed rate loans. As expected, these models were poor 
predictors of loan rate, with few significant variables. The results are available on request. 
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category of 2-4% (33%). Because of the small number of observations for premium rates 
of more than 4%, we recoded all these categories into one category. Accordingly, our final 
dependent variable has three orderings: 0-2%, 2.01-4%, and greater than 4%. The ordered 
nature of our dependent variable is reflected in our choice of analytical method – ordered 
probit – which we outline below.  
 
Figure 1.1. Frequency of premium rates in the sub-sample of firms using loan and mortgages with variable 
interest rate. 
1.3.2. Independent variable 
Our independent variables are constructed to allow us to test hypotheses 1-3. Accordingly, 
they are concerned with growth and growth strategies. To this end, the data allow us to 
construct three measures of growth. In the first instance, and in line with H1, we focus on 
the growth history. Firms are considered to experience past growth if respondents declared 
they experienced 30% increase in sales turnover for each of the three years preceding the 
survey date3. This is a fairly high threshold and these growth firms may reasonably be 
                                                          













thought of as ‘super growth’ firms (Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner 2003). In practical 
terms, these high growth firms were coded 1, with all other firms coded as 0. 
To address H2, our second independent variable focuses on growth aspirations. The 
relevant survey question captures the owner managers’ growth intention over the three 
years subsequent to 2007. Owner managers’ growth intentions are not trivial in 
distinguishing between actual growers and non-growers. Indeed, there is a longstanding 
view that “one of the most important factors [in influencing growth] is the commitment of 
the leader of the company to achieving growth” (Smallbone, Leigh, and North 1995, p. 59). 
In this instance, respondents were asked whether they planned for their firm to “grow 
substantially”, “grow moderately”, “stay the same” or “become smaller”. We coded firms 
intending to grow substantially or moderately as 1. Respondents who indicated that they 
wished their firms to stay the same size or to become smaller were coded as 04. 
However, since questions relating to growth intentions are likely to be prone to both a 
normative bias and the over optimism of the entrepreneurs, we also focus on specific 
growth strategies. By this means, we investigate our third hypothesis. To this end, the 
survey included a question on how firms intended to grow (directed only to those firms 
indicating a growth intention). Specifically the question identifies four possible growth 
strategies: “move into new markets”, “introduce new products or services”, “increase sale 
with existing products and services”, and “hire more employees”. These strategies are not 
mutually exclusive and firms could indicate all, some or none. In line with our stated 
hypothesis, we consider “new market” and “new products or services” to be higher risk, 
                                                          




more aggressive strategies; whilst “sales of existing product” and “hiring more employees” 
are lower risk, less aggressive strategies. In each case, firms indicating the intention to 
follow one of the strategies were coded 1, otherwise firms were coded 0. This results in 4 
binary dummy variables that are entered into the models. Respondents had the option to 
add to these strategies, but because of small number of observations those responses are 
excluded from the analyses. 
In addition to the variables that allow us to directly test our hypotheses, we also estimate 
models incorporating a ‘super growth’ variable. This variable was defined by the survey 
investigators (Cosh et al. 2008), such that  firms characterised as ‘super growth’ 
experienced more than 30% increase in turnover each of the 3 years prior to the survey and 
intend to sustain the growth moderately or substantially over the three years subsequent to 
the survey. This measure reflects the past and future orientation of the firms, excluding 
start-ups (firms in business for less than two years). In essence, this variable is an 
interaction term between realised past growth and future growth intentions. 
1.3.3. Control variables 
In modelling small firm loan prices as a function of our independent variables, it is 
important to control for other influences on price. These are likely to be factors which lower 
or raise perceived risk. Two factors, in particular, are commonly considered in the empirical 
literature: the role of collateral and relational lending. Credit institutions consider collateral 
as a positive signal that alleviates lending constraints by reducing information asymmetries 
or default risks (Berger and Udell 1998; Parker 2002). The information asymmetry between 
banks and entrepreneurs retards banks’ ability to distinguish between good and bad 
entrepreneurs. However, the entrepreneur, aware of their situation, and trying to avoid 
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imperilling their assets, increases their effort to succeed. Strahan (1999) argues that 
collateral makes post-investment monitoring activities easier but does not affect the price, 
and the riskiness of a firm is reflected in the price it pays. While pledging collateral may 
not necessarily lower the risk (price)  for growth firms, it is not an unambiguous merit 
(Binks and Ennew 1996). That is, as the risks of these firms increase, the gap between the 
banks’ valuation of the assets (at the time of probable default) and the costs of obtaining 
those assets from the firm rises. Hence, growing small firms, comparing to other small 
firms, are more prone to under-evaluation of their assets or “inadequate collateral”. To 
mitigate this problem and respond to  growing firms’ increasing demands for funds, banks 
may rely on relationship lending (Binks and Ennew 1996). 
The severity of information opacity can be mitigated by relational lending. Relationships 
allow banks to gather information about the firm and entrepreneur over time and to shift 
the emphasis of lending decisions from hard to soft criteria (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 
2006). This reduced problem of information asymmetry may translate into greater access 
to bank finance at lower prices (Binks and Ennew 1996). However, there is no general 
consensus about the effect of relationship banking. Sharpe (1990) suggests that banks, 
relying on the fact that firms are locked-in, internalize the benefits of the relationship. 
Peterson and Rajan (1994) conclude that there is no significant association between length 
of lending relationship and lower interest rate; excepting an insignificant effect where the 
bank also provides other financial services to the firm. Moreover, loan pricing may also 
exhibit a cyclical pattern. That is, when firms switch to new banks, interest rate decreases 
in order to lock in the new customers. However, after a while,  firms are charged the same 
price that they should have paid if they had stayed with their initial bank (Ioannidou and 
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Ongena 2010) or an even higher price to compensate the early subsidies (Kim, Kristiansen, 
and Vale 2012). Finally, when banks collect enough information about the firm’s 
performance, the interest rate decreases again (Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale 2012). 
Yet, despite the equivocal literature, the provision of collateral and the existence of longer 
term relationships are likely to be important control variables in loan pricing models. In our 
model, these two variables are part of a set of controls intended to capture important aspects 
of the loan contract. Collateral is measured as a simple dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the firm was asked to provide collateral in securing the loan, and 0 otherwise. 
Relationship banking is proxied by the length of relationship with the firm’s primary bank. 
This information was captured categorically, with the smallest category indicating a 
banking relationship of 0-3 years. Firms in this category were coded 0, indicating no 
relationship banking, otherwise firms were coded 1. 
In addition to these 2 variables, we also include indicators of the purpose of the loan and 
of the source of the loan. In the first instance, we are able to observe whether the intended 
use of the loan was for working capital or for the purchase of assets. Physical asset, 
purchased with a loan, can have a similar function as collateral (Berger and Udell 1998) 
and imply lower risk. We code loans sought for the purchase of physical assets as 1, 
otherwise we code them as 0. In terms of loan source, this describes the relationship 
between the banks and the firm further. Specifically, firms were asked whether their main 
bank was the only provider of the loan, one of the providers, or whether the loan was 
provided by a bank other than the firm’s primary bank. In the last instance, we would 
anticipate that the ‘external’ bank would have had less information about the quality of the 
firm and the entrepreneur. In general, we anticipate that working with a new bank or 
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securing a loan from multiple sources may impact the price of loan (Kim, Kristiansen, and 
Vale 2012; Peterson and Rajan 1994; Vos et al. 2007). In addition, we controlled for the 
access of the entrepreneur to other sources of external finance. Entrepreneurs may use more 
than one source of external finance to fund their company; and the various forms available 
may be more or less sensitive to information asymmetries and require more or less 
information disclosure or firm monitoring. To this end, the pecking order hypothesis 
(Myers 1984) posits that firms exhibit a preference hierarchy in seeking sources of finance; 
starting from internal sources to debt and then equity financing. To the extent that external 
equity is rare and that other forms of debt instrument (e.g. leases and overdrafts) entail 
lower agency costs, term loans may be at the bottom of the hierarchy. In this case, firms 
may view term loans from banks as funding of last resort. Those who approach banks later, 
having exhausted all other avenues of funding, may be viewed as more risky than those 
who approach banks early, confident in their ability to repay principal and interest and to 
satisfy monitoring requirements5.  Alternatively, using multiple sources may signal to 
banks good management and lessen the risk. Regardless, it is clear that the financing 
decisions of the entrepreneur prior to or at the time of the loan request may affect the 
perceived riskiness of the business. The issue is one of sequencing (i.e. when the bank was 
approached in relation to other sources of finance). Unfortunately, our data does not allow 
us to directly address this issue. Rather, to reflect the idea that the entrepreneur has 
exhausted less costly sources of financing, and those which entail a lower agency burden,  
we build a proxy based upon the number of sources of external finance the firm had used 
during the 3 years prior to, or were using at the time of, the survey. Ideally, we would like 
                                                          
5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility. 
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detail on the financing of the firm before the loan request, but the data did not provide any 
information to shed light on the historical financing activities. The index is a simple count 
of identified use of loans from the owner, loans from family and friends, leasing and higher 
purchase agreements, credit cards, and overdraft funding. 
Our second set of control variables is intended to capture firm heterogeneity. The first of 
these variables is a ‘usual suspect’ in empirical studies of small firms – viz. size. Size has 
been shown to affect both access to and price of credit (Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and 
Pagés 2011; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005; Binks and Ennew 1996; Freel 
2007; Vos et al. 2007). Even within small firm samples, larger firms are less likely to suffer 
(or to suffer less) from information opacity and their performance may be more easily 
evaluated (Berger and Udell 1998). In this study, size is measured by the number of 
employees and coded into four size-bands: zero employees, 1-9, 10-49 and more than 50 
employees. The zero size-band provides our reference category. We also control for broad 
sectoral variation at the SIC division level. Here, agriculture acts as our reference category. 
Finally, we also include the age of the business as a control variable. As the firm grow 
older, one expects that the credit history and reputation of the firm act as risk mitigating 
factors. Due to the structure of the questionnaire and number of observations, we defined 
age of the business as 1 if it is older than 10 years and zero otherwise.  
Beyond these structural characteristics, banks also rely on information they have on the 
quality of the owner of the business (as a borrower) (Berger and Frame 2007). To this end, 
we were able to incorporate in our models measures of entrepreneurial experience, and 
owner-manager’s age and gender. However, when these are included with business age in 
our models, collinearity becomes a concern. In the final analyses we use age of the 
43 
 
entrepreneur in preference to entrepreneurial experience. Importantly, our key findings are 
robust to this choice. Lastly, we control for gender of the principal owner. This is measured 
as a simple binary variable taking the value 1 if the principal owner was male, and 0 
otherwise6.  
1.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. As the data in 
panel A illustrate, most of the firms are active in the service sector; have between 10-49 
employees; and are older firms. For almost two-thirds of firms, their main bank is the only 
provider of the loan. From the data in panel B, 82% of firms are principally owned and 
managed by men; the remaining 18% of firms are run by women or jointly. Seventy-seven 
percent of sample firms had a banking relationship extending more than 3 years and 76% 
of firms were required to collateralize the loan of interest. 
  
                                                          
6 This would include cases where the principal ownership was female or shared. 
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A. Freq Percent Cum. B. Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
    Sector     Business older than 10 years 65%  
Agriculture etc. 21 8.11 8.11 Age of the owner (years) 50.88 10.36 
Manufacturing 20 7.72 15.83 Male ownership 82%  
Construction 30 11.58 27.41 Purchased asset with loan 53%  
Wholesale/Retail 32 12.36 39.77 
More than three years relationship 
with bank 77%  
Service sectors 156 60.23 100 Collateral 76%  
     Size         
0 employee 16 6.18 6.18 Super growth 17%  
1-9 employees 66 25.48 31.66 Past growth 19%  
10-49 employees 105 40.54 72.2 Growth intention 71%  
50-249 employees 72 27.8 100 New Market 25%  
    Loan provider     New Product 31%  
Only main bank 168 64.86 64.86 More sale 55%  
Main bank one of 
the provider 57 22.01 86.87 More employees 34%  
Main bank not a 
provider 34 13.13 100      
Number of sources 
of finance used a         
0 12 4.63 4.63      
1 34 13.13 17.76      
2 78 30.12 47.88      
3 80 30.89 78.76      
4 45 17.37 96.14      
5 10 3.86 100      
a Including leasing, loan from owner, loan from family and friends, credit cards, and overdraft 
Table 1.1. Frequency table of the characteristics of firms, owners, and loan for firms using loan and 
mortgages with variable rate. 
 Panel B also records the distribution of firms across our key independent variables, such 
that: 17% of firms were classed as “super growth” firms (i.e. firms experiencing growth 
more than 30% in each of the three years preceding the survey and intending to growth in 
the three subsequent years). This figure is largely constrained by the 19% of sample firms 
that were recorded as having experienced growth in the previous three years. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, 71% of firms reported an intention to pursue growth in the coming years. 
This large figure may speak to normative biases or over-optimism. However, only around 
25% of firms indicate an intention to “grow substantially”, which is closer to the number 
of past growers. In terms of growth strategies, 22% of firms indicated their intention to seek 
growth through penetrating into new markets, 30% expect growth through new product or 
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services, 55% expect to increase the sale of existing product in the same market, and 34% 
plan to recruit more employees. As noted, these strategies were not mutually exclusive and 
firms could select more than one strategy for growth.  
1.5. Methods 
To examine the relationship between firm growth and the price of loans, and given the 
ordered nature of our dependent variable, we estimate a series of ordered probit models 
(Greene and Hensher 2009). However, only a proportion of the sample report loan rates, 
since only a proportion of our sample have outstanding loans. Focusing only on these firms 
may result in sample selection bias. This bias may result from two selection issues: firstly, 
we only deal with firms that applied for and were offered loans and, secondly, amongst 
those firms, we opt to consider only those that received variable rated loans. To control for 
potential issues of selection bias, we estimate a two-stage model (Heckman 1979). For 
completeness, we present the results of both the simple ordered probit and the two-stage 
ordered probit in tables 3 and 4 (the details of the selection model used in the two-stage 
Heckman model is detailed in the following section). Ordered probits, along with other 
forms of regression, are sensitive to collinearity amongst the independent variables. For 
this purpose, table 2 also displays Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all the explanatory 
variables - calculated in regressions excluding and including the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). 





a VIFb Variables VIF
a VIFb 
Age of the owner 1.40 1.45 
Relationship with bank (>3years 
=1) 1.20 1.19 
Male Ownership 1.23 1.35 Collateral (yes=1) 1.13 1.19 
Sector-Ref: Agriculture   
Count of financial resource c - Ref 
:0   
  Manufacturing 1.98 2.12   1 type 3.77 4.35 
  Construction 2.42 2.59   2 types 6.07 7.87 
  Wholesale/Retail 2.40 2.51   3 types 6.09 7.93 
  Service sectors 3.61 3.77   4 types 4.36 5.61 
Size-Ref: zero     5 types 2.02 2.48 
  1-9 employees 4.59 5.87 past growth 4.98 6.49 
  10-49 employees 5.90 8.38 Future growth 2.54 2.64 
  50-249 employees 5.40 8.68 Super growth 5.81 7.05 
Business older than 10 years 1.55 1.77 New Market 1.48 1.46 
Asset Purchased with loan  1.15 1.21 New product 1.64 1.58 
Loan provider- Ref: only 
main bank   More sale 1.80 1.79 
main bank one of the provider 1.17 1.22 More employees 1.79 1.85 
Main bank not a provider 1.20 1.27 IMR -- 1.71 
a.Matrix of variables excluding IMR, b. Matrix of variables including IMR, c. use of credit card, 
overdraft, leasing, loan from the owner, and loan family and friends 
Table 1.2. Variance Inflation Factor 
1.6. Results 
Table 3 presents the result of the simple ordered probit models. All the models are 
statistically significant at 99%. In the first instance, our base model considers the control 
variables that are intended to proxy firm heterogeneity. Here, we note that firm size 
associates with loan pricing. That is, as the size of the firm increases loan price decreases. 
This is consistent with our expectations. Beyond this, we observe that older firms, the use 
of funds to purchase assets and the provision of collateral are significantly negatively 
related to the probability of paying higher interest rates. To restate, if a firm used the loan 
to purchase fixed assets and/or provided collateral for the loan, then the probability of 
paying a higher price for the loan falls. In contrast, there is tentative evidence that the 
probability of paying a higher loan rate rises with the age of the entrepreneur. 
The second model includes all our control variables along with past growth. The significant 
variables from our base model continue to associate with loan prices, except for the age of 
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the business. However, we also now note a negative relationship between loan syndication 
and the probability of paying higher interest rates. Importantly, and in line with hypothesis 
1, firms that experienced rapid growth in the past have a higher probability of paying more 
interest. 
Model 3 is concerned with growth intentions. In this, our control variables largely act in 
the same manner. However, we do not find any support for our second hypothesis. There 
is no evidence that firms declaring an intention to grow in the future pay higher rates of 
interest. Our initial intuition was that this was likely to relate to the high proportion of firms 
reporting a growth intention. Over 70% of firms in the sub-sample declared an intention to 
grow over the three years following the survey. However, recoding the variable to indicate 
only those firms planning to growth “substantially” does not change this finding. It would 
seem that banks pay little regard to broad growth intentions in pricing loans. However, it 
may also reflect the countervailing effects of different intended strategies (see below).  
As a supplementary analysis, we introduce an interaction term to model 4. It indicates that, 
when coupled with past growth, growth intentions do associate with higher loan prices. 
That is, firms enjoying growth in the past and planning to grow in the future are more likely 
to have paid higher rates of interest on their loans. The survey team termed such firms 
‘super growth’, but one may also think of them as sustainable growers. Regardless, this 
result provides further evidence in support of the global hypothesis that growing firms are 
discriminated on price in loan markets. These firms differ from ‘future growth’ firms to the 
extent that, despite having proven past success, they continue to pay more for loans than 
their non- and less growing peers. 
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The final model in table 3 is concerned with the relationship between different growth 
strategies and loan prices. Here the results are broadly in line with H3. Of our four growth 
modes, growth through new product introduction is positively associated with loan rates, 
whilst growth through sales of existing products is negatively associated with growth rates. 
In other words, firms pursuing a ‘more of the same’ strategy appear to pay less for loans 
than those pursuing more aggressive, innovative strategies. In our analysis, penetrating into 
new market or hiring more employees are not significant explanatory variables in 
predicting the probability of higher or lower interest rates. These results support our 
speculations about the associations between modes of growth and loan pricing; whereby 
riskier strategies are associated with more expensive bank financing. Conversely, firms 
intending to sell more of ‘tested-and-tried’ products are associated with lower cost of 
financing. The countervailing effects of aggressive and conservative intended strategies 
may also help explain the lack of a significant finding in support of H2. 
As noted earlier in the paper, the foregoing analyses may be susceptible to selection biases 
arising from our focus only on those firms who held variable rate loans. To control for the 
potential sample selection bias, the Heckman (1979) two-stage model has been used. In the 
first stage, we estimate a Probit model of the probability of accessing loans for all the 
observations in the sample. To calculate the probability of having loans in firms, we 
introduce the following selection equation: 
 
p(accessing to loan)= f (export, innovation, capital expenditure, size, assets, legal status, 
age of the business) 
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In our selection equation, we try to consider not only the variables that ease access to loans 
(e.g. firm size, asset base and legal status) (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Berger and 
Udell 1998; Berger and Udell 2006; Freel 2007), but also variables that may affect the 
demand for loans (e.g. export activity, innovation, and recent capital expenditure). In this 
way, we see loan utilisation as a function of both firms’ demand and banks’ willingness to 
supply. Exporting, innovation, and capital expenditure are reported by the owners or 
managers. From this equation, we calculate the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) which is 
subsequently used as an additional explanatory variable in the second stage model. As table 
4 records, the coefficient of the IMR is statistically significant in four models out of five7. 
This suggests the presence of selection bias (Jones 2007, 36–37); although our data does 
not support the existence of selection bias in one of the models8. 
Turning to our two-stage ordered probit, with Heckman correction; table 4 takes a similar 
approach to table 3, but all models include the IMR calculated from the probit selection 
equation. Although the thrust of these results are broadly in line with regards our 
independent variables, there is one intriguing differences with respect to our control 
variables. Firm size, measured by the number of employees, was a negative and significant 
explanatory factor in the probability of paying higher loan prices in the absence of our 
control for potential selection bias. However, when selection is controlled for, size is no 
longer significant. It would seem that, whilst size may associate with holding a loan, it has 
no robust influence on loan pricing. However, syndication, collateralization and loan use 
                                                          
7 The results of first stage probit regression are available on demand 
8 Another model, considering use of variable rate loans as the dependent variable of the probit (selection) model was 
also estimated. The results were broadly in line with the reported approach. 
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continue to be significantly negatively associated with the probability of paying higher 
interest rates.  
In all but our ancillary ‘super growth’ model, the existence of sample selection bias is 
indicated. However, where this is controlled for, we continue to find evidence to support 
hypotheses 1 and 3 – though not hypothesis 2. In other words, firms which have recorded 
past growth or who intend to grow through innovation are likely to have paid higher rates 
of interest on their loans. Our sustainable, or ‘super growers’, are also likely to have paid a 
higher price for credit. These firms, whilst not denied credit, are discriminated on the basis 
of price. In the next section, we turn to the implications of these findings.
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 Base Model Past Growth Future Growth Super Growth Modes of Growth 
 One stage models Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Age of the owner 0.0158* 0.008 0.0205** 0.009 0.0162* 0.008 0.0235** 0.009 0.0121 0.009 
Male Ownership -0.162 0.219 -0.192 0.220 -0.171 0.220 -0.338 0.240 -0.186 0.220 
Sector-Ref: 
Agriculture           
Manufacturing 0.674 0.414 0.682 0.416 0.671 0.414 0.699 0.445 0.764* 0.425 
Construction 0.526 0.395 0.504 0.396 0.519 0.395 0.44 0.409 0.65 0.413 
Wholesale/Retail 0.389 0.383 0.34 0.385 0.394 0.383 0.291 0.391 0.413 0.387 
Service sectors 0.108 0.333 0.0657 0.335 0.108 0.333 0.0936 0.341 0.118 0.335 
Size-Ref: zero           
1-9 -0.0831 0.350 -0.0595 0.350 -0.0808 0.350 -0.0742 0.392 -0.00772 0.356 
10-49 -0.714** 0.357 -0.721** 0.357 -0.710** 0.357 -0.703* 0.398 -0.648* 0.369 
50-249 -0.776** 0.377 -0.809** 0.378 -0.784** 0.378 -0.772* 0.411 -0.798** 0.393 
Business older than 10 
years  -0.346* 0.206 -0.281 0.210 -0.334 0.209 -0.18 0.235 -0.316 0.213 
Asset Purchased with 
loan  -0.432** 0.172 -0.433** 0.172 -0.425** 0.173 -0.404** 0.184 -0.475*** 0.176 
Loan provider-Ref: 
only main bank           
main bank one of the 
provider -0.342 0.213 -0.402* 0.218 -0.342 0.214 -0.393* 0.224 -0.302 0.218 
Main bank not a 
provider -0.0392 0.259 -0.0102 0.260 -0.032 0.260 -0.065 0.293 -0.0366 0.267 
Relationship with 
bank (>3years =1) -0.2 0.210 -0.226 0.211 -0.191 0.212 -0.323 0.238 -0.207 0.213 
Collateral (yes=1) -0.540*** 0.185 -0.513*** 0.186 -0.541*** 0.186 -0.425** 0.199 -0.498*** 0.189 
Sources of finance A- 
Ref:0           
1 types 0.683 0.452 0.737 0.453 0.691 0.453 0.848* 0.507 0.623 0.456 
2 types 0.375 0.416 0.383 0.416 0.385 0.417 0.487 0.468 0.368 0.419 
3 types 0.637 0.427 0.627 0.427 0.636 0.427 0.775 0.482 0.615 0.431 
4 types 0.633 0.435 0.635 0.434 0.629 0.435 0.597 0.498 0.568 0.440 
5 types 0.017 0.617 -0.16 0.633 0.00391 0.620 -0.0449 0.677 -0.0165 0.632 
past growth   0.420* 0.219       
Future growth     0.0449 0.128     
Super growth       0.496* 0.261   
New Market         -0.0117 0.221 
New product         0.504** 0.216 
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more sale         -0.389** 0.192 
More employees         0.0358 0.212 
/cut1 -0.763 0.828 -0.336 0.860 -0.667 0.872 0.0943 0.990 -0.878 0.852 
/cut2 0.55 0.828 0.99 0.862 0.646 0.872 1.378 0.994 0.478 0.850 
Number of 
observation 230  230  230  206  230  
Prob > chi2 0.0004  0.0002  .0006  0.0058  0.0002  
Pseudo R2 .1131  .1216  .1133  .1085  .1315  
Dependent variable is contracted premium rate on variable rate loans (1=0 to 2%, 2=2% to 4%, 3=More than 4%) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1.3. Results of one-stage Ordered Probit Model  
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 Base Model Past Growth Future Growth Super Growth Modes of Growth 
 Two  stage models Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Age of the owner 0.0175* 0.009 0.0231** 0.010 0.0185** 0.009 0.0292*** 0.010 0.0138 0.009 
Male Ownership -0.115 0.240 -0.15 0.242 -0.148 0.243 -0.349 0.271 -0.149 0.242 
Sector-Ref: 
Agriculture           
Manufacturing 0.626 0.444 0.632 0.446 0.624 0.443 0.619 0.470 0.698 0.450 
Construction 0.369 0.430 0.367 0.432 0.344 0.429 0.3 0.441 0.522 0.441 
Wholesale/Retail 0.108 0.425 0.0697 0.426 0.119 0.424 0.0662 0.433 0.0882 0.425 
Service sectors 0.0937 0.362 0.0608 0.363 0.0862 0.361 0.0368 0.369 0.0887 0.359 
Size-Ref: zero           
1-9 0.462 0.420 0.506 0.421 0.474 0.422 0.331 0.473 0.59 0.431 
10-49 -0.102 0.442 -0.109 0.444 -0.0965 0.444 -0.232 0.501 0.0351 0.465 
50-249 -0.00638 0.488 -0.0495 0.490 -0.0195 0.489 -0.177 0.541 0.0396 0.511 
Business older than 10 
years  -0.465* 0.241 -0.373 0.246 -0.420* 0.247 -0.311 0.269 -0.441* 0.251 
Asset Purchased with 
loan  -0.395** 0.190 -0.394** 0.192 -0.374* 0.192 -0.426** 0.204 -0.430** 0.195 
Loan provider-Ref: 
only main bank           
main bank one of the 
provider -0.471** 0.230 -0.555** 0.236 -0.478** 0.231 -0.552** 0.239 -0.454* 0.235 
Main bank not a 
provider -0.149 0.280 -0.132 0.280 -0.121 0.282 -0.302 0.324 -0.115 0.290 
Relationship with 
bank (>3years =1) -0.138 0.230 -0.171 0.231 -0.118 0.232 -0.282 0.258 -0.16 0.234 
Collateral (yes=1) -0.415** 0.200 -0.377* 0.201 -0.424** 0.200 -0.316 0.211 -0.363* 0.203 
Sources of finance A- 
Ref:0           
1 types 0.716 0.508 0.739 0.508 0.754 0.510 1.002* 0.570 0.671 0.514 
2 types 0.259 0.464 0.239 0.464 0.293 0.466 0.393 0.519 0.245 0.470 
3 types 0.545 0.481 0.515 0.481 0.546 0.481 0.675 0.538 0.515 0.486 
4 types 0.447 0.479 0.407 0.479 0.443 0.479 0.318 0.548 0.377 0.486 
5 types -0.143 0.646 -0.369 0.664 -0.169 0.651 -0.266 0.716 -0.173 0.663 
past growth     0.499** 0.243            
Future growth         0.121 0.141        
Super growth             0.646** 0.275    
New Market                 -0.0482 0.228 
New product                 0.603*** 0.225 
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more sale                 -0.25 0.206 
More employees                 -0.0164 0.232 
IMR 0.955** 0.417 0.888** 0.421 0.983** 0.418 0.71 0.444 1.031** 0.422 
/cut1 0.58 1.041 1.041 1.070 0.901 1.108 1.079 1.195 0.647 1.072 
/cut2 1.905* 1.048 2.385** 1.079 2.226** 1.114 2.408** 1.204 2.018* 1.078 
Number of 
observation 201  201  201  182  201  
Prob > chi2 0.0024  0.0010  0.0029  0.0054  0.0012  
Pseudo R2 .1168  .1280  .1188  .1267  .1381  
Dependent variable is contracted premium rate on variable rate loans (1=0 to 2%, 2=2% to 4%, 3=More than 4%) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1.4. Result of second-stage Ordered Probit model  
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1.7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Based on UK survey of SME Finance (2007), we find that growth firms pay higher interest 
rates on bank loans. This result holds after controlling for the effects of size, owner’s 
experience, industry sector, loan purpose, collateral and relationship banking. In simple 
terms, firms that have successfully grown their businesses in the recent past paid higher 
interest rates. Even where these firms anticipated sustaining their growth, they exhibited a 
higher probability of paying more. That is, despite evidence of success and ambition, 
interest rates are higher. 
 Moreover, although intention to grow does not, on its own, show any association with 
higher price, we note that intended growth strategy associates with loan price. Specifically, 
more risky strategies, involving the introduction of new products and services, associated 
with higher interest rate; whilst, more conservative strategies, associated with increased 
sales of the same products in existing markets, associate with lower loan prices.  
Crucially, none of the foregoing need imply a criticism of banks. Growth and innovation 
are likely to entail additional risks to small businesses. Although banks are the primary 
sources of financing when entrepreneurs decide to seek external financing (Robb and 
Robinson 2014), banks are not risk funders. Rather, in assessing loan applications, banks 
are interested in the “serviceability” of the firms not the value of the business: the ability 
to generate enough cash flow to pay the debt (Cowling, Liu, and Ledger 2012; Lee, Sameen, 
and Cowling 2014). In this sense, growing small firms may be perceived as less attractive 
to risk-averse banks. Other sources of external financing such as venture capital funds are 
presumed to be better suited to the financing of viable high risk projects. However, for 
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reasons of both supply and demand, venture capital is used by only a small proportion of 
firms. In our sample, only four out of 2500 firms sought venture capital financing in the 
three years prior to 2007 and only 11% reported that they may consider equity financing in 
future. If the risk of a project is too high that banks cannot offer any interest rate to hedge 
the risk, the project may declined or the loan downsized. More often, however, the interest 
rate rises (Parker 2002) and valuable capital is diverted to the loan provider in the form of 
a risk premium. This might open a door for interventions designed to ameliorate the 
apparent risk of growth firms. 
Academic commentary has recently argued that interventions in the process of 
establishment or growth of SMEs are justified if targeted to growing and innovative firms 
(Shane 2009; Mason and Brown 2011; Nightingale and Coad 2014). If programs do not 
recognize the differences among the firms, their implementation will favour lower quality 
firms at the expenses of higher quality ones (Nightingale and Coad 2014). Supporting lower 
quality firms would decrease the investment rate of return and consequently would increase 
the price of capital for all type of firms (Nightingale and Coad 2014). Alas, it seems easier 
to call for support targeted to high growth firms than to provide practical guidance on how 
this may be achieved. In large part this is because “[high growth firms] are found across all 
sectors of the economy, a heterogeneity that is also reflected in their age, size, origin, and 
ownership ( Mason and Brown 2011, p.222)”.  
We believe that focusing on the riskiness of growth firms may be a useful starting point for 
practical intervention. This rests on an appreciation of growth risk as both objective and 
perceived. To the extent that growth firms are objectively riskier, there is little policy can 
do other than offering to bear risk. This is what loan guarantee schemes (LGS) currently 
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do. Whilst belief in the existence of credit rationing is the fundamental rationale for loan 
guarantee schemes (Cowling 2010), in practice they encourage incrementality or 
additionality in lending ( Riding et al., 2007). That is, they encourage lending to firms that 
would have received turndowns otherwise due to their higher risk of default (Zecchini and 
Ventura 2009). Crucially, guarantors typically apply a fee to cover defaults and protect the 
integrity of the scheme. Thus, raising loan price. Regardless, our concern is not with firms 
that would otherwise be turned-down for a loan. Rather, ours is with those [growth] firms 
who pay a higher price for loans. To this end, whilst Riding (1998) observes that “the 
objective [of LGS] is to assist small firms, not to subsidize risky ones”, one might wonder 
if there was a role for a targeted schemes whose objective was to subsidize risk. Of course, 
the broader provision of grants to growing firms would be a more direct form of subsidy – 
providing some funds and signalling firm quality in the event of a loan application. 
Regardless, in the absence of further evidence, we are agnostic on the desirability of 
interventions aimed at addressing the objective riskiness of growth firms – at least, beyond 
that which already exists. However, we are more convinced of the merits of potential 
interventions aimed at reducing perceived riskiness. Much of the banks assessment of small 
firm risk is likely to result from the greater information opacity attendant upon small firms 
generally and growing small firms specifically. Past evidence has suggested that, for SMEs, 
relationship banking may provide access to finance at lower costs (Binks and Ennew 1996). 
Relationships reduce information asymmetry. However, there may be other, more timely, 
ways of reducing information asymmetries. In this, an analogy may be drawn with the 
growing number of Investment Readiness programmes across Europe (Mason and Kwok, 
2010). Mason and Kwok(2010) note that the primary reason that businesses are not 
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‘investment ready’ is one of information failure. In large part this involves presentational 
shortcomings: “Even if the underlying proposition is sound a business may still fail to raise 
finance if the business plan is poorly constructed and presented” (Mason and Kwok 2010, 
p.272). The parallels to ‘debt readiness’ are clear. Given the relative use of debt and equity 
even amongst growing small firms, interventions designed to improve the ‘debt readiness’ 
of growing firms may be well suited. In line with “investment readiness” (Mason and 
Harrison 2001), the main goal of such assistant to growth firms should be increasing the 
quality of loan application and also providing information on the different banking product 
and services, and their associate costs, potentially available for those firms. 
 In conclusion, based on the 2007 UK survey of SME Financing and information on the 
variable rate loans, we find that growing firms hold more expensive loans. Similarly, those 
whose future growth plans revolve around innovation are also more likely to hold higher 
priced loans. We interpret these findings to indicate a relationship between firm risk (both 
objective and perceived) and loan pricing. However, there are inevitably limitations to our 
research. In the first instance, higher loan rates may simply reflect the willingness of growth 
firms to accept poorer contract terms. Busy entrepreneurs must allocate precious time and 
resources to apply for a loan. In consequence, they are more willing to meet the higher loan 
price because of the higher opportunity/transaction costs they incur – relative to non-growth 
firms9. Secondly, for the firms that had grown in the three previous years, our data does not 
provide any information on whether the premium rate was contracted before, after or 
coincidental to growth. Still, the significant partial relationship between the modes of future 
growth and interest rate suggests that even if the loan is granted before initiating growth 
                                                          
9 We are grateful to anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility. 
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process, it captures the higher risk profile. Moreover, the modal number of years firms had 
held loans in the sample was between 1 and 3 years. Thirdly, from all the bank facilities 
available to SMEs, our study was only concerned with term loans and only variable rate 
term loans. Overdrafts or lines of credit, which are likely to be important sources of working 
capital, are only a minor component in our financial ‘bundling’ explanatory variable. Future 
research might investigate the relationship among different risk profiles, the propensity to 
use broader bank facilities, and the price those facilities obtain. Although we loosely proxy 
the capital structure of the firm in terms of number of sources an entrepreneur uses, this 
sheds limited light on the perceived riskiness of the business prior to contracting loan terms 
and conditions. Further research, where data is available, may consider the riskiness of the 
business due to its proximate financing decisions.  
Fourthly, we concentrated on variable rate loans and the premium above base rates. Our 
expectation was that base rates control for macro fluctuations. Nonetheless, our results may 
be context specific. The UK banking system is relatively concentrated on supply side 
(Competition Commission Report 2002). As reported by Competition Commission (2002), 
SME owners mainly work with one bank for all their required services and rarely change 
their banks for better prices. Owners of course have the option to seek quotes from different 
banks, but the associate costs and the perceived importance of banking relationship to the 
owners, make bargaining difficult (Competition Commission Report 2002). Moreover, the 
scope for ‘shopping around’ is more limited than would be the case in a more fragmented 
banking market. In the UK SME loan market, lending relationship becomes important for 
banks and SMEs: Banks try to lock-in their customers, as SMEs are less likely to switch to 
new banks, and SMEs use relationship banking to access finance more easily or on better 
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terms (Berger and Udell 2006). Concentration in banking markets has been shown to 
associate with the extent of relational lending (Ashton and Keasey 2005). Moreover, 
establishing a long term relationship would aid banks to assess SMEs activities with lower 
degree of information opacity (Ashton and Keasey 2005). In such a market, growing and 
innovative firms maybe more likely to accept higher fees in order to keep their relationship 
with their banks and ensure their access to finance at the time of cash flow difficulties. 
However, increasing competition among banks may increase customers’ bargaining power 
and lower the price of loans (Rice and Strahan 2010). 
The final consideration is the pertinence of our findings given the current situation in the 
UK loan market following the financial crisis. Small firms’ access to bank facilities 
experienced a sharp decline from 2008. Whilst SMEs decreased their demand for finance, 
the supply side was marked by a “U-shaped pattern”; with an initial decline and subsequent 
recovery to the levels experienced before December 2009 (Cowling et al., 2012).  Small 
businesses, in the early part of this period, experienced higher rejection rates comparing to 
previous years. But the situation eased considerably after 2009 (Financing SMEs and 
Entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard 2014). These patterns held for all types of 
SMEs. Intriguingly, in the case of growing and innovative firms, firms intending to grow 
reduced their demands, but firms who had achieved growth before the crisis maintained the 
same level of debt demand (Cowling, Liu, and Ledger 2012). Nonetheless, Lee et al. (2014) 
show that access to bank finance for innovative firms became more difficult after the 
financial crisis (based on 2007-2012 loan applications) and that these firms were more 
likely to be unable to secure debt financing from any bank. Yet, the average credit scoring 
of innovative and non-innovative firms did not differ significantly during this period, 
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suggesting that assessments of objective risk remained at the same level (Lee et al., 2014). 
One possible explanation of higher rates of loan refusal for innovative firm might be banks’ 
increased perceived risk about their activities. In the recessionary period, the most 
significant factor affecting the loan appraisal decision was the size of businesses, with 
growth orientation apparently ignored in the process of decision making (Cowling et al., 
2012). Regardless, given the recovery of loan approval rates to before crisis levels, we 
anticipate that banks are likely to rely upon the same criteria to appraise loan applications 
as prevailed in the pre-recession period. In short, bank assessment of risk and subsequent 
pricing are likely to follow similar logics today as when our data was collected10. 
  
                                                          
10 Informal conversations with British banking professionals suggests that this is a reasonable supposition. The things that ‘mattered’ 
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Essay 2- Business advice and lending in small firms 
 
Abstract  
The literature on lending to small firms has primarily focused on the mechanisms and 
methods used to evaluate entrepreneurs and businesses and on the types of firms that 
are more likely to experience unfavourable application outcomes. That is, the focus of 
most empirical research is on supply-side decisions. The current research attempts to 
shed some light on demand–side considerations. Drawing upon data collected as the 
UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2014), we identify links between entrepreneurs’ 
diligence, business risk and finance-related advice-seeking prior to initiating loan and 
overdraft applications. The results show evidence of the usefulness of advice in 
ameliorating, both structural and strategic, business risk and improving the prospects of 





Support for the creation and development of small firms is a central component of the 
industrial policies of most nations (Blackburn, 2016). A central concern for policy in 
all countries has been with the difficulty SMEs may face in accessing bank loans (Beck 
et al., 2013; Canton et al., 2013). Due to relative information opacity, small firms 
represent riskier prospects to potential sources of finance (Berger and Udell, 2003; 
Kirschenmann, 2016; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). For banks, as the primary source of 
external finance, asymmetric information manifests in a greater risk of moral hazard 
and higher agency costs of debt. The firm owner, who is typically also the manager and 
key decision maker, has an incentive to pursue riskier projects since the costs of these 
risks are disproportionately borne by the lender (Berger and Udell, 2003; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). Lending to small firms (and lending smaller amounts) carries 
disproportionately higher costs of due diligence (Treichel and Scott, 2006); with these 
costs inflated in the face of limited credit histories or audited financial statements. 
Largely for these reasons, smaller firms have historically been identified as especially 
susceptible to credit rationing. 
However, through the use of different lending mechanisms, evidence suggests that 
banks and small firms manage to avoid credit rationing on a general basis (Berger and 
Black, 2011; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013; Parker, 2002). The provision of collateral, the 
imposition of shorter maturity terms, the insertion of covenants, and the setting of 
varying prices gives the tool to banks and entrepreneurs to reach terms of contract that 
are acceptable to both sides(Berger and Udell, 2003; Peltoniemi and Vieru, 2013). 
Nonetheless, while recognising that most small firm applicants are ultimately able to 
obtain debt financing (Cowling et al., 2012; Vos et al., 2007), there is some evidence of 
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loan scaling1 or structural higher pricing faced by specific segments such as innovative 
and growing firms (Lee et al., 2014; Nitani and Riding, 2013; Rostamkalaei and Freel, 
2016).  
One potential source of market failure results from consumers being poorly informed 
about the quality and prices of alternatives in the market before making decisions 
(Storey, 2003). On the supply side, different lending technologies have been 
investigated and the potential effect of these methods on small firms have been 
discussed (Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Black, 2011; Berger and Udell, 2006). 
However, we are much less informed about the readiness of the entrepreneur to 
approach external financiers. An important part of successful lending processes depends 
on entrepreneurs’ decisions about when, where, and how to apply for external financing.  
An example of the effect of imperfect information on the demand-side is the case of 
“discouraged borrowers” (Freel et al., 2012; Kon and Storey, 2003; Xiang et al., 2015). 
Discouraged borrowers do not apply for credit because they fear rejection – despite their 
declared neediness and despite being observationally indistinguishable from those who 
applied for and received money. There is also evidence that some entrepreneurs face 
initial rejection or are presented with unsuitable terms of contract at the first attempt 
and must re-apply, renegotiate, or switch banks for a better deal. For example, in the 
current data set, 40% and 25% of firms seeking loan and overdraft funding, respectively, 
report initial rejection or did not accept the initial terms of contract. Not being well 
informed about available alternatives and prices may lead entrepreneurs to avoid 
requesting external funds or increase the risks of initial rejection. In contrast, some 
applicants are likely to be more aware of potential information and resource gaps and, 
                                                 
 
1 In the current context, loan scaling is the practice of being offered some proportion of the funds 
requested, but less than the full amount. 
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accordingly, will be better placed to make an ‘educated’ decision. In short, our concern 
is with how well the demand-side is informed about external financing before initiating 
the applications process. 
Our research draws upon this idea and investigates the role of business advisors in 
preparing small businesses to request external finance. We speculate that higher 
financial awareness on the part of the entrepreneur and a higher degree of business risk 
will both associate with a higher probability of understanding the knowledge gap and, 
accordingly, of seeking advice. Our paper seeks to study this group of bank clients and 
the effect of advisory services in ameliorating resource access pressures. If business 
advice reduces information and risk asymmetries, by allowing firms to better present 
themselves to banks, then firms may experience better initial outcomes than similar 
non-advice seeking firms. 
Drawing on data from the UK SME Finance Monitor, our paper considers applicants 
for new bank facilities in the UK during 2011-2014. As segue to our main analyses, we 
begin by modelling the use of borrowing-specific business advice. That is, we explore 
what types of entrepreneurs identify (and act upon) a need for advice before applying 
for external finance. Following this, we investigate whether accessing business advice 
helps applicants get satisfactory results at their first attempt of approaching banks. We 
hypothesize that the riskiness of the business and the diligence of the entrepreneur are 
good indicators of the probability of seeking advice, and of the ability to successfully 
exploit advice. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the characteristics of firms 
or individuals that are linked with advice seeking behaviour. From this we develop our 
opening two hypotheses. Thereafter, it reviews evidence on the potential effect of 
advice on loan application success and in mitigating access to finance problems. From 
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this we form our remaining two hypotheses. Section 3 outlines our data and econometric 
choices; section 4 elaborates our findings; and section 5 discusses the implications of 
our results for entrepreneurs and policy. 
 
2.2. Business advice and SMEs 
Decision makers rarely operate in isolation. Rather, they draw upon internal and 
external sources of information to analyze a situation and to draft a plan. Entrepreneurs, 
faced with a dynamic business environment and dense regulations, frequently recognise 
the limits of their expertise. In such circumstances, entrepreneurs must search for 
additional information and expertise. Evidence on the use of advice by small firms 
suggests broad use of social networks, business networks, banks and accountants, 
private professional business services and publicly funded advisory services (Bennett 
and Robson, 1999; McGee and Sawyerr, 2003; Shaw and Bennett, 1999). Crucially, 
advice is different from static sources of information such as reports, regulatory 
documents, and internet content. Advice entails an interactive and iterative process of 
exchanging information, involving the advice seeker and advice supplier (McGee and 
Sawyerr, 2003). Advice is a recommendation (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006) or an 
influence (Harvey et al., 2000) which is aimed at reducing complexity in the 
environment. The decision maker may utilize the advice or disregard it (wholly or in 
part), but in the process of exchanging information a new piece of knowledge or 
perspective is inevitably transferred. Through decreasing risk and complexity and 
adding knowledge resources, business advice may improve the prospects of small firms. 
The empirical evidence typically suggests a positive impact of business advice on small 
firms’ competitiveness (Bennett and Robson, 2000; Chrisman et al., 2005; Chrisman 
and McMullan, 2004; Robson and Bennett, 2000). 
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The ability to recognise missing information or the likelihood of having limited 
confidence in one’s decision-making are affected by the entrepreneur’s human capital 
(Collis and Jarvis, 2002; Han et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2007; Larsson et al., 2003; 
Scott and Irwin, 2009), the level of pre-advice confidence and the accuracy of past 
decisions (Yaniv, 2004), perceptions of the complexity of the environment and of the 
current challenges (Dyer and Ross, 2008; Trevelyan, 2008). Accordingly, advice 
seeking behaviour and information search activity is influenced by individuals’ 
confidence in their decisions (Yaniv, 2004). At opposite extremes, being highly 
knowledgeable or knowing too little may lead to individuals’ overconfidence about their 
skills and judgment (Bhandari and Deaves, 2006). Forbes (2005)  demonstrates that 
‘comprehensiveness’ is associated with overconfidence in entrepreneurs. In this way, 
we may anticipate a U-shaped relationship between diligence and overconfidence such 
that the likelihood of being overconfidence initially decreases with diligence, but at very 
high levels of diligence (i.e. ‘comprehensiveness’) overconfidence may return. 
However, the comprehensiveness required is likely to be extensive and, in a mixed 
sample of small firms, unlikely to be frequently observed. Rather, we hypothesize that 
better informed and more diligent entrepreneurs are more capable of recognising 
uncertainty in lending markets and take preventative actions to avoid disappointment. 
That is, they are more likely to seek external advice before applying: 
Hypothesis 1a. Informed and diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to seek advice for 
their financing needs. 
 
Entrepreneurs’ need for external advice is also influenced by the characteristics of their 
firms. For instance, the size and age of the business are frequently shown to affect the 
probability and intensity of advice seeking (Boter and Lundström, 2005; Dyer and Ross, 
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2008; Johnson et al., 2007; Mole et al., 2008; Robson et al., 2008). Both size and age 
may be thought to indicate relative ‘riskiness’. Although larger companies are likely to 
face more complex problems (Johnson et al., 2007), it is the resource constraints 
associated with smaller size that drives the “liability of smallness” (Aldrich and Auster, 
1986). In a similar vein, the related concept of the “liability of newness” is likely to 
explicate the relationship between age and advice seeking (Stinchcombe and March, 
1965). As businesses age, legitimacy improves, knowledge and resources are 
accumulated  and the need for ‘routine’ external advice diminishes (Bennett and 
Robson, 2000). 
However, firm risk may be strategic as well as structural. Irrespective of age and size 
considerations, firms adopting specific strategies may face increased risk and 
uncertainty. Riskier strategies increase perceived environmental uncertainty and, from 
the perspective of potential funders, information opacity. Entrepreneurs, in turn, must 
increase their efforts towards environmental screening (Dyer and Ross, 2008; McGee 
and Sawyerr, 2003). Higher perceived risk is reflected in the behaviour of entrepreneurs. 
For example, innovative firms are more likely to recognise the need to contact external 
sources of information to reduce uncertainty (Bennett and Robson, 2000; Johnson et al., 
2007). In a similar manner, exporting, as a method of expansion and growth, also 
increases the complexity of operations and uncertainty (Bennett and Robson, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2007). Moreover, growth history may also affect the propensity to seek 
advice (Bennett and Robson, 2000). Growing firms, recognising their higher risk, are 
likely to perceive of a higher level of difficulty in accessing external financial (Binks 
and Ennew, 1996; Westhead and Storey, 1997). Indeed, this financing difficulty for 
higher risk firm may not only be a perception. Recent empirical studies have provided 
evidence of loan scaling (Freel 2007) or higher pricing (Nitani and Riding, 2013) toward 
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innovative and growing firms. Following this, we hypothesise that increased risk, 
associated with both structural and strategic factors, reduces entrepreneur’s confidence 
in obtaining external finance, and therefore: 
Hypothesis 1b. Entrepreneurs whose firms exhibit a higher degree of risk are more 
likely to seek external sources of information before approaching banks. 
 
Beyond use, measuring the effectiveness of advice and soft support is difficult. Advice 
is a perishable and intangible good (Bennett and Robson, 1999). Moreover, observing 
how the advice seeker reacts to the advice is not straightforward. Advisees assess the 
quality of the given advice based on their perceptions. They weigh the advice against 
their initial intentions (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 2004). They utilize it, or 
discard it. Indeed, individuals may show reluctance to follow advice even when they 
know it is true and it is free (Harvey and Fischer, 1997). Nevertheless, in the process of 
exchanging information, the typical advisee receives reassuring information about their 
decision (Ramsden and Bennett, 2005). Studies frequently show that entrepreneurs see 
positive effects from advice and can link the advice to better performance (Bennett & 
Robson 2000; Berry et al. 2006; Boter & Lundström 2005; Scott & Irwin 2009). 
Evidence indicates that business advice may help small firms to survive or grow 
(Chrisman and McMullan, 2000; Wren and Storey, 2002). Broadly speaking, taking up 
advice has been shown to benefit advice seekers (Harvey and Fischer, 1997). Advice, 
even poor quality advice, is thought to decrease complexity (McGee and Sawyerr, 2003) 
and error variance (Harvey and Fischer, 1997). Both discounting and utilising advice 
are related to the entrepreneurs’ confidence in their knowledge and reasoning. Better 
informed individuals are more capable of analyzing the information they receive. We 
speculate that more informed and diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to realize the 
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value of the advice they are offered and utilize or discard it effectively. Accordingly, 
we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 2a: More informed and diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to benefit 
from external advice; with the benefits manifest in a successful financial application. 
 
With respect to the efficacy of the advice in reducing risk; using external advice is likely 
to lower the perceived level of complexity (Ramsden and Bennett, 2005) and increases 
the entrepreneur’s post-advice confidence (Dyer and Ross, 2008). Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that the advice sought specifically for external financing will help 
entrepreneurs reduce the uncertainty associated with their firm and increase the chances 
of favourable outcome: 
Hypothesis 2b. Entrepreneurs with higher risk profiles are more likely to benefit from 
external advice when applying for external financing.  
 
Seeking advice, valuing, utilizing, or discarding it are not solely dependent upon the 
decision maker. Rather, it is also affected by structure and the size of the advice market, 
types of task, rewards system, quality of advice, and trust and power distance between 
advisees and advisors ( Bennett & Robson 2000; Berry et al. 2006; Gooderham et al. 
2004; Larsson et al. 2003; Mole 2002; Harvey et al. 2000; Mole & Bramley 2006). Due 
to data limitations, our study cannot investigate the structure of advice taking-giving 
systems. Rather we are constrained to focus solely on the entrepreneur. In our study, 
sources of advice are treated as homogenous. However, we construct an objective index 
to measure the effectiveness of advice. We call an application a ‘success’ if the 
application is new and if funds are offered by the bank and accepted by the entrepreneur 
at the first attempt - before the entrepreneur and the bank engage in re-negotiating, 
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reduce the amount, or the entrepreneur switches banks. We believe that this measure 
can help us to understand whether seeking advice can save time and resources and 
prevent unnecessary stress to the entrepreneur.  
 
2.3. Data and methodology 
The data used in this paper is the series of cross-section surveys comprising the Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor (2011-2014) accessed from UK Data 
Archive (BDRC Continental, 2014). The first wave was conducted in 2011 and repeated 
quarterly2. In each wave, 5000 telephone interviews were conducted on a broad range 
of issues related to small firm finance. The respondents to the questionnaire were the 
persons in charge of making financial decisions within sample firms.  Sample 
businesses are for-profit, non-governmental and independent, with less than 250 
employees and less than £25 Million prior year sales turnover. The screening criteria 
remained the same during all waves of data collection. The sample is drawn from Dun 
and Bradstreet and Experian and captures a wide range of businesses across different 
sectors, sizes, ages, external risk ratings, and locations. In addition, the data provides 
information on business performance and strategy, planning, and human resource 
policies. Compared with the UK business population statistics, the dataset is over-
sampled toward larger firms (BDRC Continental, 2015); therefore, analysis without 
weights would be biased towards those firms.  
In our analysis, we used the probability sample weight calculated by BDRC Continental 
from the first quarter of 2012 to second quarter of 2014. The data, and sampling weight, 
is provided on a 10 waves rolling basis. The weighting is calculated based on population 
                                                 
 
2 The last quarter conducted but not published by this date is second quarter of 2015. 
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figures for SMEs across numbers of employees, business sectors, 12 NUTS1 regions, 
and start-ups (see BDRC Continental, 2015). The total sample size is more than 50,000 
observations, which represents more than 4.5 million businesses within the UK. All the 
presented analyses and statistics in our paper are weighted, unless otherwise stated. 
Given the large size of the dataset, we speculate that there is limited risk of cross 
sampling. Moreover, if a firm appears more than once in the dataset, as a loan applicant 
and overdraft applicant in the same year, they are treated as a single firm with identical 
covariates across independent and control variables.  
We divided our sample on the basis of overdraft and loan requests separately. The 
reasons for requesting each type of facility are likely to differ: overdrafts, trade credit 
and lines of credit are mainly used to address working capital needs, whereas longer 
term loans are typically requested for the purchase of premises and equipment (Berger 
and Udell, 2003). In the unweighted sample, there were 2401 and 4572 firms that 
applied for, respectively, term loans and overdrafts and, in turn, 25% and 13% of these 
applicants sought advice prior to application. It appears that entrepreneurs perceive 
greater challenges when they decide to apply for term loans. The survey studied the 
demand for external financing in the 12 months preceding each wave of the survey. The 
survey explicitly asks, only from new applicants, whether the entrepreneur has sought 
external advice before applying for her new loan or overdraft facility3. This gave us the 
opportunity to investigate the characteristics of those managers who look for bank-
related application advice, not general advice. We did not include firms who were asked 
by banks to re-negotiate the terms of contract, cancel an existing facility, lower or 
increase a loan or overdraft amount, since the decision to approach the banks was not 
                                                 
 
3 The text of the question reads: “Did you seek any external advice before applying for your 
overdraft/loan facility?”  
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initiated by the entrepreneur. In addition, in the case of existing facilities, both sides are 
likely to be better informed about the condition of the facility and its riskiness.  
Consequently, we prepared two different sub-samples: Loan applicants and overdraft 
applicants. Since the sample only deals with new applications, the problem of selection 
bias might exist (we do not observe how non-applicants and banks would behave should 
the entrepreneurs decided to apply for a facility). To control for selection bias, we hoped 
to estimate a two-stage Heckman procedure, modelling financial neediness in the first 
stage. However, from the variables available, it was not possible to meet the exclusion 
criteria. There are some questions which explore the reasons for seeking finance, 
however, those questions were only asked of applicants and cannot be used in a two 
stage analysis. With this in mind, we are cautious in not extending our findings to non-
applicants. 
To test hypothesis 1a and 1b, we model the probability of seeking advice prior to 
requesting external finance as a function of characteristics of the entrepreneur and 
potential sources of application risk alongside with a set of control variables. To 
investigate the effect of advice in mitigating risk, ideally we would like to employ 
advice-taking as an independent variable and assess its significance in explaining the 
probability of obtaining credit. However, since many of the variables hypothesized to 
influence advice seeking behaviour are also likely to bear on application success, this 
approach raises conceptual and empirical challenges. To overcome this challenge, one 
might seek to replace advice-seeking with its instrument. However, as is frequently the 
case in research of this kind, finding suitable instruments was not possible4. 
Accordingly, we chose to split the sample further and regress the probability of 
                                                 
 
4 The pitfalls of using mis-specified two-stage models and invalid or weak instrument are explained by 
Puhani (2000) and Murray (2006) . 
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successful application for advice seekers and their counterparts separately. This allows 
us to compare the variables that improve or diminish the probability of application 
success for firms seeking advice and non-seekers of advice5.  
 
2.3.1. Dependent variables 
In the first stage of our analysis, identifying the characteristics of advice seekers, we 
used a dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur sought external advice prior to 
applying for bank finance. As indicated, some applicants were referred to sources of 
advice by banks after initial rejection. We do not include these applicants as they 
approached external sources of advice to satisfy their banks, not to identify any potential 
gap proactively. This operationalisation of advice-seeking remained the same over all 
analyses.   
For the dependent variable used in the second stage of our analysis, we employed a 
specific definition for application success. We consider an application successful if the 
bank and entrepreneur agree on a contract at the first attempt. This allows us to consider 
the effect of advice seeking prior to approaching banks and to control for the effect of 
appealing, renegotiating, re-applying, or switching banks. For this reason, our rate of 
successful application is lower than the ultimate success rate (unweighted, 62% and 
75% success rate for, respectively, loan and overdraft based on our definition; and 80% 
and 88% for ultimate success defined by the survey conductor). To test the hypotheses, 
we estimate Probit regression models, since our dependent variables are binary. 
                                                 
 
5 We also tested for multicollinearity problem by calculating Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). None of 
the variables showed VIFs greater than 10.  
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2.3.2. Independent variables 
Our study investigates the effect of perceived knowledge gaps and business risk on 
advice seeking behaviour and on the usefulness of advice sought. We incorporated 
different measures to proxy these two elements. Firstly, we hypothesize that diligent 
entrepreneurs are more likely to recognise knowledge gaps, seek external advice (H1a) 
and use the advice effectively (H2a). It seems clear that entrepreneurs require some 
degree of absorptive capacity to realize the benefits of advice (Gooderham et al., 2004). 
To measure diligence, we first consider financial training. We speculate that training in 
financial management helps entrepreneurs understand external financing requirements 
and take the necessary steps to meet those requirements. Beyond this, we conjecture 
that if the long term plan of the business is clear, the entrepreneur is more likely to know 
the resources needed for development and act to acquire these. In line with this idea, we 
also use a dummy variable indicating the production of regular accounting reports. 
Generating systematic accounting information should help the owner identify sources 
of risk and to take the necessary steps to mitigate these. Periodic reporting is the most 
used indicator of the financial wellbeing of entrepreneurs and often signals a good 
relationship with lenders (Collis and Jarvis, 2002).   
Our second concern is with the effect of potential business risk on the propensity to seek 
advice (H1b) and on the effectiveness of advice in mitigating risk (H2b). In the first 
instance, we use innovation as an indicator of riskiness. Innovation is an essentially 
speculative strategy, with innovative firms committing resources to an uncertain 
outcome. Past research on the financing of innovative small firms has shown them to 
be less successful in loan markets relative to their less innovative peers (Freel, 2007). 
As Mina and colleagues note (2013, p. 894), “uncertain innovation activities negatively 
affect the supply of finance, in line with the expectation that businesses undertaking 
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risky projects will incur higher external costs of capital and will have access to 
suboptimal levels of financial resources”. In our analysis, a firm is innovative if they 
declared they developed a new product or service and/or significantly improved an 
aspect of the business in the three years prior to the survey. 
Our second indicator of potential business risk is exporting. In the face of imperfect 
access to information, foreign market entry becomes a particularly risky and uncertain 
undertaking (Bennett and Robson, 2000; Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). We identify a 
firm as an exporter if they declare that they sell products or services outside of the UK. 
Ideally, we would also like to capture the effect of firm growth on perceived riskiness 
(see, for example, Rostamkalaei & Freel 2016). Indeed, data on the growth history of 
firms were available to us; however, the data were highly collinear with business age. 
That is, the majority of firms which experience substantial growth in sale turnover were 
the youngest ones. Accordingly, we only include the age of the business in our models. 
We also proxy business risk by firm size and age: reasoning that older and larger firms 
have improved access to resources, which lower their risk profiles. In addition, we 
expect younger, less experienced firms (and their entrepreneurs) to have accumulated 
less knowledge; therefore, they are expected to be more likely to perceive higher risks 
with their applications. Firm size is measured by number of employees and firm age by 
the years since business establishment. Both variables are measured categorically.  
Our next measures relate to the relationship of the applicants with their banks. It has 
long been argued that established relationships between banks and their customers 
provide the basis for the exchange and accumulation of better quality data about 
entrepreneurs and the prospects of their businesses; leading to a decrease in the 
information asymmetry that is thought to mark small firm-bank relationships (Binks 
and Ennew, 1996). In this way, relational banking may increase small firms’ access to 
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information asymmetry that is thought to mark small firm-bank relationships (Binks 
and Ennew, 1996). In this way, relational banking may increase small firms’ access to 
bank facilities or, at least, lead to better terms of contract. For instance, in a study of the 
effect of bank provided business advice on the financial condition of small firms, Han 
et al (2012) found that better relationships with banks lowered the entrepreneur’s 
perceptions of difficulties in accessing finance. In line with this, we speculate that 
applying to a firm’s main bank will lower perceived risk for both the entrepreneur and 
the bank. However, we observe that almost all overdraft applicants applied to their main 
banks (table 1). For this reason, we excluded this variable from our overdraft 
applications estimations. In addition, we are able to identify first time applicants. This 
group are expected to know less about the application procedures and banks’ lending 
criteria, and are more likely to seek advice prior to applying. We also control for the 
amount of facility sought; with the expectation that larger amounts signal more risk to 
both banks and entrepreneurs.  
In evaluating the effectiveness of advice, we add one additional variable. For both term 
loans and overdrafts, we identify the reason(s) why the money was requested. We 
speculate that the reasons funds are sought may affect application outcome. For 
example, if the loan is sought to purchase assets, the risk taken on by the bank would 
be lower than a situation where the funds are sought to support firm growth. In the 
former case, firms can pledge the purchased asset to insure the loan; in the latter, money 
is used to fund a risky activity with an uncertain outcome. 
Relatedly, in assessing the riskiness of the business, the ability of firms to provide 
collateral to partially insure the loan and reduce moral hazard has been widely discussed 
in the literature (e.g. Berger & Udell 1998; Parker 2002). Ideally, we would hope to 
include some measure of the firm’s ability to pledge collateral, such as firm’s assets or 
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entrepreneur’s personal wealth. Unfortunately, this information was not available. We 
hope to capture some effect of asset availability by controlling for industry and business 
age. 
 
2.3.3. Control variables 
In order to estimate the unique effects of diligence and riskiness on the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs and banks, it is important to account for other possible influences on 
advice-seeking behaviour and application success. To this end, we include a number of 
control variables in our models. Firstly, we include a variable that indicates the location 
of the firm, since the density and quality of advisory services may differ and past 
research has shown that small firms typically use local providers for business advice 
(Bennett et al., 2000). The variable takes the form of a categorical variable that records 
whether firms were located in the dominant economies of London or the Southeast of 
the UK, with the rest of the UK acting as a reference group. We also include industry 
sector, since the objective and perceived risk of businesses may differ across different 
sectors (Michelacci and Schivardi, 2013). Moreover, some industries may draw upon 
their networks more for gathering external information. In addition, we incorporate a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the business is mainly run by a woman (i.e. more than 
50% of the firm belongs to a woman). Gender is a ‘usual suspect’ in studies concerned 
with small firms and their banks (e.g. Orser et al. 2006) and advice seeking (Mole et al. 
2008). We control for the legal status of the business on the grounds that the number of 
proprietors may influence the need to seek external advice and the likelihood of 
application success (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006). Finally, since the survey was 
conducted after the credit crunch of 2008 and the subsequent ‘healing’ period (Cowling 
et al., 2012), we do not expect the perceived riskiness of the businesses would differ 
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across 2011-2014. However, as Cowling, Liu, and Ledger (2012, p.796) note, “For 
banks and small businesses, the way they react to a recessionary environment is quite 
different and not synchronised”. Accordingly, we control for the year in which each 
wave of the survey was conducted to account for the potential psychic effect of the 
credit crunch – viz. banks scaling down available credit and small businesses’ 
reluctance to approach banks.  
 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest used in our analysis. 
The data in the table are weighted. Accordingly, the bias towards larger firms, present 
in the unweighted data, is not apparent here. More than half of the firms in the weighted 
sample are zero-employees businesses. While 74% of small firms in the UK are zero-
employee firms, only 20% of these firms were considered in the sampling protocol 
(BDRC Continental, 2014). This difference illustrates why it is important to consider 
sampling weight in our analysis. Beyond size, 22% and 17% of loan and overdraft 
applicants were less than two years old. These figures approach the 20% estimation 
reported by the survey conductor for the share of start-ups in UK small businesses 
population. 
In the case of both loan and overdraft applicants, 50% of firms use regular accounting 
reports and more than 40% have formal business plans. Further, around 30% of 
entrepreneurs have been trained to manage their business’ financial tasks. In terms of 
innovators and exporters, given the definitions employed, half the sample report being 






Loan Overdraft  Loan Overdraft 
Advice seekers 20% 10%    
Successful 
application 
47% 63% Applicants to main 
bank 
89% 97% 
Financial training 30% 28% Age of Business   
Business plan 47% 42% start-up 22% 17% 
Accounting 51% 50% 2-5 yrs 22% 22% 
exporter 11% 10% 6-10 yrs 27% 28% 
Innovation 50% 50% >15 yrs 29% 33% 
first time applicant 46% 29% Size   
Amount of facility   Zero employees 59% 57% 
    Less than 10k 41% 62% 1-9 employees 34% 37% 
    10K-100K 44% 32% 10-49 employees 6% 6% 
    >100k 15% 6% >50 employees 1% 1% 
Table does not include data on control variables: Gender, Location, Sector, Legal Status, Time of 
survey 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics (weighted) – as percentage of loan or overdraft applicants 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Advice Seeking 
Turning to our main results, Table 2 reports the results of our first stage analysis – 
weighted Probit models estimating the probability of bank-specific advice seeking 
behaviour among loan and overdraft applicants. In the first instance, we hypothesised 
that better informed firms (proxied by regular financial reporting, formal business 
planning and financial training) would be more likely to seek advice prior to 
approaching banks for funds. In the loan panel, only formal business planning is 
associated with the increased probability of advice seeking. However, for overdraft 
funding, preparing regular accounting reports and the presence of a formal business plan 
both increase the probability of advice seeking. We take these results to partially 
confirm hypothesis 1a; which speculated that more diligent entrepreneurs would be 
more likely to perceive information/resource gaps and seek advice before requesting 
external finance. To rephrase, among applicants to banks, those entrepreneurs who 
show some degree of professionalism through regular accounting reports and preparing 
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business plan are more likely to realize a gap between what they know and what they 
need to know before completing a bank application.  
Hypothesis 1b held that riskier firms would be more likely to seek advice – with 
riskiness measured by exporting and innovation activities; by the age and size of the 
business; by applications to other than the firm’s main bank; by first time applications; 
and by the amount of funds requested. Our results suggest that innovative firms were 
more likely to seek advice prior to approaching banks for both term loans and overdraft 
funding. Exporting also positively associates with the probability of advice-seeking 
prior to applications for overdraft funding. We interpret these findings to show that 
entrepreneurs pursuing riskier strategies appreciate the greater risk to banks and 
increase their information-seeking/uncertainty-reducing efforts. Similarly, the 
coefficients on business age categories for both loan and overdraft applications indicate 
that as firms age, the probability of seeking external advice fall. In the same vein, as 
firms get larger, they are likely to accumulate more tangible and intangible assets and 
build relationship with their banks, such that they perceive fewer knowledge gaps and 
less risk with respect to bank finance. In this way, we expected firm size to be negatively 
associated with the probability of advice-seeking. Our results, however, only provide 
partial support: For overdraft applications, firms with more than 50 employees are less 
likely to seek finance advice than zero employee firms.  
Continuing with the hypothesised influence of perceived riskiness on advice-seeking 
behaviour; the amount of facility sought is also a significant predictor of the likelihood 
of advice-seeking. For both loan and overdraft applicants, as the amount of requested 
facility increases, the entrepreneur’s likelihood of engaging with external sources of 
information and advice increases. In general, these results support hypothesis 1b in 
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indicating that riskier firms were more likely to seek advice prior to approaching banks 







DV Advice sought=1 Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Financial training (yes==1) 0.124 0.154 0.154 0.114 
Business Plan (yes==1) 0.314** 0.135 0.271** 0.118 
Regular accounting reports (yes==1) 0.0768 0.145 0.414*** 0.144 
Export (yes==1) 0.269 0.227 0.234** 0.115 
Innovation (yes==1) 0.345** 0.139 0.00513 0.113 
First time applicant (yes==1) -0.0461 0.141 0.281** 0.135 
Application to main bank (yes==1) -0.0115 0.204   
Amount sought (ref: <10k)     
   10-100K 0.367** 0.164 0.151 0.115 
   >100 K 1.122*** 0.184 0.414** 0.164 
business age (ref: start-ups)         
   2-5 yrs -0.225 0.201 -0.259 0.181 
   6-15 yrs -0.813*** 0.221 -0.269 0.181 
   >15 yrs -0.506** 0.221 -0.538*** 0.178 
Size (ref: 0 employees)         
   1-9 emps 0.196 0.158 -0.0324 0.138 
   10-49 emps 0.00966 0.215 -0.0152 0.174 
   >50 emps -0.252 0.261 -0.380* 0.214 
Business run by female 0.337** 0.151 0.0343 0.11 
Location (ref=rest of the UK)         
    London 0.234 0.21 -0.173 0.132 
   South East 0.0666 0.184 0.00858 0.156 
Sector(ref=community and personal 
services)         
   Agriculture 0.142 0.244 0.406** 0.194 
   Manufacturing -0.0456 0.305 0.117 0.234 
   Construction -0.0156 0.256 0.147 0.204 
   Services 0.143 0.218 0.00853 0.176 
   Real Estate 0.0857 0.24 0.249 0.184 
Legal (sole proprietorships==1) 0.258 0.164 -0.364*** 0.14 
Wave (ref==2011)         
  2012 -0.233 0.165 -0.109 0.137 
  2013 -0.0768 0.193 -0.0187 0.144 
  2014 -0.00959 0.352 0.0676 0.231 
Constant -1.624*** 0.343 -1.452*** 0.291 
Observations 1759  3955  
p-value 0  0  
Summer's D 66%  74%  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






2.5.2. Benefits of Advice 
Turning to the second stage of our analysis: Table 3 displays the results of weighted 
Probit models of the probability of successful loan and overdraft applications for advice 
seekers and non-seekers. As mentioned, our definition of successful application is 
different from ultimate success in securing external funding. If bank and entrepreneur 
agree on terms of contract at the first attempt, we call that application a successful one. 
Considering the variables that are used to indicate the entrepreneur’s diligence, the data 
provide no support for hypothesis 2a. Indeed, some results appear contrary to our 
speculations. For example, taking advice decreases the probability of accessing 
overdraft funding for applicants with financial training. It also decreases the probability 
of access to loans for applicants who generate regular accounting reports, while this 
measure has a positive influence on application success in the non-advice seeking 
group. The only positive significant effect of advice exists for overdraft applicants who 
had a business plan. These counter-intuitive results are certainly intriguing. One 
possible explanation might relate to the effect of advice in increasing the confidence of 
entrepreneurs. In such circumstances, confident entrepreneurs, with additional 
knowledge, are less likely to accept the bank’s initial offer and more likely to engage in 
negotiation (in which case they would be erroneously classed as ‘unsuccessful’ here). 
If we use final funding outcomes as a measure of success, the negative effect of regular 
accounting reports does not exist. It is also possible that, while more diligent 
entrepreneurs are in a better position to realize the riskiness of their business and to seek 
advice, ultimately the advice cannot wholly ameliorate the risks involved. Whilst it is 





  No Advice Advice No advice Advice 
DV Successful application=1 Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Financial training -0.050 0.16 -0.103 0.243 0.048 0.115 -0.540** 0.245 
Business Plan -0.118 0.154 -0.077 0.284 -0.215** 0.109 -0.0785 0.237 
Regular accounting reports 0.291* 0.164 -0.72*** 0.27 0.181 0.158 0.108 0.267 
Export 0.15 0.271 0.018 0.314 0.0122 0.103 -0.175 0.255 
Innovation -0.313* 0.165 0.456* 0.273 -0.226** 0.106 0.0079 0.239 
First time applicant (yes==1) -0.27 0.165 0.121 0.266 -0.99*** 0.122 -0.664** 0.294 
Application to main bank 
(yes==1) 
-0.526** 0.243 0.934*** 0.36         
Money for daily cash 
purposes 
   
  -0.043 0.171 0.322 0.328 
Money for asset purchasing -0.116 0.161 -0.179 0.264         
Money for funding growth -0.185 0.169 -0.64*** 0.236         
Amount sought (ref: <10k)                 
   10-100K -0.144 0.169 0.238 0.357 0.00769 0.112 0.033 0.29 
   >100 K -0.187 0.204 0.729* 0.381 0.124 0.186 0.0299 0.349 
business age (ref: start-ups)                 
   2-5 yrs 0.203 0.248 0.457 0.373 0.365** 0.175 -0.0225 0.36 
   6-15 yrs 0.197 0.244 0.167 0.426 0.550*** 0.177 0.232 0.384 
   >15 yrs 0.551** 0.244 0.279 0.443 0.599*** 0.186 0.39 0.393 
Size (ref: 0 employees)                 
   1-9 emps 0.296* 0.16 0.025 0.319 0.108 0.116 -0.411 0.299 
   10-49 emps 0.656*** 0.219 0.660* 0.356 0.448*** 0.152 -0.373 0.336 
   >50 emps 1.016*** 0.292 1.110** 0.429 0.619*** 0.211 0.605 0.422 
Business run by female -0.0107 0.178 0.703*** 0.25 0.154 0.112 0.484** 0.235 
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Location (ref=rest of the 
UK)                 
    London -0.440** 0.222 -0.421 0.391 -0.277* 0.15 0.508 0.342 
   South East 0.195 0.206 0.108 0.311 0.047 0.15 -0.145 0.326 
Sector (ref= community and 
personal services)                 
   Agriculture 0.495 0.326 1.037** 0.453 0.00332 0.22 0.474 0.427 
   Manufacturing -0.488 0.332 0.429 0.432 -0.22 0.247 -0.335 0.452 
   Construction -0.409 0.326 0.661 0.513 -0.277 0.205 0.423 0.428 
   Services -0.305 0.284 0.338 0.334 -0.452** 0.187 -0.276 0.373 
   Real Estate -0.414 0.311 0.704* 0.409 -0.274 0.213 0.138 0.376 
Legal (sole proprietorships 
==1) 0.0549 0.183 0.257 0.281 0.0157 0.124 -0.304 0.302 
Wave (ref==2011)                 
  2012 0.227 0.21 -0.0468 0.29 -0.136 0.122 -0.0431 0.273 
  2013 -0.0923 0.222 0.242 0.333 -0.229* 0.129 -0.379 0.284 
  2014 0.513 0.333 1.042* 0.546 -0.36 0.256 -0.41 0.557 
Constant 0.402 0.521 -1.938** 0.771  0.725**  0.330  0.516  0.67  
Observations 1228   416   3312   491   
p 0.0 
 
0   0   0.00363   
Summer's D 72%   58%   77%   68%   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Turning to measures of risk and hypothesis 2b, we find no evidence that exporting is a 
significant variable in explaining the probability of successful applications in both 
advice-seeking and non-seeking models. On the other hand, the negative effect of 
innovation on application success is absent from advice-seeking models and, indeed, is 
positively associated with successful loan applications. In both types of application, 
advice-seeking (and taking) benefits innovative firms. 
Our results also suggest that advice-seeking reduces the negative effects of smaller size 
and younger age on application success. For both overdraft and loan applications in the 
non-advice seeking group, size and age of the business are significant factors in 
explaining the probability of successful application. As one would expect, smaller and 
younger firms occupy unfavourable positions in lending markets in comparison to their 
better resourced and experienced counterparts. However, in our advice-seeking group, 
age is no longer a significant predictor of success. In a similar way, advice seeking 
seems to mitigate the liability of smallness when applying for overdraft funds – although 
the effect on loan applications is only partial: In loan applications, the negative effect 
of size on smaller firms is removed relative to firms with 1 to 10 employees. However, 
firms with more than 10 employees are still more likely to achieve a successful outcome 
than zero-employee firms. In general, advice helps to remove the positive significant 
effect of age and size in applications for bank finance. Advice taking may have an 
important role to play in bridging the knowledge gaps of micro firms and start-ups and 
help them overcome ‘liabilities’ associated with newness and smallness. 
Moreover, as anticipated, loan applicants are significantly less likely to enjoy initial 
application success when they apply exclusively to their main banks. However, this 
effect turns positive when applicants seek advice beforehand. It seems that advice may 
increase the entrepreneur’s knowledge of credit markets and, in consequence, their 
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confidence in their ability to secure a loan from their main bank. Advice taking also 
increases the chance of a successful application for larger loans. In the advice-seeking 
group, larger applications have a better chance of being successful. In the non-advice 
seeking group, the size of the facility is not associated with success. Finally, in the case 
of overdraft applications, first time applicants are significantly less likely to be 
successful; and advice-seeking does not alter this observed relationship. 
Taken together, we interpret the results to indicate support for hypothesis b2. That is, to 
the extent that advice-seeking ameliorates the risks associated with innovativeness, age, 
size and single sourcing, it improves the prospects of small firms. This is also in line 
with the reported association between use of advice and lower level of perceived 
difficulty in raising external finance (Scott and Irwin, 2009).  
To summarize both stages of analysis; we find some evidence that more diligent 
entrepreneurs are more likely to seek external advice when they decide to apply for bank 
facilities. However, they are not more likely to benefit from the advice sought in terms 
of improved chances of application success. Of course, this need not be interpreted as 
‘no effect’. Rather, advice-seeking could result in increased knowledge and confidence 
and an unwillingness to accept the first offer. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us 
to explore this further and we are constrained to simply note the absence of an 
association with initial funding outcomes. 
On the risk measures, we find that innovative firms are more likely to seek advice when 
the entrepreneur decides to apply for a bank loan and to benefit from the advice sought. 
Advice also improves the prospects of firms applying solely to their main banks. We 
speculate that this revolves around removing the negative effect of information 
restricted by the main bank and increasing the chance of successful application. Our 
strongest findings, however, relate to the effect of advice in attenuating difficulties in 
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obtaining bank facilities for newer firms and, to lesser degree, smaller firms. Younger 
firms across all models were shown to be the main consumers of pre-application advice 
and to benefit from the advice sought. In other words, newer and smaller firms that have 
accessed external advice appear to be more ‘debt ready’ than their counterparts who 
eschew advice. They are able to obtain what they need in shorter time, with less physic 
pressure, allowing the entrepreneur to spend more of their limited time and energy on 
developing the early stage firm.  
2.6.  Concluding Remarks 
To date, the literature on small firms and their banks has been dominated by concerns 
with funding outcomes, with some limited work on supply-side lending technologies 
(Berger and Black, 2011; Cowling et al., 2012).  The former often models application 
success as a function of a vector of firm and/or entrepreneur characteristics; to identify 
turn down rates or, more recently, adverse loan conditions among specific sub-sets of 
small firms (e.g. innovative, growing or exporting firms) or entrepreneurs (e.g. firms 
owned by women or visible minorities). This approach treats firms as islands of 
decision-making, which sits ill with longstanding evidence on the extensive use of 
external sources of advice by small firms (Bennett and Robson, 1999). 
Although small firms may be susceptible to credit rationing, this phenomenon is less 
likely to exist in the long run when the finance market for small firms is in equilibrium: 
i.e. there is a price at which the supply and demand for credit are equal. However, the 
price mechanism works under several conditions. For small firms “the key assumptions 
most likely to be contravened are those of perfect information and the absence of 
externalities” (Storey, 2003, p. 476). Imperfect information can give rise to perceived 
riskiness and leads to risk overestimation. Although there is limited evidence of broad-
based credit rationing, with turndown rates historically low, there is some evidence that 
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particular groups of small firms fare less well (e.g. the very young and small, innovative 
firms and growing firms). These groups are thought to be ‘riskier’. And, since many of 
the sources of risk are thought to be intractable, the typical response is to call for supply-
side interventions. For example, policies such as Loan Guarantee Schemes (LGS) 
reduce the objective risk to the lender by transferring much of the default risk to the 
government, encouraging the lender to fund projects which are not likely to secure debt 
without government intervention. 
However, a focus on supply-side interventions appears to ignore the possibility that the 
risk involved is a combination of both objective and subjective risk. The former may 
well be intractable (and amenable only to transference), but the latter is surely not. 
Rather, it is likely to be a function of information-asymmetries and may well be 
responsive to demand-side actions. One example of such effort is the “investment 
readiness” initiatives in the UK, which aim to prepare firms for equity financing (Mason 
and Harrison, 2001). There may also exist scope for better equipping small firms for 
lending markets (Freel 2007). These efforts may help small, high-risk firms to reduce 
their perceived riskiness and increase their chance of accessing debt with less effort, in 
shorter time, and on more favourable terms.  
In the current study, we are interested in the extent to which a particular form of 
demand-side action – advice seeking – acts to reduce identified liabilities in loan and 
overdraft applications to improve the prospects of small firms. Encouraging SMEs to 
access external advice has been a central plank of enterprise policy in most developed 
economies (Cumming and Fischer, 2012). In the UK, for instance, the government has 
sponsored the creation of a “mentoring gateway” (www.mentorsme.com), which seeks 
to link entrepreneurs with potential sources of advice in the public and private sectors. 
Outside of the UK, McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2016, p. 546), in their review of 
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European enterprise policy, suggest that for “small and micro-enterprises, in particular, 
basic business advice may be the single most cost-effective form of support”.  However, 
the advice offered under the ambit of enterprise policy is typically not specific to bank 
finance and, where it touches on financing at all, it is explicitly concerned with 
“investment readiness” (e.g. Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011, 7). 
Drawing upon data from the UK SME Finance Monitor (BDRC Continental, 2014), we 
investigate the link between borrowing-specific business advice and loan application 
success. Initially, we explore the extent to which diligence and risk associate with 
advice-seeking. In both cases, we observe that more diligent entrepreneurs and those 
leading riskier businesses are more likely to seek advice. 
Thereafter, we speculate that the benefits of advice-seeking will be greatest among 
diligent and risky businesses. Our results do not support the former; but strongly support 
the later. The prospects of innovative, new and micro firms are enhanced following 
lending-specific advice. The results suggest that demand-side efforts aimed at 
alleviating risk may be fruitful. In other words, advice-taking for the purpose of external 
financing may mitigate the ‘liability of smallness and newness’ and liabilities associated 
with innovativeness. 
Additional evidence of the positive impact of advice is important. A UK report (BMG 
Research, 2011), exploring barriers to the take up and use of business advice, noted that 
“[w]ith regards to the various categories of market failure, doubts about the benefits and 
value of assistance in relation to its cost appeared to be the most common form of market 
failure” (p. 71). This echoes Storey’s (Storey, 2003) earlier assertion that “[s]mall 
business owners do not realise the private benefits of obtaining expert advice from 
"outside" specialists”. That our results suggest a positive impact of advice on bank 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the trend of discouragement in the SME’s 
lending market during the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.  It detects the 
extent to which the responses of discouraged firms to improvements in the lending 
market are lagged. 
The results are based on surveys of UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2016). Probit 
regression models were used to assess the effect of time passed from the financial 
crisis on the probability of discouragement. The analysis, inter alia, shows that the rate 
of discouragement has reduced significantly since 2013. The results highlight the 
long-term effect of tightened credit supply on SMEs that are ready to invest, but hold 
back because of fear of rejection. 
The research suggests addressing imperfect information among discouraged SMEs 
that are recuperating from the financial crisis. With the rise of information asymmetry, 
entrepreneurs show a higher level of fear of rejection by financial institutions. The 
longer the effects of the financial crisis exists among entrepreneurs, the longer they 
self-ration from credit market, which subsequently leads to reduced levels of 
investment, growth, and innovation among SMEs.  
This research fills a gap in the literature of the effect of financial crisis on the latent 
demand for lending. It discusses the long-term effect of tightened credit supply among 





This research seeks to add to our understanding of the effect of credit squeeze after the 
2008 financial crisis on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly firms 
that are discouraged from borrowing. A number of studies have explored the effect of 
the financial crisis on SMEs, indicating that small firms faced particular problems in 
accessing external finance (Vermoesen et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Kremp & 
Sevestre 2013; Cowling et al., 2012). Research also indicates that there is less demand 
for external finance as a result of the credit squeeze (i.e. Cowling et al., 2012; 
Vermoesen et al., 2013). These studies focus on customers who applied for external 
financing. In the current study; however, the concern is with latent demand. The aim 
is to shed light on the proportion of small firms that hesitate to declare their demands 
known as “Discouraged Borrowers”. These firms are differentiated from other non-
applicants by their desire for credit. They refuse to ask for credit, not because they 
rely on other sources of finance, or they do not need it, but because they fear their 
applications being turned down (Kon and Storey, 2003). Research shows that initial 
credit squeeze created a rapid increase in the rate of discouragement in the UK lending 
market (Cowling et al., 2016). This research tries to understand to what extent this 
effect lasted.  
Current research regarding the profiles of discouraged borrowers are still scant and 
there is merit in understanding how shocks in the lending market could lead to 
increased fear of rejection among entrepreneurs. The importance of acknowledging 
discouraged borrowers is twofold: i) financiers may lose potential customers, and ii) a 
good but discouraged borrower relies on internal financing, which may limit 
investment and, subsequently, growth. 
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Access to finance is not the only determinant of a firm’s survival or growth (Cressy, 
1996), but it has been identified as a critical factor for growth (Beck et al., 2005; Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Coleman, 2002). As a firm develops and accumulates 
internal finance, its reliance on internal financing for growth diminishes and the use of 
external financing increases (Rahaman, 2011). The longer a firm hesitates to declare 
its financial need, the longer it needs to rely on internal financing and the likelihood of 
abandoning investment projects is greater (Price et al., 2013). With credit tightening, 
the gap between the cost of external and internal funds increases (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). This affects firms directly through increased financing expenses and 
indirectly through decreased asset values (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Smaller firms 
are less able to compensate with short term financing; therefore, they take cost-cutting 
measures, especially during a recession (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). A proportion of 
non-applicants, however, face self-imposed credit rationing. These firms need capital, 
but they don’t have the confidence to apply for credit.  
With the rise in information asymmetry, more firms are discouraged from applying for 
external financing (Cowling et al., 2016). They do not perceive themselves as good 
borrowers in the lending market. It may be expected that discouragement would 
decrease as banks resume previous levels of credit supply. A key question is by what 
means do firms respond to the improved lending environment and thus display 
decreased discouragement? Understanding the lagged effect of credit improvement on 
discouragement creates a window of opportunity to address higher perceived riskiness 
and the undeclared demands of firms that are ready to invest again.  
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To test the research question, 18 waves of UK Surveys of SME Finance Monitor 
(2011-2016)1 are drawn upon (BDRC Continental, 2016). The surveys collect 
information about finance related activities as well as discouragement. Probit models 
examine the relationship between the probability of discouragement among SMEs and 
the time passed from the 2008 financial crisis. The results of this study show that, 
ceteris paribus, decrease in discouragement lags improvements in lending market 
conditions. This suggests that SME owners’ or managers’ perceptions recover more 
slowly than the economy. Importantly, the improvement in discouragement lags 
traditional supply side indicators of the health of the small business credit market.  
This paper starts off by discussing the situation of small firms during the financial 
crisis and its relation to the theory of discouraged borrower. It then goes on to provide 
a description of the lending market for small firms in the context of this research (the 
UK at the time of crisis) and is followed by the presentation of the data and 
methodology used to test the research question. Finally, the findings and implications 
are discussed.  
3.2. Literature review 
The Pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) argues that firms, after exhausting 
internal resources, turn to external financing and prefer lower cost external finance: 
debt financing. Banks are the main source of debt finance for small firms (Berger and 
Udell, 2003). When a firm does not have access to finances offered by banks when 
needed, it may abandon its investment, rely on internal sources, or look for more 
expensive methods of financing. This may impose additional barrier to a firm’s 
growth. Due to higher information opacity, smaller firms are prone to tighter access to 




capital (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). One of the consequence is being more susceptible 
to credit rationing: being denied credit, despite being indistinguishable from good 
borrowers and willing to pay the market price (Parker, 2002). Research on 
entrepreneurial finance shows that some types of small firms may face a higher 
rejection rate (Freel, 2007; Irwin and Scott, 2010), but that the majority receive what 
they apply for (Fraser, 2004; Vos et al., 2007). At the time of crisis, SMEs faced a 
more restricted credit market (BMG Research, 2014), but the majority of applicants 
still did not face absolute credit rationing (Lee et al., 2014). 
Importantly, research shows that a larger proportion of firms are discouraged from 
applying for external finance than that of firms that applied and could not secure any 
form of finance (Freel et al., 2012; Levenson and Willard, 2000). In one UK based 
study, the number of discouraged firms is estimated at twice the level of firms that 
were rejected2 (Freel et al., 2012). If discouragement is an effective self-rationing 
mechanism (Han et al., 2009), then mainly bad borrowers will be excluded from the 
market. However, if discouraged firms misjudge their creditworthiness, then 
entrepreneurs decide adversely (Kon and Storey, 2003). In fact, they self-impose 
credit constraints. Given that a large number of firms are discouraged from loan 
applications, “appropriately” or “inappropriately” (Freel et al., 2012, p. 415), there is 
merit in turning our attention to discouraged firms during the aftermath of the credit 
crisis.  
Based on Kon and Storey’s (2003) model, discouragement is a function of information 
asymmetry, cost of application, and the difference between price of funds at banks and 
                                                          
2 According to Cowling et al. (2016), in 2008 2.65% of population of SMEs are discouraged. This figure in 2005 is 
8.1% in Freel et al (2012) with a different survey. The estimations of proportion of discouraged firms vary across 
different countries and methods of measurement (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling 
et al., 2016; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). 
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other credit institutions. Imperfect supply side information might result from banks 
not having enough information about firms to evaluate applications accurately. As 
banks accumulate data on their customers and build a benchmark for comparing new 
applications, entrepreneurs must increase their efforts in preparing applications. 
Consequently, both application costs and the fear of being rejected rise. Conversely, 
firms might not be confident of their prospects. When firms increase their information 
about their own prospects, good borrowers are more likely to apply and bad borrowers 
are more likely to exclude themselves from lending markets. Alternatively, a “two-
sided screening error model” might exist where both these situations are combined.  
The financial crisis and subsequent changes in the economy and in financial markets 
exacerbated imperfect information to both sides. One, the prospects of businesses 
diminished. And two, banks tightened credit to all customers, with small firms being 
disproportionately penalized (Bank of England, 2010; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013). 
With increased information asymmetry, one would expect to observe a higher rate of 
discouragement among SMEs. Conversely, one would expect to detect a lower 
probability of discouragement when the information opacity decreases. Following this 
one anticipates an inverted U curve in the rate of discouragement following the 
financial crisis. This study seeks to know more about the reaction of the entrepreneurs 
to the fluctuations of information asymmetry in lending market.  
On the side of businesses, the financial crisis of 2008 was followed by increased 
payment delay, insolvency for businesses, reduced demand for loans ((OECD), 2009), 
and increased rates of loan write offs and default (Bank of England, 2009a, 2013). In 
the UK, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant price dropped in 2008, started 
recovering in 2009 and reached the pre-recession level in 2012 (Office for National 
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Statistics, 2016). The percentage of firms that experienced growth in employment and 
turnover, dropped with the onset of the crisis (Cowling et al., 2015; IFF Research, 
2012). In terms of growth in employment, after the initial fall, SMEs have been able to 
hire more employees since 2009; however, growth in sales did not recover as quickly 
(Cowling et al., 2015). Overall, with improvement in economic conditions, the 
economic climate has not been perceived as a major barrier to firms’ growth since 
2012 (BDRC Continental, 2015). In short, business prospects diminished with the 
financial crisis and started to recover slowly since 2012.  
In terms of funds loaned, in the aftermath of the financial crisis banks reduced their 
lending: both good and bad borrowers were evaluated with new set of criteria. This 
could be seen as screening error for the customers who were not creditworthy in the 
aftermath of financial crisis. Therefore, the information asymmetry had risen. 
(Armstrong et al., 2013; Bank of England, 2009b; Cowling et al., 2012; Kremp and 
Sevestre, 2013). Supply, or what banks lent to SMEs showed a decline in application 
approval rate and a quick recovery; however, demand, or what entrepreneurs ask for, 
declined but did not recover as quickly as the supply side.  
On the supply side, Cowling et al. (2012) noted a drop in the percentage of approved 
applications, and a recovery after 12 months. This, however, was in the face of 
significant decline in demand. From 2009, small firms requiring bank finance were 
largely able to secure it (IFF Research, 2011). Armstrong et al. (2013) observe that the 
turndown rate did not recover until the end 2012; although, the marginal negative 
effect of time decreased compared to 2008-2009. As a result, SME owners and 
managers perceived external financing as less affordable (IFF Research, 2012; North 
et al., 2013; Price et al., 2013). Studies show that firms were more susceptible to 
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partial than absolute credit rationing (Kremp and Sevestre, 2013; Lee et al., 2014). 
However, SMEs acknowledged an improvement in the lending environment in 2011 
(Bank of England, 2011a). In summary, UK-based studies show that starting from 
2010, SMEs faced a more favourable situation than during 2008-2009.  
The demand side tells a different story. The series of Trend in Lending reports (2009-
2013) show that the growth rate in net lending for all firms has decreased since the 
financial crisis, but the drop is milder for SMEs. That is likely to be because SMEs did 
not have access to substitute sources such as capital markets (Bank of England, 
2009b). Some firms were more resilient at the time of financial shock and continued 
to invest and take advantage of lower interest rates and a smaller number of 
competitors (Kitching et al., 2009; Price et al., 2013).  In spite of these, the growth of 
net lending to SMEs is negative from the end of 2009 till 2013 (Bank of England, 
2013) . The recovery of demand in SMEs was slower than in larger firms. While 
demand for all firms rose from 2010, SMEs still decreased their use of bank loans. 
Interestingly, smaller firms (firms with less than £1M annual sales) experienced a 
sharp negative growth rate without recovery from 2010-2012 (Bank of England, 
2012). In short, the demand side did not recover as quickly as the supply side.  
This unwillingness to invest is also reflected in the rise of the proportion of 
discouraged borrowers towards the end of the recessionary period, “…suggesting that 
initially entrepreneurs anticipated that the supply of loans would not diminish too 
much, and only when it became clear that banks were rationing credit persistently did 
entrepreneurs become disillusioned about applying for loans” (Cowling et al., 2016, p. 
20). A comparison of the characteristics of discouraged borrowers and firms whose 
loan applications were declined shows that a significant proportion of discouraged 
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firms would likely have been approved, if they had applied (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; 
Cowling et al., 2016). In 2010, UK banks resumed the previous lending criteria, the 
turndown rate recovered (Cowling et al., 2012), and the majority of firms were able to 
secure finance. As firms’ confidence in the banking system and macroeconomic 
factors improved, they increased their demand for credit (Bank of England, 2009b). 
Following this, it is expected that discouraged firms should also perceive these 
positive signs and discouragement should decline as the economy improves. 
The importance in understating the lagged effect of the credit squeeze on 
discouragement is in acknowledging the higher perceived riskiness of the businesses. 
With the recovery in the supply side, the sooner the firms reassess their perceptions of 
risk at banks and apply for bank loans, the faster they will have access to the growth 
funds.  
3.3. Data and methodology 
The data used in this study are a series of cross section surveys drawn from the UK 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor, 2011-2016 (BDRC 
Continental, 2016). The survey is conducted quarterly and collects information on 
SME financing. The unit of analysis is firm with less than 250 employees and/or £35 
Million annual sale. The sample is initially provided by Dun & Bradstreet and 
Experian and is structured across all sizes, sectors, and regions. Data is provided on a 
10-wave basis. Therefore, in order to have all the waves, the first and last available 
datasets were combined and the sampling weights were adjusted. The sample used in 
this study covers the first and second quarter of 2011 (combined) until the end of 
2015. Each wave contains around five thousand observations, giving a sample size of 
ninety five thousand firms. Without applying sampling weights, the sample is biased 
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towards larger firms. Employing sampling weights, the final sample is representative 
of 4.5 million SMEs in the UK (BDRC Continental, 2014).  
The respondents to the surveys are the persons in charge of the financing decisions of 
the firms (the owner or principal manager). Each survey collects information via 
telephone interviews on the usage, application, or alteration of loan and overdraft 
facilities. Moreover, the sample provides information on the size and age of the firms, 
sector, legal status, geographical location, as well as entrepreneur’s age, financial 
certification, and gender. Data on innovation, exporting, credit risk, and using other 
financial facilities is available. The definition of all variables used in this study is 
presented in table 1.  
The Probit model is used in this study to suit the binary dependent variables. As 
discouragement was only measured for firms that expressed a need for credit at the 
time of survey, the analysis is prone to selection bias. Firms that did not desire credit 
are not considered in the sub-sample. To attempt to control for this potential bias, a 
Heckman (1979) two-stage model was estimated by considering the probability of 
neediness for credit for all firms. In the first stage, the probability of neediness for 
credit is modeled through business size, age, legal status, industry, and growth 
intention. Growth intention is the discriminatory variable that is expected to explain 
desire for credit, but not discouragement. The Inverse Mill’s ratio of this model is 
incorporated in the model of interest. However, it was not significant in any of the 
models. Therefore, the results of one stage Probit model is presented in table 2.  
In addition to discouragement model, a rejection model is also included in the 
analysis. Previous research shows that after 2010 the lending criteria resumes for 
lending to smaller firms (Cowling et al., 2012) ; therefore, it is expected that time is 
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not associated with the rejection rate after this year. The rejection models control for 
this assumption.  
3.3.1. Dependent variable 
Discouraged borrowers, in this study, are small firms that desire capital but do not 
apply for loans specifically due to the fear of being declined. Some firms need capital 
but avoid applying for bank loans for other reasons such as securing the money from 
other sources, not preferring borrowing, not having the time or knowledge to complete 
applications, or not wanting to commit to the conditions of borrowing. These firms are 
not identified as discouraged borrowers. Among the non-users with a desire for credit, 
discouraged borrowers are those who didn’t apply to the bank only because they 
“thought”: they would be turned down, that it was not the right time to borrow, or that 
banks were not lending. The dependent variable takes the value ‘1’ if the firm is a 
discouraged borrower and zero if they needed capital and they could secure funds. 
Overall, 7568 firms showed a desire for loans, among which 1657 were discouraged. 
After employing sample weights, only 7.1% of the population needed credit and, 
among these firms, one third applied for a loan and one third feared rejection (2.1% of 
population). Among firms who needed credit, the proportion of discouraged firms 
decreased since 2012. To understand to what extent these changes are significant and 
not due to changes in firms’ and entrepreneurs’ demographics, a multivariate analysis 
is presented.  
3.3.2.  Independent variable 
A categorical variable captures the year in which the surveys were conducted. The 
reference year in each analysis is 2010, noting that the 2011 surveys enquire about the 
financing practices during 2010. Therefore, the study investigates the change in 
119 
 
discouragement from 2010 to 2014. There are similar surveys on SME financing in 
the UK for 2007, 2008, and 2009. However, the differences in the definition of 
discouragement and the range of years each survey covered did not allow for 
combining surveys and examining the trend of discouragement before and after the 
crisis. To this end, reliance is on the most recent research in the UK context by 
Cowling et al. (2016) that reported a sharp increase in the rate of discouragement at 
the end of financial crisis.  
3.3.3. Control variables: 
As discouragement is a function of imperfect information, to separate the effect of 
time passed from the credit squeeze, variables associated with information asymmetry 
between banks and small firms are included in the multivariate models. The first 
group of control variables belongs to the entrepreneur. In this study, holding a 
financial qualification and the entrepreneur’s age are used as proxies for the 
entrepreneur’s education and experience. Although education is not shown to have a 
relationship with difficulty in raising finance (Irwin and Scott, 2010), it affects the 
prospect of the firm (Westhead and Storey, 1995). Less experienced entrepreneurs are 
more likely to be discouraged in the lending market (Han et al., 2009). However, 
Cowling et al (2016) found that during a recessionary period, more experienced and 
educated entrepreneurs are more likely to be "realistic” and refrain from applying to 
banks. Female entrepreneurs demand less credit (Cowling et al., 2012). This could be 
explained through lower confidence in approval of their application and more 
inclination to avoid extra risk and control over business (Constantinidis et al., 2006; 
Watson et al., 2009).  
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The second group of control variables relates to structural risk: firms age and size. 
Both of these variables are recognized for their effects on credit rationing and 
discouragement. The larger and more established a firm is, the less likely it is to face 
difficulty in raising finance (Beck et al., 2005; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Cassar, 2004; 
Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Freel et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009; Vos et al., 2007). 
The probability of discouragement decreases as firms grow in size (Chakravarty and 
Xiang, 2013; Freel et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009). The higher level of discouragement 
in smaller and younger firms may also be attributed to the more limited relationship 
they have with their banks (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013). Larger firms were less 
likely than SMEs to face application turndown during the crisis. Therefore, it is 
expected that they experience less fear of being declined. In addition, firm size and 
age may determine the performance, and consequently, the “serviceability” of the 
firms at the time of crisis (Cowling et al., 2015; Peric and Vitezic, 2016).  
The dataset contains credit risk ratings for the firms. The sample providers input risk 
ratings. A categorical variable is used to classify low, medium, and high-risk firms. 
The findings of Han et al. (2009) show those riskier borrowers are more likely to be 
discouraged having controlled for key characteristics of the business and the 
entrepreneurs. This is also in line with the finding of Cowling et al. (2016) for the UK 
market during the recessionary period. Inclusion of credit risk in the model is an 
attempt to control for the effect of unobserved variables such as assets (Berger and 
Udell, 2006; Robb and Robinson, 2014). 
Beside structural risk, some degree of higher information opacity is attributed to the 
firm’s strategy. Exporting firms are better able to diversify their sources of financing 
through national and international channels and they have superior performance to 
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generate significant cash flow (Ponikvar et al., 2013). Thus, it is possible that 
exporting decreases discouragement through better serviceability and financing 
options. The effect of innovation on discouragement could be through large sunk cost 
in the face of an uncertain outcome. Higher information opacity of innovative firms 
are reflected in higher application turndown rates (Freel, 2007; Lee et al., 2014; North 
et al., 2013) and higher loan prices (Nitani and Riding, 2013). In addition, legal status 
might influence the entrepreneur’s perception about the credibility of the business.  
The next group of variables measures the information banks have about the 
performance of the entrepreneur. Two dummy variables are included in the model to 
specify whether the firms use credit card and overdraft facilities (Cole and Sokolyk, 
2016). It is hoped that inclusion of these variables could partially control for the 
amount of information banks have about their customers. In addition, whether a firm 
banks with more than one financial institution is considered in the data. It is expected 
that the more resources that are available to entrepreneurs, the less likely it is that they 
will feel discouragement (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016). Firms were also asked how 
satisfied they are with their relationship with their banks. It is expected the more 
satisfied customers show less discouragement.  
Performance of the firms in the year prior to the time of survey is also included. Firms 
that perform better in terms of revenue and profit, are more likely to consider 
themselves creditworthy and less likely to be discouraged (Xiang et al., 2015). A 
dummy variable is included to report whether the firm was profitable in the last year 
or not. In addition, a categorical variable measures the annual sale turnover of firms.  
The industry in which the firm operates might influence business prospects. Before 
the crisis, growing firms could be found indiscriminately across all the industries. 
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However, the financial crisis affected firms heterogeneously (Cowling et al., 2015; 
Peric and Vitezic, 2016). For example, in the UK, the largest decline in sales and 
employment happened to manufacturing and construction firms, respectively 
(Cowling et al., 2015). In addition, some sectors such as manufacturing have more 
assets to be pledged as collateral; therefore, they may have different financing needs 
(Johnsen, 2005). A firm’s region is also included to account for differences in shared 
information between banks and their customers (Rauterkus and Munchus, 2014). 
LIBOR3 interest rate for GBP was initially considered a proxy for the costs of 
borrowing. Cost of borrowing is shown to be associated with discouragement 
(Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). All the indices tried in the analysis were highly 
correlated with time (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). To account for the change in the 
price of the loan and avoid multicollinearity problem, the change in LIBOR interest 
rate is included in the model. The difference is measured by the change in the average 
rate from 12 months prior to survey to the end of the quarter in which the survey is 
conducted. Both overnight and 12-month rates are considered in the analysis and the 
results are not different. In this paper, the results of the change in overnight rate are 
reported4.  
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
The proportion of discouraged borrowers during the crisis is presented in figure 15. 
Combining with the finding of Cowling et al. (2016), the trend of discouragement in 
the UK market follows an inverted U curve. The highest rate of discouragement is 
                                                          
3 http://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/british-pound-sterling/british-pound-sterling.aspx 
4 Ethnic minorities are also more prone to discouragement (Han et al., 2009). In the current data; however, the 
ethnicity is missing for 50% of the responses. Therefore, it is not included in the analysis 
5 In the calculations of Cowling et al. (2016), discouraged borrowers are defined as firms that avoid applying for 
loans due to fear of rejection and high costs of application. As a robustness check, entrepreneurs who were 
discouraged from applying due to concerns over the high cost of application are also considered in the definition of 




3.2% of population in 2011 (about 147 thousand firms). This figure drops in 2012 and 
reaches 1.2% in 2014. 
6 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the total sample, firms that need, and 
those that did not need loans. For the firms that needed loans, the descriptive statistics 
for applicants and discouraged firms are presented. After incorporating sampling 
weights, 30% of the firms in the sample are in manufacturing and construction sectors 
(Production). Around 20% of the firms are start-ups with less than 2 years of 
activities. Firms with no paid employees comprise 74% of the sample. Only 0.5% of 
firms have more than 50 employees. These figures are close to population estimates 
(BDRC Continental, 2014). 
                                                          
6 In the calculations of Cowling et al. (2016), discouraged borrowers are defined as firms that avoid applying for 
loans due to fear of rejection and high costs of application. As a robustness check, entrepreneurs who were 
discouraged from applying due to concerns over the high cost of application are also considered in the definition of 
discouraged borrowers. The result of the multivariate analysis with this new definition of discouragement was not 
different 
Figure 3.1. Percentage of discouraged firms in the UK populations of SMEs 
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Number of observation 95,273 87,704 7568   3789 1657   
Population size 4,548K 4,226K 32K  115K 95K  
Weighted percentage (of population) 100% 92.90% 7.10%   2.55% 2.09%   
Size  Measured by number of employees, 
categorical variable 
       
0 0.740 0.747 0.660 *** 0.572 0.724 *** 
1 to 9  0.221 0.215 0.298 *** 0.361 0.253 *** 
10 to 49  0.031 0.031 0.036 *** 0.055 0.020 *** 
50 to 250 0.005 0.006 0.005 * 0.010 0.002 *** 
Business age Measured by years from 
establishment, categorical variable 
       
<2 years 0.200 0.195 0.263 *** 0.234 0.310 *** 
2 to 9 years 0.369 0.368 0.386 *** 0.340 0.410 *** 
>10 years 0.430 0.436 0.351 *** 0.425 0.279 *** 
Sole Proprietorship  Legal status dummy (0,1) 0.653 0.657 0.605 *** 0.525 0.692 *** 
female  Gender dummy (0,1) 0.219 0.220 0.196 *** 0.185 0.204 *** 
owner's age Entrepreneur’s age, categorical 
variable 
       
less than 30 0.068 0.067 0.085 *** 0.084 0.084  
30-50 0.501 0.498 0.540 *** 0.531 0.563 *** 
50-65 0.358 0.360 0.328 *** 0.335 0.322 *** 
>65 0.071 0.073 0.045 *** 0.048 0.029 *** 
Industry Sector dummy, categorical variable        
Agriculture 0.043 0.042 0.046 *** 0.064 0.034 *** 
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Production 0.290 0.291 0.266 *** 0.263 0.286 *** 
Retail 0.192 0.189 0.238 *** 0.243 0.242  
Hotels and restaurant 0.034 0.032 0.051 *** 0.062 0.048 *** 
Real Estate 0.262 0.265 0.226 *** 0.204 0.218 *** 
Health and social work 0.177 0.178 0.170 *** 0.161 0.169 *** 
Location Location of the firm, categorical 
variable 
       
London 0.170 0.167 0.196 *** 0.172 0.200 *** 
Southeast 0.160 0.160 0.152 *** 0.141 0.163 *** 
Rest of the UK 0.670 0.671 0.651 *** 0.686 0.636 *** 
Financial training  Entrepreneur with financial training 
dummy (0,1) 
0.252 0.250 0.275 *** 0.299 0.255 *** 
Export  Exporting firm dummy (0,1) 0.083 0.081 0.110 *** 0.108 0.103 *** 
Innovation  Process and/or product innovator firm 
in the last three yrs (0,1) 
0.381 0.372 0.506 *** 0.531 0.473 *** 
Risk a Credit risk rating, categorical variable 
(provided by sample providers) 
       
Low risk 0.194 0.198 0.140 *** 0.207 0.089 *** 
Medium risk 0.308 0.311 0.276 *** 0.282 0.253 *** 
High risk 0.496 0.489 0.582 *** 0.510 0.656 *** 
Sale a Last year sale turnover in GBP, 
categorical variable 
       
<50K 0.618 0.622 0.570 *** 0.452 0.675 *** 
50-100K 0.170 0.170 0.166 *** 0.180 0.151 *** 
100-500K 0.138 0.135 0.173 *** 0.232 0.115 *** 
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500-1M 0.033 0.032 0.041 *** 0.055 0.030 *** 
1-5M 0.033 0.032 0.041 *** 0.067 0.024 *** 
>5M 0.006 0.006 0.006  0.012 0.002 *** 
profit a Firm showing profit in the last year 
(0,1) 
0.733 0.743 0.613 *** 0.705 0.523 *** 
Relationship with main bank Firm’s level of satisfaction with 
relationship with the main bank, 
categorical variable 
       
Not-Satisfied 0.094 0.079 0.295 *** 0.306 0.303  
Neither 0.090 0.087 0.129 *** 0.099 0.156 *** 
Satisfied 0.815 0.833 0.574 *** 0.594 0.539 *** 
Credit card  Firm using credit card (0,1) 0.168 0.160 0.267 *** 0.326 0.236 *** 
Overdraft  Firm using overdraft (0,1) 0.192 0.180 0.344 *** 0.416 0.306 *** 
more than one bank a Firm banking with more than one 
bank (0,1) 
0.015 0.012 0.045 *** 0.064 0.040 *** 
*, **, *** significant at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01  
a Number of observations is different due to missing values. 
b There is a third group of firms that desire credit that are included in this analysis. These firms refrain from applying for bank loan because of 
reasons other than fear of being rejected by banks. 




A comparison among different groups of firms that needed loan shows that discouraged 
firms are smaller and younger firms. With an increase in credit risk level, the proportion 
of discouraged firms increases. In terms of firm strategies, exporting and innovating firms 
show more desire for credit and less discouragement. Women appear to be less in need of 
loans, but they make up a higher proportion of discouraged firms. Lower annual sales 
associate with a higher likelihood of being discouraged. The use of credit cards, 
overdrafts, and working with more than one bank are associated with a smaller proportion 
of discouraged firms.  
3.5. Main results and discussions 
Table 2 shows the results of Probit regressions in one-stage models for: discouraged firms 
versus applicants; and rejected firms versus approved firms. In each panel, two models 
are presented. The first model includes the basic demographic variables and the second 
model includes risk related variables as well as variables concerned with the banking 
relationship and firm performance. The number of observations is lower for the second 
model due to missing values. The total number of observations for discouragement model 
is 7413 and 6056 in model 1 and 2, respectively, representing 319,000 and 238,000 firms.  
Looking at the coefficients of the variable of interest (i.e. year) in the regression results, it 
is clear that discouragement decreases over time. The effect of time is significant for 
years 2013 and 2014. That is, the level of discouragement is significantly lower in 2013 
than it was in 2010. Although not significant, the coefficient for 2011 is positive, 
suggesting that the “scarring effect” (Cowling et al., 2012, p. 796) of financial crisis on 
entrepreneurs was being intensified at that time. From 2012, the coefficient turns 
128 
 
negative, but the influence only becomes significant in 2013. In summary, accounting for 
the variations of control variables, the probability of discouragement follows an inverted 
U curve over time. Also, the decrease in discouragement lagged the signals of 
improvements in lending markets (in 2010). 
There are some interesting findings among the other variables. Unexpectedly, business 
age in model 2 is not a significant variable in predicting the probability of 
discouragement. Further tests show that in the absence of risk rating, age is a significant 
variable for firms with more than 10 years of activity compared to start-ups. Although the 
calculation of credit risk provided by sample providers is not known, it seems it is related 
to business age. Similar findings are also presented in Han et al. (2009) where business 
age is not a significant variable in the presence of credit risk rating. As the firm grows in 
employment it becomes increasingly less likely to be discouraged. The effect of size is in 
line with the findings of previous studies (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Freel et al., 
2012; Han et al., 2009).  
Risk rating does not appear to affect the likelihood of discouragement in the full model. 
Further tests show high risk firms are more likely to be discouraged than low risk firms; 
however, the inclusion of sales and profits mask the effect of risk rating. In the full 
model, profitable firms are less likely to be discouraged. In addition, the more sales a firm 
generates, the lower the probability of discouragement. This suggests that discouragement 
seems to act as an efficient tool dispersing high-risk businesses from banks. Nonetheless, 
this does not suggest that risk is a key determinant of discouragement. Evidence shows 
that businesses with low and medium risk profiles are also discouraged from applying. 
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  Discouragement =1 (vs. Applicant=0) Rejection=1(vs. Approved=0) 
  Model 1   Model 2 Model 1   Model 2 
  Coef   S.E   Ceof   S.E Coef   S.E   Ceof   S.E 
Year; Ref a 2010 
      
    




























2013 -0.34 * 0.17 
 







2014 -0.4 ** 0.17 
 







Size, Ref a: zero employees 
      
    
     
  















0.164 -0.57 *** 0.14 
 
-0.56 *** 0.19 
More than 50 -1.1 *** 0.16 
 
-0.589 ** 0.249 -1.01 *** 0.18 
 
-0.89 *** 0.26 
Business age, Ref a: start-ups 
      
    
     
  

































Owner's age, ref a: less than 30 
      
    
     
  











50 to 65 years 0.371 ** 0.19 
 

















-0.6 * 0.36 




















































Sector, Ref a: agriculture 
      
    
     
  
Production 0.421 *** 0.15 
 
0.44 ** 0.184 0.54 *** 0.16 
 
0.458 ** 0.21 
Retail 0.329 ** 0.16 
 
0.4154 ** 0.192 0.495 *** 0.18 
 
0.417 * 0.22 




0.198 0.581 *** 0.18 
 
0.451 * 0.23 
Real Estate 0.49 *** 0.17 
 
0.5117 *** 0.194 0.398 ** 0.18 
 
0.433 * 0.22 




0.226 0.436 ** 0.22 
 
0.551 ** 0.28 
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Location, Ref a: rest of the UK 
      
    







































Business Risk, Ref a: Low risk 
      
    
     
  
Medium risk 
    
0.0299 
 
0.15   





    
0.1876 
 
0.143   




Relationship with main bank, Ref a: 
Neutral 
      
    
     
  
Satisfied 
    
-0.293 
 
0.166   
   
-0.85 *** 0.19 
Not satisfied 
    
-0.306 
 
0.178   




Use of credit card b 
    
-0.152 
 
0.112   




Use of overdraft b 
    
-0.115 
 
0.108   
   
-0.32 ** 0.12 
More than one bank b 
    
-0.354 
 
0.235   





    
-0.376 *** 0.11   
   
-0.35 *** 0.13 
Sale, Ref a: less than 50 K 
      
    
     
  
50K to 100 K 
    
-0.286 * 0.157   




100 K to 500 K 
    
-0.544 *** 0.14   




500K to 1M 
    
-0.401 ** 0.195   




1M to 5M 
    
-0.591 *** 0.211   




More than 5M 
    
-0.78 ** 0.355   
















   
6056 
 
  3124 




Population size 319K 
   
238K 
 
  97K 




P>F 0       0     0       0     
*, **, *** significant at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
a REF is the reference for categorical variables. 
b dummy variable with yes=1 
Table 3.2. The results of multivariate analysis- weighted analysis  
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As a robustness check, a rejection model is evaluated to test whether the fear of being 
rejected is objective. In this phase, absolute credit rationing from a bank loan is 
considered as the dependent variable. A dummy variable is set to 1 if an application is 
totally turned down and zero if the applicant could secure some loan from a bank. Using 
the same control variables, a Probit model shows that the probability of application 
turndown does not change over time (consistent in both models). The fear of rejection 
seems to be more connected with decreased loanable funds to SMEs, increased 
application turndown in 2008-2009, and the associated downturn in business prospects. In 
addition, larger and older firms are less likely to face rejection (in model 1). Firms with 
higher risk rating are more likely to face rejection than low risk firms. Firms that are 
satisfied with their relationship with their banks face lower probability of rejection, 
although the satisfaction might be the result of the approved application.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is the investigation of the changes in the level of 
discouragement during the aftermath of the recession and after UK banks resumed pre-
recession loan approval practices. The results show that lower probability of 
discouragement among SMEs lags the improvement in SMEs’ access to bank funds. The 
results highlight the longer-term effect of tightened credit supply on SMEs that are ready 
to invest, but hold back because of fear of rejection.  
The analysis shows that when the information asymmetry has risen between two parties, 
the amelioration does not happen quickly. This is of importance, because entrepreneurs 
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hold back from applying for bank loans despite the fact that banks started to evaluate the 
application with pre-crisis criteria shortly after the credit squeeze. In fact, the probability 
of application turndown was not associated with time (within the years under 
investigation). However, the probability of discouragement still rose after improvement in 
the lending market and recovered slowly afterwards. The existence of a mismatch in 
perception between banks and entrepreneurs seems to hold back firms from seeking 
external finance (British Business Bank, 2016). 
In a recessionary period, SMEs’ perception of lack of support, as mentioned by Hutton 
and Nightingale (2011), leads “to significant numbers of discouraged borrowers” and, 
subsequently, a “… lack of investment leads to reduced levels of innovation in the 
economy, and thus a self-reinforcing cycle of less innovation, less investment and less 
dynamism…”(Hutton and Nightingale, 2011a, p. 8).  Discouragement in the EU region is 
estimated to lower investment growth, employment growth and total asset growth in the 
following years since recession (Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). In the UK, recent empirical 
work shows a significant amount of underinvestment from SME’s during the recessionary 
period (Cowling et al., 2016). To alleviate this effect and induce more investment among 
SMEs, addressing the concerns of discouraged borrowers may be an important starting 
point. They are ready for investment. 
The merits of acknowledging the lagged response of entrepreneurs to health indicators of 
financing market is in planning policy measures to deal with the lack of demands. The 
presence of ‘good’ borrowers among discouraged firms signals the imperfect flow of 
information in the market. If ‘good’ borrowers do not recover their confidence in the 
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banking system, with the increase in supply, the chance of bank’s adverse selection and 
over-investment is likely to increase, raising application costs for all.  
Discouragement, especially for the firms that are discouraged “inappropriately”, is a 
function of information asymmetry between SMEs and banking market. There are several 
programs addressing the supply-side of lending and equity markets ((BIS), 2013) that set 
out to help SMEs address potential funding gaps. For example, to stimulate supply after 
the recession, a commitment between UK major banks and the UK government, known as 
Project Merlin7, aimed to encourage banks to lend more to small businesses. There are 
also other government schemes that aim to help SMEs with external finance8. BMG 
Research (2013) argues that only a small number of SMEs are aware of government 
financial support schemes, such as the National Loan Guarantee Scheme. Entrepreneurs’ 
awareness of new methods of finance such as venture capital funds, business angels, 
crowd funding, and mezzanine finance is increasing, but the usage of these methods is 
still low (British Business Bank, 2016). Moreover, the amount of time that the majority of 
entrepreneurs spend on the decision and application for external finance, often limited to 
their main banks, is minimal (BMG Research, 2013).  Many entrepreneurs think the credit 
granting decision is totally computer-based (Fraser, 2014). Whilst, the majority of 
applications made to banks are being funded, SME owners are still avoiding banks due to 
the psychic pressure of possible rejection (BMG Research, 2013). Fraser (2014) notes that 
entrepreneurs are heavily influenced by their adverse experiences with banks, but that 
they are poorly informed about alternative opportunities. An initiative that tries to address 
the pressure and stigma of rejection might be the setup of an “Appeals Process” by British 





Banker’s Association in April 2011. In this forum, SMEs that are not satisfied by the 
lending process have the opportunity to voice their concerns. However, no study has yet 
discussed the merits of such programs. It seems much of the information asymmetry 
between borrowers (including discouraged ones) and banks is related to entrepreneurs 
being less informed about the current state of the banking system and their own prospects. 
On the other hand, lack of communications between SMEs and banks, centralized 
banking systems and procedures make it difficult for banks to adapt to their SME needs 
(Silver and Vegholm, 2009).  
To alleviate this problem, government can play an intermediary role through subsidized 
services and business supports already in place. The psychic pressure of search for 
finance and application costs is harder to address than the objective costs (Xiang et al., 
2015). While there are initiatives addressing SME “investment-readiness” (Mason, 2009), 
more attention towards debt financing is merited (Freel et al., 2012; Rostamkalaei and 
Freel, 2016). Disseminating information related to improvements in credit supply, the 
lending process and criteria, and “ex-post counselling” (Xiang et al., 2015, p. 16) through 
advisory services may mitigate the entrepreneur’s fear of rejection at banks. This may 
also help entrepreneurs to assess their riskiness more objectively and increase their efforts 
to address these risks through better quality applications. In light of this, banks serve as a 
good channel for transferring such information through relational lending.  
Relational lending appears to ameliorate the problem of imperfect information. 
Discouragement works as an efficient tool when the length of relationship between banks 
and SMEs increases (Han et al., 2009): low risk customers are less discouraged and high 
risk customers become more “pessimistic” about their applications. In the time of crisis, 
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relational banking and a strong bond between banks and SMEs became more important 
for smaller firms (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016; Durkin et al., 2013). The 
dataset on hand was not competent to control for the length of firms’ relationship with 
their main bank. Nonetheless, it is hoped to capture some of the effect of shared 
information by the inclusion of business age, risk rating, level of customers’ satisfaction 
with main bank and use of other financial tools. With a more comprehensive dataset or 
qualitative studies, one might scrutinize how the exchange of information between banks 
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This research seeks to add to our understanding of discouraged borrowers by examining 
the roots of discouragement. Specifically, the work examines the role of informal 
turndowns: the practice in which a commercial lender verbally informs a potential SME 
owned that if a formal loan application were to be advanced, it would likely be denied. 
First described in 1991 (Wynant, L. & Hatch, J., 1991. Banks and small business 
borrowers: A 1990 Research Study, London, Ontario: Western Business School, 
University of Western Ontario), this aspect of lending has received scant attention in the 
research literature. Whereas the presence of discouraged borrowers evidence a market 
imperfection, informal turndowns represent an efficient mechanism in SME debt markets 
and provide an explanation for a share of borrower discouragement. This research finds 
that entrepreneurs who are in more need of external finance and more established firms 
are more likely to suspend formal loan applications through informal talks with their 





The research described here relates to the emerging literature regarding demand-side 
constraints on access to financial capital among small- and medium-sized enterprises’ 
(SMEs). This work seeks to add to our understanding of discouraged borrowers (Kon and 
Storey, 2003). Specifically, this work examines the roots of discouragement by focussing 
on borrowers who are discouraged from making a loan application for a good reason: 
their prospective lenders have informally advised them that a loan application, if 
forthcoming, would be rejected—an informal turndown. 
The context for this work lies in Kon and Storey's (2003: 47) definition of discouraged 
borrowers as: “… good borrower[s], requiring finance, that choose not to apply because 
it feels its application will be rejected.” This definition, however, has not been 
operationalized consistently in previous research. In particular, quality of borrower is not 
always observable. Research often resorts to defining as discouraged borrowers all firms 
that need funding but whose owners state explicitly that they did not apply for a loan out 
of a fear of being turned down. Conceptually, the presence of a high frequency (Cole and 
Sokolyk, 2016; Freel et al., 2012; Shane, 2009) of market participants whose firms both 
need financing but who choose not to apply and who are good borrowers constitutes a 
“market imperfection [that] lies at the heart of the concept of discouraged borrowers” 
(Han Fraser and Storey, 2009: 416). On the face of it, it seems surprising that a market 
imperfection such as discouragement could be so widespread, especially insofar that 
discouragement bears economic consequences if misplaced fear of rejection compromises 
either the viability, or the job-creating growth, of SMEs. 
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In this work, it is argued that some owners who report being discouraged are not all good 
borrowers: that their decision not to apply for a loan may be a result of being well-
informed through owners’ relationships with their commercial bankers. In not applying 
for a loan, those potential loan applicants whose loans would not have been approved 
appear to have made an appropriate, and an efficient, decision. The concept of informal 
turndowns is neither new nor hypothetical. Based on a sample of interviews with bank 
customers, Wynant and Hatch (1991: 116) documented the prevalence of both informal 
loan requests and informal turndowns:  
“… a large number of financing requests are declined or discouraged after a meeting with 
the client . . . [and it] is only in those instances where the proposed financing involves a 
reasonable chance of being approved that a formal application results.” 
Even though Wynant and Hatch (1991) report a high frequency of informal turndowns 
among small firms, the topic of informal turndowns seems to have been disregarded in 
the research literature. Accordingly, this work argues that, for some segment of the 
discouraged borrower population, fear of rejection may be justified by information 
gleaned, explicitly or implicitly, from SME owners’ relationships with their lenders. 
While such relationships may be nuanced, the extreme situation could arise in which the 
prospective lenders explicitly advise the SME owners that, were they to apply for a loan, 
the application would likely be rejected. Less explicit might include situations in which 
the lender outlines unacceptable terms of lending in the event a loan were to be advanced. 
One could likewise imagine more subtle signals of discouragement in the context of a 
lender-borrower relationship. In such situations, fear of rejection would be a rational fear 
and would not constitute an imperfection.  
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This is an efficient process from both the lender and the borrower perspective. It saves 
loan account managers’ time when a formal request is not well-considered, obviously too 
risky, or when considerable—and costly—due diligence is required. From the borrowers’ 
perspective, the informal discussion saves them non-negligible costs in time and funds 
associated with preparing a fruitless formal loan application. Potential borrowers are also 
spared further consequences of rejection such as the prospect of negative impacts on 
credit ratings. Evidence of informal turndowns is therefore consistent with efficient 
operation of the credit markets; yet, as noted, the prevalence of unjustifiably discouraged 
non-applicants questions the efficiency of the lending market. Accordingly, this research 
seeks to add to our understanding of the discouraged borrower phenomenon by 
considering the role of informal turndowns in the context of commercial lending and 
borrowing in the SME market. 
This is important research because it is widely understood that SMEs contribute 
disproportionately to economic prosperity—especially through the growth of young 
ventures (Audretsch, 2012; Nightingale and Coad, 2014; Storey, 1994). However, 
enterprise growth requires financial capital to sustain the necessary incremental 
investments in real assets, working capital and human resources (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006), to which access has been considered to be limited. Availability of financial 
resources gives small firms the opportunity to explore new possibilities so as to further 
increase opportunities (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Vos et al. (2007) also note that 
growing firms seek external financing more than their non-growing counterparts. 
However, Lee (2014) reports that owners of growth firms perceive relatively more 
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constraints on access to external finance. With public policy increasingly focused on high 
growth firms (Shane, 2009) financing is central to this growth.  
This study draws upon data from the series of United Kingdom Surveys of Small- and 
Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor (2011–201; BDRC Continental 2015). These 
surveys, initiated in 2011 and continuing, is conducted on a quarterly basis. This study 
benefits from questions that focus on non-borrowers and investigates the reasons why 
firms refrain from applying for bank loans even though they need financial capital.  
 
4.2.Previous Research: Discouraged Borrowers and Informal Turndowns 
4.2.1. The context for discouraged borrowers 
Research about SME financing preferences generally agrees that SME owners first prefer 
to draw capital from internal sources, including personal savings, before considering 
external sources of capital (Berger and Udell, 2006; Cosh, Cumming and Hughes, 2009; 
Robb and Wolken, 2002; Thornhill, Gellatly & Riding, 2004). Enterprise growth, 
however, typically entails the need to find external investment capital to finance plant, 
equipment, technology, working and human capital, etc. Among external sources, 
research has established that SME owners turn to banks as commercial lenders of choice 
(Cosh et al., 2009). However, the Nobel-prize-winning work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
and that of their many successors, have led to a considerable literature on so-called 
“capital market gaps”: the presence of supply-side financing constraints in the SME 
lending market (see Cressy (2002) and Parker (2002) for digests of this literature).  
 150 
 
Even though the majority of loan applications are successfully financed (Cole and 
Sokolyk, 2016; Freel et al., 2012), it seems clear from previous research that accessing 
financial capital is fraught with obstacles for most SMEs—and for new ventures in 
particular (Berger and Frame, 2007; Cosh et al., 2009; Eddleston et al., 2016; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994). To business owners, the process of seeking external capital involves 
some degree of uncertainty as to the outcome as well as with regard to financial and other 
less tangible costs and benefits that are associated with success and failure of their 
applications (Kon and Storey, 2003). In the judgement of some business owners, the 
perceived cost-benefit balance reaches a point such that tendering a formal application 
seems unreasonable. What remains unclear is the process by which business owners 
arrive at this understanding. This research posits that some business owners who need 
financing but who elect not to apply may do so because they in fact do have knowledge, 
ingrained in their relationships with lenders. 
4.2.2. Profiles of discouraged borrowers 
Within this literature, research has sought to understand better the profile of discouraged 
borrowers (for exmaple, Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Cole and 
Sokolyk, 2016; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015; Freel et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009; Levenson 
and Willard, 2000). While there is convergence on many aspects, there remain several 
areas of disagreement within this literature.  
The research literature generally confirms that discouraged borrowers are indeed engaged 
in relatively riskier projects when compared with loan applicants (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; 
Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015; Han et al., 
2009). That is, firms with higher risk scores are more likely to feel discouraged from 
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applying for credit, a finding that implies that discouragement may be an efficient sorting 
tool (Han et al., 2009). However, the presence of low risk businesses among discouraged 
borrowers also reveals that this mechanism may not be thoroughly efficient. 
Firm age and size also feature consistently as key factors in the likelihood of 
discouragement, such that owners of older and larger firms are relatively less likely to be 
discouraged (Chandler, 2010; Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Freel et al., 2012; Han et al., 
2009; Robb and Wolken, 2002). However, these factors are also collinear with each other 
as well as with other measures—such as risk, gender of ownership and race (Neville et 
al., in press.; Rosa et al., 1996).  
The literature, however, disagrees on other points. Most, but not all, research finds that 
discouragement is more likely among firms with established banking relationships. 
Chandler (2010) reports that compared to denied-loan applicants, discouraged borrowers 
have stronger relationships with their respective credit suppliers. Likewise, Han et al. 
(2009) report a correlation between the length of a relationship with a bank, the riskiness 
of the borrower, and the probability of discouragement. They report that, within the group 
of firms with longstanding relationships, discouragement is less likely among good 
borrowers (that is, relatively low risk) but more likely among high-risk borrowers. This 
finding, that discouraged borrowers tend to have established lender relationships, is 
consistent with the premise that decisions not to apply for a loan may be well-informed.1 
Arguably, prospective borrowers and lenders are more comfortable with broaching and 
discussing the idea of a loan application within the context of a good quality banking 
                                                          
1 However, Freel et al. (2012) report that firms with banking relationships that extend beyond financial 
transactions are relatively less likely to report discouragement. 
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relationship than in the absence of such a relationship. Moreover, in relationships in 
which the banker also acts as an advisor, either party could raise the matter of seeking 
additional financing. 
4.2.3. Prevalence of discouragement 
The prevalence of discouragement also remains unclear. Han et al. (2009), Cole & 
Sokolyk (2016), and Freel et al. (2012) report high frequencies of discouragement among 
SME owners (good owners or otherwise) that declare a need for finance but who do not 
apply. This high incidence is not consistent with research by Chandler (2010) nor that of 
Chakravarty and Xiang’s (2013) 10-country comparison of the prevalence of discouraged 
borrowers2. 
In the case of Cole and Sokolyk’s (2016) work, they drew on data from the U.S. Surveys 
of Small Business Financing.3 According to the Federal Reserve Board, more than one-
half of respondents to these surveys who opted not to apply for a loan (even though they 
needed financing—“discouraged borrowers”) cited their awareness of their firms’ weak 
credit history, poor balance sheet or personal experience. In the U.K., data from the 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor (2011–2015) reveals that among 
business owners who needed financing but who did not submit an application for a loan, 
47 percent cited lack of time or knowledge, didn’t like the “hassle,” or identified 
                                                          
2 Ferrando and Mulier’s (2015), Chakravarty and Xiang’s (2013) inter-country comparisons of the 
prevalence of discouraged borrowers reveals a range of discouragement frequencies, from as little as 3 per 
cent of firms needing financing to as much as 45 per cent. Chandler identified 1 to 2 per cent of Canadian 
firms as discouraged borrowers. 
3 See, for example, Federal Reserve Board, 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances Sample Frequency 





unacceptable expected terms and conditions as reasons for not applying. Table 1 presents 
a breakdown of reasons why entrepreneurs chose not to apply for credit according to the 
U.K. Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor (2011–2015). Among these, 
14 per cent reported having been turned down informally. 





Informally turned down 14% 548 29,852  
Discouraged borrowers (Fear rejection) 39% 1,189  83,160  
Did not like the hassle, didn’t have time or knowledge 9% 297 18,338  
Didn’t like the expected conditions 20% 636 41,580  
Other reasons 18% 628 39,298  
Total 100% 3,298*  212,228  
*189 firms did not provide any reason for discouragement. 
Table 4.1. Reasons for not applying for loans as stated by non-applicants 
Chakravarty and Xiang (2013) also report that firms needing credit may eschew a loan 
application for several reasons other than fear of rejection. They note that potential 
borrowers may perceive the loan application process as too onerous or they may be 
unwilling to pay the cost of the debt. As well, owners may not like being in debt or they 
may perceive that collateral requirements are too demanding. Perhaps this is why 
Cowling et al. (2016) and Chandler (2010) define discouraged borrowers as firms that 
fear rejection but also seek to avoid high application costs.  Beyond these studies, as 
noted, the mechanism(s) through which borrowers come to learn about their respective 
quality remains unspecified.  
Potentially relevant in this context is Wynant and Hatch’s (1991) report of a surprisingly 
high (to them) frequency of what they call informal turndowns; communications within 
the lender-borrower dyad whereby a bank representative informally advises a potential 
loan applicant that rejection would be likely if a loan application were to be advanced. To 
the extent that informal turndowns were reported to be common, there may be very good 
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reasons that some prospective borrowers who need financing become non-applicants: 
they may have been told informally not to apply! Moreover, applying—and being turned 
down—is costly in time and resources and potentially more so if the applicant’s credit 
rating is negatively affected in the process.  The informal turndown phenomenon, 
however, does not yet appear to be the subject of research and the need for further 
research on this topic seems implicit. To this end, the following conceptual discussion 
may be useful. 
 
4.3. A Conceptual Framework of Informal Turndowns 
The conceptual framework for this research rests in the process by which commercial 
lenders adjudicate loan applications from SMEs. Given the importance and context of 
lending relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), the adjudication process may be 
conceptualized as comprising two steps. The first is an informal stage edified partially 
from the lender-borrower relationship. The second stage is a more formal process 
characterised by a written application from the borrower and, for applications that pass 
initial muster, costly due diligence conducted by the lender. In the years since Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), the lending markets have changed somewhat in that requests for very 
small loans are typically adjudicated by credit scoring, yet the process may nonetheless be 
conceptualized as this two-step procedure.  
4.3.1. Formal loan applications 
When entertaining a formal loan request, lenders potentially face two decisions. The first 
decision is to determine if it is worthwhile to undertake the due diligence necessary to 
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alleviate information asymmetry. The second is the decision related to approving the 
formal loan application (or not) and deciding on the terms of lending. Besanko and 
Thakor (1987) are among those who have modelled this process analytically. They 
conclude that factors in the adjudication decision includes, among others, risk of the 
borrower, perceived availability and resale value of collateral, the degree of lender 
conservatism and the level of information asymmetry.  
4.3.2. Informal loan discussions 
In the context of a lender relationship, however, an initial step is likely to be based on a 
discussion between a potential borrower and its bank account manager. Before incurring 
the costs associated with a formal application and due diligence, it seems reasonable to 
expect that some business owners would seek an informal talk with their lenders (and vice 
versa) about the possible outcome of a potential loan application. The prospective lender 
would be able to review readily available information in order to inform a prima facie 
case for recommending (or not) proceeding to a formal application. With SME owners 
seeking to finance growth and survival of their firms, suppliers of finance are under 
pressure to maximize profits—in part by minimizing loan losses. It therefore makes sense 
that informal discussions would be employed to reduce information asymmetry on both 
sides of the transaction. In this initial step, two sources of information may be pertinent:  
Lender relationship. If the potential applicant has an established relationship with the 
financial institution the quality of the information gleaned from the relationship may 
inform lenders’ advice about the likelihood of loan approval. This information may 
include impressions of qualitative and quantitative data (age of firm; sector; size of 
business; management experience; availability of collateral, etc.). By virtue of a banking 
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relationship, lenders also are typically able to access, quickly and inexpensively, credit 
scoring data obtained from third party suppliers. Borrowers, meanwhile, would develop a 
yet better understanding of potential terms of lending and the implications of borrowing. 
The scale of the loan. Small lending balances (especially new and small ventures) can be 
too small to make economic sense for lenders. Income from interest payments and fees 
may be insufficient to warrant the relatively fixed costs of the due diligence implicit in 
the second stage. Accordingly, regardless of risk of the SME, small loan requests may be 
either discouraged by prospective lenders, relegated to loan guarantee programs (if 
available) or treated as personal—rather than business—loans. 
This process suggests several potential factors behind the informal turndown outcome4. 
First, and given the relatively fixed nature of the costs of due diligence, the expected 
return on the loan must be sufficient to more than cover the lender’s estimate of the fixed 
component of the cost of due diligence and cost of funds. Small loans, typically sought by 
small firms, are less likely to cover these costs, leading to immediate, arguably informal, 
turndowns. Hence, the scale of the loan is arguably a factor. For this reason, among non-
applicants, it is expected that the owners of smaller firms postpone their applications 
because they anticipate having their applications rejected. The owner of larger firms, 
conversely, are more likely to expect a successful loan application, contact their banks 
and relinquish their applications after an informal talk. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is 
as follows: 
                                                          
4 Ideally, this research sought to study the profiles of firms that had an informal talk with their banks and 
investigate the determinants of informal turndowns. However, the structure of the data does not allow such 
analysis. The following arguments pertain to understand the roots of postponing formal loan applications, 
with focus on the comparison between those who are deterred from lending by informal talks with their 
banks and those who fear to be rejected based on their own judgement.  
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H1: Among non-applicants who need credit, the likelihood of an informal turndown is 
proportional to firm size: that is, larger firms are more likely to report informal 
turndowns.  
Second, within any given size stratum, age of firm is arguably a key factor in the 
likelihood of an informal turndown. Young firms often fail relatively soon after 
founding. 5  Potential contributory factors may include “the liability of newness” 
(Stinchcombe and March, 1965), inexperienced entrepreneurs, unproven factor and 
product markets. It is speculated that the owners of the new firms are more likely to 
realize the high degree of information opacity of their firms and decide not to apply for 
loans. Conversely, information about older firms is more widely available, therefore 
business owners anticipate successful applications and proceed with an informal 
discussion. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Among non-applicants who need credit, the likelihood of an informal turndown is 
proportional to firm age: that is, older firms are more likely to report informal 
turndowns.  
Third, informal turndowns perforce take place in the context of a banking relationship. 
Firms without banking relationships would arguably either proceed directly to the formal 
application stage, or be discouraged based on their own judgment. Moreover, business 
owners who initiate with their respective bankers a discussion about a possible loan 
application are potentially risking their reputations. Therefore, it is argued that it is 
                                                          
5 According to ISED (2013), 20 per cent of SMEs did not survive their first year in business and 
approximately 28 per cent had failed within the first two years of operation. 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng/02808.html, accessed June 3, 2017.  
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relatively easier for firms with good quality banking relationships to make an unofficial 
inquiry about their prospects before making an official request; hence:  
H3: Among discouraged firms who need credit, owners of firms that report informal 
turndowns are relatively more likely to have good quality relational banking. 
Finally, high perceived levels of information asymmetry would dictate higher costs of due 
diligence, a factor that would also lead to immediate, informal, turndowns of more 
informationally opaque enterprises. Growth orientation has been identified as a factor in 
information opacity by Binks and Ennew (1996) and is often operationalized through 
expanding market reach through foreign trade (exporting; Riding et al., 2012) or through 
innovation (Coleman and Robb, 2011). Firms are expected to need and apply for credit 
when they seek growth (Thornhill et al., 2004) or when they undertake innovation (Lee, 
2014). Growth firms may be in relatively more need of credit to support the incremental 
real investments associated with growth and it is expected that they would search for and 
use a variety of finance sources. Hence, despite the riskiness of growth-oriented 
businesses, it is expected that owners of such businesses initiate an informal application, 
rather than being discouraged due to fear of rejection. Accordingly, 
H4: Among non-applicants who need credit, owners of firms that report informal 




4.4.Data and methodology 
4.4.1. Data 
The paper examines the profile of two groups of firms who needed capital but did not 
formally apply for the credit: borrowers discouraged due to fear of rejection and 
prospective borrowers who reported informal turndowns. The distinction between these 
two groups is that the former group avoids applying for bank loans due to subjective fears 
of rejection whereas the latter eschews an official application as a result of an informal 
talk with their banks.  
The investigation comprises a secondary analysis of data from the 16 iterations of the 
United Kingdom-based Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance (2011–2015)  
survey. 6  The data is available based on 10 iterations; therefore, two datasets were 
combined in order to include all 16 available iterations. The sample is stratified; 
therefore, all analyses employ sampling weights that correct for size, location, industry, 
and the share of start-ups. The respondents are the owners or the primary managers of 
private firms, all within the United Kingdom, with less than 250 employees and/or less 
than £25 million in sales revenues.    
4.4.2. Methodology 
The methodological approach used in this work consisted of estimating multinomial 
probit regression models as specified presently.  




4.4.3. Dependent variable 
The primary multivariate analysis constituted estimation of multinomial probit regression 
models applied to five categories of respondents who needed external financing but who 
did not render a formal application for financing. The categorical dependent variable 
reflects the reasons that respondents cited as their rational for not applying, as follows: =1 
if the applicant reported an informal turndown (IT); =2 if the applicant feared rejection (in 
this research defined as discouraged borrowers); = 3 if the applicant did not want the 
hassle; =4 if the applicant did not like the expected conditions: and =5 if the applicant 
mentioned other reasons.7  
Modelling non-applicants without considering the probability of needing capital could 
result in selection bias. Accordingly, Heckman’s (1979) two-stage (probit) model was 
estimated to address potential selection bias such that the dependent variable was a 
binomial variable corresponding to whether (=1) or not (=0) the firm needed external 
credit. Independent variables were measures of firm size, age, legal status, industry, and 
growth intention (as an exclusion criteria). The second stage would have involved 
incorporating the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) in the analyses of interest. However, estimates 
of the IMRs were not significant in any of the models; therefore, only the results of single 
stage analyses are reported. In addition, because of the absence of data on owners who 
sought their banks’ opinion about the prospect of a formal application, control for self-
selection is impossible. With these limitations in mind, it is noted that extending our 
results beyond categories of discouragement defined above might be heroic. 
                                                          
7 The results presented in this paper, for brevity, is limited to comparison of informal turndowns and 
discouraged borrowers. The full result of multinomial probit model is available upon request. 
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4.4.4. Independent variables  
To model attributes of businesses facing informal turndown in relation to those of 
discouraged borrowers, the analysis employs three categories of independent variables: 
the structural risk of the business (that is, firm size and age), variables that represent the 
quality of relationship between entrepreneurs and lenders, and the firm’s need for capital. 
Structural properties. Firm size and age are included as factors that arguably relate to the 
probability of informal turndowns. These are variables that previous research has linked 
with borrower discouragement, either as proxies for the level of information asymmetry 
or for the level of the fixed portion of due diligence cost (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Freel 
et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009). Firm size and age were measured by categorical variables 
according to the number of employees and years since establishment. 
Quality of banking relationship. To capture the effect of relational lending, entrepreneurs’ 
self-reported level of satisfaction with the main bank was used as an independent 
variable. Previous research often employs either length of lender-borrower relationship or 
the absence/presence of a relationship. It seems reasonable to expect that, prior to making 
a formal application, owners with satisfactory bank relationships would be relatively 
more comfortable seeking counsel from their banks than owners with poor relationships. 
To this end, a categorical variable is included in the model that measures the business 
owner’s level of satisfaction with their banking relationship.  
The analysis controls for the presence of other financing sources used by the businesses. 
Xiang et al. (2015) show that success in obtaining other sources of finance is correlated 
with the likelihood of discouragement; likewise Cole and Sokolyk (2016) find similar 
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results related to the use of credit cards. Using additional credit facilities reduces 
information opacity, as banks already possess data on firm performance. To this end, the 
analyses employed here incorporated two dummy variables that measure whether (= 1) or 
not (= 0) the firm uses, respectively, overdrafts or credit cards8. 
Financing needs. It is anticipated that growing firms are more likely to make formal or 
informal contacts with their banks compared to firms in less need for financing. To reflect 
this, the model includes three elements of the firm’s growth strategy by including three 
dummy variables according to whether (= 1) or not (= 0) the firm is, respectively, an 
exporter, or a product or process innovator9,10. 
4.4.5. Control variables 
Control variables to account for attributes of the business and entrepreneur that might 
affect the likelihood of informal turndown included. Legal status of the businesses (single 
ownership, partnership and limited liability company), found by Freel et al. (2012) to be 
linked with the likelihood of discouragement. In addition, owner’s gender, his or her 
financial qualification, having a formal business plan and having regular financial 
statement are included as control variables.  
A categorical variable based on Dun & Bradstreet credit scores was employed to measure 
the risk of the firm as riskier borrowers are understood to be more likely to report 
                                                          
8 The usage of other sources of finance is captured by the survey. However, the low percentage of firms 
using financing sources other than overdrafts and credit cards does not allow inclusion in the analysis. 
9 Firms are innovators if, in the three years prior to conducting the survey, they introduced a new product to 
the market or a new business process in their practices. 
10 Growth intention variable was also included to test whether growth objectives affect the likelihood of 
informal turndown. The results did not differ. 
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discouragement (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016; Han et al., 2009; 
Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). 
4.5. Empirical findings 
4.5.1. Background 
Survey respondents who needed financing but who did not apply for financing (non-
applicants: N = 3,478) were asked to choose one from among several reasons for their 
unwillingness to make an application. Table 1 provided a breakdown of the responses, 
showing that 39 per cent of non-applicants eschewed an application because they feared 
rejection. It is this group of non-applicants that potentially qualify as discouraged 
borrowers according to Kon and Storey’s (2003) definition, although bad and good 
borrowers are not distinguished in our definition. In addition, 14 per cent of non-
applicants who desired credit but who had not applied for a loan reported having 
experienced an informal turndown. Extrapolating this result to the underlying population 
leads to an estimate of approximately 30,000 business owners who likely faced an 
informal turndown between 2010 and 2014.  
4.5.2. Univariate comparisons 
Table 2 shows the weighted descriptive statistics of all 80,265 firms in the sample, and 
subsamples corresponding to (N = 3,487) non-applicants who desire credit, (N = 1,189) 
discouraged borrowers (DBs), and (N = 548) informal turndowns (ITs). These data on all 
firms, after accounting for sample weights, is consistent with those for population 


















Sample sizea 80,265 3,487 1,189 548 
 Size 
     Zero employees  0.729 0.694 0.725 0.609 *** 
1–9 employees 0.228 0.274 0.251 0.349 *** 
10–49 employees 0.036 0.029 0.023 0.037 ** 
> 50 employees 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.005 
 Firm Age 
     Less than 2 years  0.202 0.271 0.283 0.173 *** 
2–5 years 0.227 0.282 0.309 0.289 
 6–9 years 0.148 0.133 0.134 0.135 
 10–15 years 0.148 0.115 0.103 0.170 *** 
> 15 years 0.275 0.199 0.171 0.233 *** 
Legal Status 
     Single owner 0.638 0.633 0.691 0.534 *** 
Partnership 0.047 0.045 0.052 0.045  
Limited liability 0.314 0.322 0.257 0.421 *** 
Entrepreneur     
 Female b 0.216 0.182 0.176 0.125 ** 
Financial qualification b 0.253 0.253 0.265 0.286  
Formal business plan b 0.323 0.409 0.379 0.531 *** 
Regular financial reportb 0.420 0.451 0.451 0.526 *** 
Strategy 
     Exporter b 0.082 0.113 0.070 0.169 *** 
Product innovator b 0.163 0.239 0.218 0.296 *** 
Process innovators b 0.342 0.453 0.409 0.554 *** 
Satisfaction with Bank      
Neutral 0.090 0.145 0.137 0.170 * 
Satisfied 0.812 0.571 0.539 0.425 *** 
Not satisfied 0.098 0.284 0.324 0.405 *** 
External Finance       
Overdraft b 0.197 0.312 0.285 0.379 *** 
Credit card b 0.173 0.237 0.234 0.304 *** 
Business Risk 
     Low 0.185 0.101 0.085 0.092 
Average 0.313 0.275 0.250 0.269  
High 0.501 0.624 0.665 0.639  
*, **, *** Significant at 0.1, 0.05, and .01 level. 
a sample size varies for business risk due to missing observations. 
b dummy variable equals to 1 for yes, 0 otherwise.  
The information on other categories of non-applicants, the Industry classification and location is supressed 
from the table, it is available on request. 
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows that discouraged borrowers (those who needed financing but did not apply 
for fear of being turned down) and firms that experienced informal turndowns differ in 
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several salient respects. Compared to discouraged borrowers (DBs), firms that had 
received informal turndowns (ITs): 
Differed significantly in terms of size and age, with ITs, on average, being older and 
larger than DBs. Start-ups, firms with less than two years from establishment, are more 
likely to be discouraged than to have been informally turned down; older firms are more 
likely to face informal turndowns. Firms with no employees reported a higher incidence 
of discouragement while firms with employees are more likely to face informal 
turndown.11 Single-owner firms are more likely to ration themselves by not applying for a 
loan; however, limited liability firms are more likely to contact their banks and face 
informal rejection. 
ITs were more likely to be exporters and innovators. That is, based on univariate 
comparisons, firms that undertake these growth strategies may be more likely to contact 
their banks searching for additional credit rather than to self-ration themselves. 
However, ITs are significantly more likely than DBs to rely on alternative sources of 
financing such as overdrafts and credit cards. On the one hand, use of overdrafts and 
(expensive) credit cards might be viewed negatively by prospective lenders, possibly 
resulting in informal turndowns. Conversely, having received a (verbal) turndown, these 
firms may be obliged to rely on alternative sources of capital. Moreover, that the 
proportion of ITs is higher among firms that use credit cards and an overdraft may 
                                                          
11 As a caveat, it is important to note that firms that informally contacted their banks and 
applied for a loan as a result of their discussion are not captured in the data. 
 166 
 
suggest that it is easier for these owners to contact informally their banks when there is 
some information about their credit history. 
Female entrepreneurs are more likely to fear rejection and are less likely to contact their 
banks.  
Entrepreneurs with a business plan and regular financial statements are relatively more 
confident and more likely to inquire to their banks about their prospects.  
The distribution of business risk profiles does not seem to differ between DBs and ITs, 
based on univariate comparisons. 
Finally, while most firms are satisfied with their relationship with their banks, univariate 
comparisons between DBs and ITs shows that the proportion of satisfied firms is higher 
among DBs and the proportion of unsatisfied firms is, perhaps understandably, higher 
among ITs.  
4.5.3. Multivariate analyses 
Applicants and non-applicants  
The first step in the analysis was to estimate multivariate models that compare the 
characteristics of actual applicants with those of firms that needed credit but did not make 
an official request for any of the reasons reason stated in Table 1. The correction for 
sample selection bias was not statistically significant. The results are shown in the 





Applicants (=1) vs Non-
applicants (=0) 








  Standard 
Error 
Size (ref a: zero employees)       
1-9 employees 0.162 ** 0.075 -0.011 
 
0.136 
10-49 employees 0.321 *** 0.097 -0.258 
 
0.178 
More than 50 employees 0.722 *** 0.119 -0.604 *** 0.218 







2-5 years -0.201 ** 0.100 -0.046 
 
0.171 










more than 15 years 0.077 
 
0.112 -0.407 ** 0.193 






























Formal business plan b 0.137 * 0.071 0.084 
 
0.127 






























   Satisfied 0.157 
 
0.109 -0.785 *** 0.183 










Overdraft b 0.133 * 0.071 -0.252 ** 0.124 
Credit card b 0.210 *** 0.074 0.022 
 
0.128 





average risk -0.206 ** 0.094 0.156 
 
0.174 
High risk -0.239 *** 0.092 0.360 ** 0.167 










0.123 0.561 ** 0.222 
Wholesale, retail, Hotel, etc. -0.172 
 
0.116 0.372 * 0.216 
Real Estate and business activities -0.351 *** 0.124 0.386 * 0.229 

















Applicants (=1) vs Non-
applicants (=0) 








  Standard 
Error 
Prob>F 0.000     0.000     
Number of observations 5,911   2,580   
Estimated population 276,993     88,664     
*,**,*** Significant at 0.1,0.05, and .01 level 
 a Ref is the reference class for categorical variable. The reference variable for sector and location is, 
respectively, agriculture and the rest of the UK. 
 b is a dummy variable equals to 1 for yes 
 
Table 4.3. One-stage probit regression models of applications and rejections 
The findings reported in Table 3 indicate that size of firm is a major factor in determining 
the likelihood of making an application, with larger firms being significantly more likely 
to make formal loan applications than smaller firms. Moreover, start-ups and firms with 
high risk ratings are significantly less likely to make formal applications. Firms with 
formal business plans are more likely to apply for loans (however, such plans are often 
required as part of loan application packages). Using either overdrafts or credit cards 
increased the likelihood of making an official application for bank loans when credit was 
needed. This could be the effect of previous experience and success in securing external 
finance. Finally, the level of satisfaction with the lender relationship is not significantly 
related to the probability of applying for a loan.  
Approval vs. rejection  
The right-most panel of Table 3 shows the results of estimation of a binary probit model 
of the outcome of loan application. In this model, large firms (more than 50 employees) 
and older firms (more than 15 years) are relatively less likely to face rejection than 
smaller firms and start-ups. Higher-risk firms are more likely to face rejection than firms 
with low risk rating. Combined with the loan application model, it seems high risk firms 
are less likely to make loan applications but they face higher rates of (formal) rejection, 
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compared to low risk firms. Not surprisingly, the level of satisfaction and probability of 
rejection are significantly negatively correlated, with rejected firms reporting lower levels 
of satisfaction. Firms that use overdrafts at their banks are less likely to face rejection, 
possibly reflecting lenders’ prior experience with the applicant. 
 
Discouraged borrowers and informal turndowns  
Table 4 presents the results of estimates of multinomial probit regression models of the 
relative likelihood of informal turndown relative to discouraged borrowers (Base 
category). Four models are presented in this table. Model 1 includes control variables, 
firms size and age; the second panel shows the results of the estimation when the model is 
augmented with the measure of the quality of banking relationship; the third model is 
augmented with strategy measures, and the final panel shows the additional impact of 
credit risk rating. Credit risk rating is missing for 15 percent of observations in the 
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Estimate   
Standard 
Error 
Size (ref a: zero employees)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  



























Business Age (ref: < two year)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  














10-15 years 0.658 *** 0.239 0.640 *** 0.239 0.641 *** 0.240 0.512 * 0.283 
more than 15 years 0.632 *** 0.208 0.600 *** 0.212 0.609 *** 0.213 0.561 ** 0.243 
Legal Status (ref: limited 
liability)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  















0.261 -0.512 * 0.294 
Entrepreneur   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Business mainly ran by femaleb -0.324 * 0.186 -0.328 * 0.186 -0.329 * 0.186 -0.254 
 
0.206 









Formal business plan b 0.297 ** 0.137 0.289 ** 0.137 0.256 * 0.139 0.270 * 0.148 









Satisfaction with main bank 
(ref: Neutral)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Satisfied   
 
  -0.310 * 0.176 -0.314 * 0.175 -0.243 
 
0.195 
Not satisfied   
 







Use of external finance source    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Overdraft   
 







Credit card   
 







Strategy   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Exporter b   
 
    
 
  0.174 
 
0.210 0.395 * 0.220 
Process innovator b   
 
    
 
  0.235 
 
0.148 0.319 * 0.164 
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Product innovators b   
 
    
 





Risk (ref: low risk)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Average risk   
 
    
 
    
 
  0.263 
 
0.232 
High risk   
 
    
 
    
 
  0.340 
 
0.226 
Control Variables   
 
    
 
    
 





















Wholesale, retail, Hotel, 



















Health, social work and other 









London -0.423 ** 0.189 -0.397 ** 0.187 -0.407 ** 0.188 -0.455 ** 0.201 


















Number of observation 3298     3298     3298     2885     
Estimated population 213230 
 
  213230 
 
  213230 
 
  173568 
 
  
Prob>F 0.0001     0     0     0     
*,**,*** Significant at 0.1,0.05, and .01 level 
a ref is the reference class for categorical variable. The reference variable for sector and location is, respectively, agriculture and the rest of the UK. 
b is a dummy variable equals to 1 for yes 
The base model includes only control variables (prob>F = 0.024). In the first step, firm size is added to the model. None of the categories of size was 
statistically significant (prob> F= 0.006). For brevity, these two models as well as comparison of other reasons of being non-applicants comparing to fear of 
rejection are not reported. Full results are available upon request.   
 




Looking at the left-most panel, firm size does not seem to differentiate informal 
turndowns from discouraged borrowers. Although firm size is inversely associated with 
the probability of eschewing a loan application when the firm needs credit, it is not a 
discriminator between firms who experienced informal turndowns and discouraged 
borrowers due to fear of rejection. The first hypothesis, therefore, is not supported. 
Older firms are significantly more likely than younger firms to report informal 
turndowns, rather than discouragement. That is, older firms seem better able to seek their 
banks’ opinion informally before postponing the official loan application. This finding 
partially confirms the second hypothesis. It also speaks to the debate about the link 
between relational lending and the probability of discouragement. Given that older firms 
have longer relationships with their banks, the positive association of business age on the 
probability of informal turndown, compared to discouragement, shows that younger firms 
are more likely to self-ration themselves. Among firms that elect not to apply, older firms 
are more likely to contact their banks and enquire about the possibility of a successful 
application rather than rely on their own perception. 
Looking at the Model 2, the result shows that the entrepreneur’s reported level of 
satisfaction with relational banking is a statistically significant discriminator between 
informal turndowns and discouraged borrowers, however, unlike what it was speculated.  
The entrepreneurs who report satisfactory relationship with their banks are more likely to 
report discouragement due to fear of rejection. This can be explained that firms that have 
good relationship with their banks are aware of the availability of the credit; therefore, 
they act upon their own judgement and do not initiate an informal process. It is expected 
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that use of overdraft and credit card variables partially reflect the amount of information 
banks have about their customers. These variables are significant in determining the 
probability of making an application and getting approval but they do not discriminate 
significantly between discouraged borrowers and informal turndowns. The statistically 
significant relationship between the quality of banking relationship and the probability of 
receiving informal turndown disappears once the credit risk rating is included in the 
model (model 4). It is worth noting that credit risk is missing mainly for smaller and 
younger firms. Therefore, the inclusion of risk rating may change the results in favour of 
more established firms.  
Turning to model 3, exports and innovative activities do not seem to significantly be 
related to the probability of receiving informal turndown. Once the credit risk rating is 
included in the model 4, exporters and process innovators are more likely to experience 
informal turndowns. These results partially confirm the fourth hypothesis that owners 
who need credit most, for example to finance export activities or improve one aspect of 
their business practices, are less likely to be discouraged as a result of their own 
judgement. Surprisingly, product innovation is not significantly different, perhaps 
because entrepreneurs understand that banks do not fund high risk projects.  
Looking at the model 4, it seems that credit risk rating does not discriminate between 
informal turndown and discouraged borrowers. Given that these findings are in the 
context of firms that avoid applying to banks, it may be that credit risk is not completely 
efficient at deterring bad borrowers and attracting good ones, although higher risk firms 
are more likely to avoid formal applications (Table 3).  
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Businesses owned by female entrepreneurs are significantly less likely to experience ITs. 
This implies that women tend to rely on their own opinions and not to verify their views 
with their banks. However, the effect of gender diminishes when business risk is taken 
into account (Model 4), which also addresses a disagreement within the literature on 
discouraged borrowers. Some previous research shows that female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to avoid applying for loans due to fear of being declined (Cavalluzzo et al., 
2002; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015), while others claim no 
gender difference. This suggests a complex relationship among discouragement, risk 
profile of female-owned firms, and age/size of the firms.  
Finally, firms with formal business plans, in all models, are significantly more likely to 
face informal turndowns. It may be that having a business plan gives confidence to the 
entrepreneur to ask his or her bank’s opinion. Alternatively, a business plan may 
comprise an informal substitute for a formal loan application, leading to an informal 
turndown.  
4.5.4. Robustness  
To test the reliability of these findings, several additional tests were undertaken. First, the 
correlations among variables were reviewed, finding that no two variables were closely 
correlated with each other. In addition, multicollinearity problems do not seem to be a 
substantive issue within the multivariate modelling as all variance inflation factors (VIFs) 




4.6. Conclusions and implication 
Drawing upon the UK Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor Survey 
(2011–2015), this research investigates the profile of SME owners who are discouraged 
from borrowing by their banks as a consequence of an informal loan turndown. Although 
entrepreneurial finance has recently paid attention to the latent demand of loan markets, 
the reasons behind discouragement generally remain unclear. However, it appears that 
informal loan turndowns represent a portion of this phenomenon.  
This research compared the characteristics of firms that reported informal turndown (ITs) 
with those firms that reported discouragement due to a subjective fear of rejection (DBs). 
While ITs rely on their banks’ opinions to avoid costs of application and the potential 
consequences of rejected applications, DBs decisions are based on their own judgements. 
This work hypothesizes that (among non-applicants who need external finance) older and 
larger firms, firms that have better relationship with their banks, and firms that are in 
more need of credit are in better position to enquire with their banks about the potential 
outcome of an application and would be, therefore, relatively more likely to experience an 
informal turndown. Three hypotheses were partially, but not fully, confirmed. A caveat to 
this work is that it remains unclear what percentage of official applications are the result 
of informal approvals.  
Hypothesized to be a factor in the likelihood of informal turndowns, firm size was not 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of informal turndown. Conceptually the scale 
of a loan seemed to be a reasonable precursor of the likelihood of informal turndown, as 




An interesting finding of this research is the effect of business age in discriminating 
among the reasons for postponing formal loan applications. Business age, possibly a 
proxy for the amount of information available to banks, shows mixed effects on 
discouragement in the literature. While some researchers do not find a significant effect 
of age on probability of discouragement (Chandler, 2010; Freel et al., 2012), others report 
negative effects (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 
2016; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). Surprisingly, Han et al. (2009) find that older firms are 
more likely to be discouraged. In this work, the effect of business age is explained 
through its link with the businesses’ relationships with banks. Specifically, most UK 
firms are satisfied with their banks and they do not change their banks often. The older a 
firm gets, the more likely it is to have a working and established relationship with its 
bank. This work reports that owners of older firms seek confidential opinion from their 
banks more often, being more frequently informally turned down. Younger firms, on the 
other hand, are more likely to fear rejection, or, perhaps, they don’t yet have a specified 
account manager (Chandler, 2010). Given that young firms are also among successful 
loan applicants, addressing discouragement among young firms might be more fruitful 
than a more general approach. 
In addition, the work includes measures of the quality of banking relationship. The 
literature has partially confirmed that having better relationship with banks reduces the 
propensity of discouragement (Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009; Freel et al., 2012). Han 
et al. (2009) reported that longer relationships with banks increase the probability of 
discouragement for bad borrowers and decrease the likelihood for good borrower. 
Therefore, they conclude that discouragement is an efficient sorting tool. Nonetheless, the 
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previous research is equivocal as some research shows no significant or negative effects 
of relational lending on discouragement (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Chandler, 2010; 
Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016). Using a set of variables that control for 
the quality of the relationship between SME owners, this research finds among non-
applicants who need credit, having a satisfactory relationship with banks could increase 
the probability of discouragement due to fear of rejection. Business owners who are 
happy with their banks potentially are aware of their own creditworthiness and the 
availability of the loan, therefore, they could anticipate rejection if a formal or informal 
applications were to be advanced.   
 In terms of the need for capital, exporter firms and process innovators were linked with 
higher probabilities of informal turndowns. Growing firms are more likely to seek 
external finance but face higher probabilities of rejection (Riding et al. 2012; Freel 2007; 
Lee 2014). For these firms, financing needs are so acute that they do not settle on their 
own judgement on the outcome of finance applications. 
The main limitation of the research is that the data do not reveal which applicants, having 
spoken with their respective loan account managers, applied for a bank loan. Nor do we 
know the outcomes of those applications. Therefore, our analysis is only able to compare 
the various types of discouraged borrowers. Nonetheless, this work has established the 
presence of an additional category of SME owners who otherwise might have seemed to 
be discouraged borrowers, but who actually eschew loan applications for just cause. This 
is a finding that at the very least, reduces the scale and scope of what might otherwise be 
considered a market imperfection associated with the presence of discouraged borrowers. 
These findings provide initial insights about informal turndowns—a phenomenon about 
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which little is known—thereby helping to develop a yet better understanding of 
discouraged borrowers and the dynamics of the SME-commercial lender relationship. 
Further research is required to explore the outcomes of informal discussions between 
potential borrowers and their banks and advance a theoretical framework for examining 
the efficiency of such informal discussions. Furthermore, the mediatory role of longer/ 
better banking relationship in ameliorating lending market efficiency through informal 
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